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from the failed response to Hurricane Katrina and other interjuris-
dictional problems to illustrate this conflict, the Article demonstrates
how the trajectory set by the New Federalism’s “strict-separationist”
model of dual sovereignty inhibits effective governance in these con-
texts.  In addition to the anti-tyranny, pro-accountability, and local-
ism-protective values of federalism, the Article identifies a problem-
solving value inherent in the capacity requirement of American feder-
alism’s subsidiarity principle (that regulatory decisionmaking should
take place at the most local level possible).  The progression of federal-
ism models informing Supreme Court interpretation over the 20th
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century reflects a pendulum-like attempt to reach the proper balance
between these competing values.  Although the Court’s federalism ju-
risprudence during the New Deal era prioritized the problem-solving
value over the “check-and-balance” anti-tyranny value, the New Fed-
eralism decisions exalt the check-and-balance value at the expense of
the problem-solving (and all other) values, protecting the bright line
posited between mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal regu-
latory authority.
Interjurisdictional problems uncomfortably blur that boundary,
pitting problem-solving and checks-and-balances against one another
by demanding both local and national regulatory attention.  But it
is arguably the tension between these values that has made our sys-
tem of government so robust—enabling it to adjust for changing
demographics, technologies, and expectations without losing its es-
sential character.  The New Federalism’s focus on checks and bal-
ances above all else compromises its ability to effectively mediate this
critical competition, sacrificing other federalism values and ob-
structing even desirable regulatory activity in the interjurisdictional
gray area (such as federal initiative that might have been taken in
the wake of Katrina).  The comparatively pragmatic cooperative fed-
eralism model affords some balance, but is critiqued by New Federal-
ism proponents as providing insufficient checks.
To remedy the theoretical problems left unresolved by cooperative
federalism and the pragmatic ones caused by New Federalism, this
Article argues that the Court should adopt a model of Balanced Fed-
eralism that better mediates between competing federalism values and
provides greater guidance for regulatory decisionmaking in the in-
terjurisdictional gray area.  Where the New Federalism asks the
Tenth Amendment to police a stylized boundary between state and
federal authority from crossover by either side, Balanced Federalism
asks the Tenth Amendment to patrol regulatory activity within the
gray area for impermissible compromises of fundamental federalism
values.  The Article concludes by introducing the outlines of a juris-
prudential standard for interpreting Tenth Amendment claims
within a model of Balanced Federalism dual sovereignty that affords
both checks and balance.  Such a framework would foster a healthier
dialectic between the various federalism values that, though in ten-
sion with one another, have made our system of government so effec-
tive and enduring.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In perhaps the most famous rhetorical gesture of the New Feder-
alism,1 Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that “[t]he Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”2  And yet,
even conceding the value of the federalism principles thereby im-
plied, we have yet to seriously reckon with the question that hangs
after the rhetorical satiety dissipates: What about everything in between?
The question makes a simple point about a complex body of jurispru-
dence—the Supreme Court’s controversial “New Federalism” deci-
sions—which, in essence, is that the New Federalism breeds
controversy precisely because it imposes an overly simple theoretical
model on a complex area of law.  Just as such critical legal fields as
environmental, public health, and national security law have begun to
embrace the need for greater interconnectivity in the management of
regulatory problems that span multiple jurisdictions, the New Federal-
ism decisions chart a course toward greater jurisdictional separation,
setting the stage for conflict and confusion.  This Article argues that
American federalism can ably weather this storm, but it will require
1. In the standard litany of the New Federalism decisions, the Court addressed: (1)
the extent of the federal commerce power, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
627 (2000) (invalidating a section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA));
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (overturning the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 as beyond the scope of commerce power); but see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
32–33 (2005) (affirming federal authority to proscribe intrastate production and use of
medical marijuana despite contrary state law); (2) the extent of Congress’s power under
the post-Civil War Amendments, see, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(finding that the pecuniary remedy in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
did not satisfy the requirements of congruence and proportionality, which are needed to
establish a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment), Mor-
rison, 529 U.S. at 627 (refusing to sustain a section of the VAWA under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment), Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000) (con-
cluding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) is “not ‘appropri-
ate legislation’ under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment”), City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA) exceeded Congress’s authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); (3) the extent of Congress’s ability to command state executive branch and legisla-
tive activity, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that
Congress may not compel state and local law enforcement to implement a federal regula-
tory program), New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that the
Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from “commandeering” state legislative action under
a federal regulatory program); but see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (finding
that a federal law regulating state action did not commandeer state legislative and adminis-
trative process); and (4) the extent of state sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (limiting Congress’s power to authorize suits against state govern-
ments in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (limiting Con-
gress’s power to authorize suits against state governments in federal courts).  For further
discussion, see infra Part III.A.
2. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (emphasis added).
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that we (1) recognize the interjurisdictional zone that so complicates
the project; (2) better understand the tensions between underlying
federalism values there exacerbated; and (3) articulate an adminis-
trable means of mediating between them so as to best realize the ulti-
mate objectives of our constitutional design.
This the New Federalism fails to do, as have preceding interpre-
tive movements that espoused similar ideals until they too were over-
come by competing federalism concerns for which their theories
could not account.  In this most recent round, the Court’s reasoning
has proceeded from a model of state-federal relations based on a se-
vere construction of dual sovereignty, the constitutional principle by
which regulatory authority is allocated between the independently
functioning federal and state governments.  Under this strict-separa-
tionist model, state and federal governments are idealized as operat-
ing in mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction, without overlap.
Regulatory matters are styled as properly local or national concerns,
state and federal authority is segregated accordingly, and the Tenth
Amendment polices the supposed bright-line boundary between
them.  The distinguishing characteristics of the New Federalism deci-
sions are premised on this ideal, which stands in contrast to much of
the existing map of American government (so characterized by areas
of concurrent or interlocking state and federal jurisdiction that its
dual sovereignty has been likened to the intertwining layers of a mar-
ble cake3).  Nevertheless, the New Federalism’s approach has altered
the American federalism discourse, changing the way we think about
the allocation of state and federal authority in modern regulatory
endeavors.
Although they have attracted intense academic attention, these
changes are hardly esoteric matters of interest only to judges and law
professors.  For better or worse (and in different respects, probably
both), they would alter the way that Congress approaches lawmaking,4
3. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
4. Whether the lines of influence primarily run from the Court’s decisions to Con-
gressional legislation or vice versa is a chicken-and-egg problem over which much ink has
been spilled.  Still, when state actions or statutes are invalidated by the Supreme Court,
Congress often seeks to repair the infirmity with conforming legislation. See, e.g., Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (authorizing the
President to prosecute enemy combatants in military tribunals in direct response to
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), which invalidated the practice for lack of
congressional authorization). The Court’s federalism jurisprudence appears similarly moti-
vating, as suggested by the care with which the 1994 Congress crafted the “federal interest”
provision of the VAWA (albeit unsuccessfully, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613–14), presuma-
bly in response to the anticipated critique in Lopez of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 for failure to assert a constitutionally valid federal interest.  (After a multiplicity of
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and the way that the Executive approaches administration.5  At least
in the latter case, the answer may well be “for worse” because, by many
accounts, the ideals associated with the New Federalism’s project of
better differentiating state from national authority may have contrib-
uted to the delayed federal response to the devastating aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.  News reports indicate that, as
pressure mounted on the White House to assume responsibility for
key tasks not performed at the local level, the federal response was
paralyzed as senior advisors stalled in debate over the federalism im-
plications of providing the needed assistance.6  This Article takes the
Katrina aftermath as a primary example of how the New Federalism’s
ideological trajectory7 can obstruct interjurisdictional problem-solving
by confusing, rather than clarifying, the proper roles of national and
local regulatory authorities.  But the Katrina aftermath is only the
most mediagenic example of confusion spawned by the New Federal-
ism’s intolerance for interjurisdictional complexity.  Similar confusion
has arisen in other like contexts, ranging from environmental to an-
titerrorism programs, resulting in uncertain policymaking efforts and
New Federalism-inspired legal challenges to regulatory partnerships
that link state and federal actors in related spheres of authority.8
Challenging the strict-separationist premise that all regulatory is-
sues can be clearly characterized as matters of either local or national
jurisdiction, this Article suggests that some regulatory targets are bet-
amendments, the VAWA was passed by the House and Senate in late August and signed
into law on September 13, 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, before Lopez was decided
in April 1995 but after the relevant briefing had been submitted on June 2, 1994 (Brief for
the United States, 1994 WL 242541), July 19, 1994 (Brief for Respondent, 1994 WL
396915), and August 17, 1994 (Reply Brief for the United States, 1994 WL 449691).) But
see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (invalidating Congress’s attempt to reverse the effect of a prior
Supreme Court decision with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).  Although it
is difficult to assert a definitive causal direction in the dialectic between legislative and
judicial decisionmaking, the New Federalism’s ideals seek to impact decisionmaking at
both levels, and have been embraced by decisionmakers at both levels. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing the role of federalism considerations in the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina).
6. See infra Part II.B.  Interestingly, the public castigation that the federal government
received for its failed Katrina response suggests that the New Federalism has not changed
the way that large sectors of the public think about the respective roles of state and federal
government.
7. The strict-separation ideal extrapolated from the New Federalism decisions ex-
ceeds their doctrinal impact at present, and we continue to operate from within a predomi-
nantly cooperative federalism system. See infra Part V.B.3.  Nevertheless, it has already
infiltrated the regulatory mindset of policymakers. See infra Part II.B.  As such, the strict-
separationist trajectory of New Federalism warrants scrutiny now, before its culmination
further complicates our ongoing navigation of good governance.
8. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.1.b.
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ter understood within a separate, interjurisdictional sphere that legiti-
mately implicates both local and national responsibility.  As defined
here, an “interjurisdictional regulatory problem”9 is one whose mean-
ingful resolution demands action from both state and federal regula-
tory authorities, either because neither has all of the jurisdiction
necessary to address the problem as a legal matter,10 or because the
problem so implicates both local and national expertise that the same
is true as a factual matter.11  Because assigning responsibility for man-
agement of such a problem to the exclusive attention of either the
local or national government is an ultimately arbitrary endeavor,12 the
better criteria for federalism consideration is whether regulation
within this interjurisdictional “gray area” ultimately advances or de-
tracts from the full panoply of federalism values that underscore
Tenth Amendment dual sovereignty.  But the New Federalism ap-
proach vindicates some of these values to the exclusion of others, thus
threatening the ability of state and federal government to cope with
complex problems in adherence to a strict-separationist vision that
misses the full federalism target.
Interjurisdictional problems pose special difficulty for federalism
because their circumstances exacerbate inherent tension between the
underlying values of American federalism, principally the promotion
of government accountability, the checks and balances that dual sov-
ereignty affords against tyranny, and the socially desirable benefits as-
9. In recognition that not every public quandary ranks among the “regulatory
problems” with which we are here concerned, I note that for the purposes of this piece,
“regulatory problems” are those associated with the classic targets anticipated by adminis-
trative law—such as market failures, negative externalities, and other collective action
problems reasonably susceptible to efficient resolution by government activity. See infra
Part IV.
10. An example of this type of de jure interjurisdictional regulatory problem is the
regulation of stormwater pollution. See infra Part IV.A.1.
11. Examples of such de facto interjurisdictional regulatory problems include the regu-
lation of air pollution and domestic efforts to combat terrorist attacks from abroad. See
infra Part IV.A.2.
12. Establishing precise boundaries around the category of interjurisdictional regula-
tory problems invites disagreement, ranging from dispute over whether a given problem
truly implicates both local and national concern to dispute over whether the given prob-
lem is truly amenable to a regulatory solution.  I leave such legitimate arguments aside for
the purpose of this piece, which introduces an interjurisdictional conceptual framework to
the federalism discourse through a sample of problems that meet the criteria in a relatively
uncontroversial manner.  They are uncontroversial because they address matters that have
remained targets of regulatory response over time, and because most would agree that they
implicate the obligation or expertise of both a local and a national actor.  As discussed
infra in Part IV, these include a variety of environmental and land use problems, natural
disaster management issues, public health crises, and counterterrorism and national secur-
ity matters.
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sociated with the protection of local autonomy (including regional
diversity, regulatory efficiency, and innovation yielded by interjurisdic-
tional competition).  Each value represents an underlying principle of
good government that we ask federalism to help us realize, and each is
claimed in support of the need for judicially enforceable federalism
constraints.13  But in addition to these more familiar values, the feder-
alism premise of as-localized-as-possible governance (or “subsidiarity”)
incorporates an often overlooked problem-solving value.  Directing
that public decisionmaking take place at the most local level possible
implies the most local level with capacity—or the most local level of
government that may actually be able to solve the problem.  Tensions
exist between the satisfaction of each of these values in any given
model of federalism, but a central federalism tension is located be-
tween the anti-tyranny “check-and-balance” value and the underap-
preciated “problem-solving” value.14
Indeed, the historic progression of the various models of federal-
ism that informed Supreme Court interpretation over the twentieth
century reflects a pendulum-like attempt to achieve the proper bal-
ance between underlying federalism values, each model perhaps
overcompensating for the excesses of its predecessor.15  After the
Great Depression crippled the capacity of state and local governments
to cope with unprecedented levels of social and economic despair, the
Supreme Court adopted a model of federalism that exalted the prob-
lem-solving value at the expense of the check-and-balance value to ap-
prove pragmatic New Deal legislative programs that expanded federal
jurisdiction into traditionally local arenas.  Cooperative federalism,
the predominant model of federalism since World War II, recovers
some of the balance through a partnership-based approach to regula-
tion in areas of interjurisdictional overlap, allowing state and federal
governments to take responsibility for interlocking components of a
collaborative regulatory program.  However, cooperative federalism
has also been criticized as an overly pragmatic model that insuffi-
ciently protects anti-tyranny values.16  Responding to concerns that co-
operative federalism is, at best, undertheorized (and at worst, more
coercive than collaborative), the New Federalism reestablishes the
supremacy of the check-and-balance value over all others in an effort
to bolster the line between state and federal authority against pres-
13. See infra Part V.A.
14. See infra Part V.A.4.
15. See infra Part V.B.
16. See infra Part V.B.3.
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sures (some perhaps political, others genuinely interjurisdictional)
that would blur the boundary.
Demanding attention from both a national and local actor, in-
terjurisdictional problems do blur that boundary, pitting concerns
about tyranny and needs for pragmatism against one another.  But it
is arguably the tension between federalism’s check-and-balance and
problem-solving values that has made our system such a robust form
of government—enabling it to adjust for changing demographics,
technologies, and expectations without losing its essential character.
A model of federalism that engages these tensions is a model that can
endure.  But the New Federalism’s focus on preserving bright-line
boundaries above all else renders it unable to effectively mediate the
competition between federalism values, contributing to a governmen-
tal ethos that obstructs even desirable regulatory activity in the in-
terjurisdictional gray area (such as federal initiative that might have
been taken in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).  Taken to its ex-
treme, the New Federalism model can lead to jurisdictional gridlock,
posing obstacles to novel approaches to interjurisdictional regulatory
partnerships17 and discouraging efficient responses to some of soci-
ety’s most pressing problems.18
In this ironic respect, the New Federalism simply does what New
Deal federalism did in the opposite direction—shortchanging the
problem-solving value in the name of the check-and-balance value,
which it mistakes for federalism generally.  In so doing, the New Fed-
eralism lays too proprietary a claim to the essence of American feder-
alism itself—implying that faithfulness to the Constitution requires its
approach and only its approach, when federalism is really a more vari-
egated institution.  Exploration of how different models of American
federalism have variously prioritized different values over time reveals
New Federalism’s approach as merely one alternative among many,
each true to constitutional design in its unique vindication of the fun-
damental federalism values.  Like so many other constitutional con-
17. For example, the innovative state-federal partnership created by the Clean Water
Act’s Phase II Stormwater Rule, though negotiated with the participation of the states over
a ten-year period, was challenged fiercely (though unsuccessfully) on Tenth Amendment
grounds. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 843–45 (9th Cir. 2003); National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution
Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,724, 68,743
(Dec. 8, 1999); see also infra Part IV.A.1.b.
18. For example, federalism-related concerns may have frustrated a more efficient reg-
ulatory response during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. See infra Part II.B.
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cepts, then, federalism ultimately invites interpretive choices.19  As
such, we should invest in the jurisprudential development of a federal-
ism model that more explicitly (and capably) balances all competing
values than have New Deal federalism, cooperative federalism, and
New Federalism, enabling a structure of governance that best realizes
the demands we make upon our political institutions.
There is, of course, a wide range of views on what those demands
should rightly be.  Some advocate for ambitious regulatory problem-
solving,20 others for a government that limits itself to as little interfer-
ence with private activity as possible.21  Some, chafing against New
19. Of course, some argue that the only valid interpretation is that of the original ar-
chitects of the constitution, and that anything else reflects “judicial activism,” or inappro-
priate judicial aggrandizement. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 283–84,
363–70 (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 46 (1997); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 824–25 (1986); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (1988); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Consti-
tution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).  If textual directives prove problematic over time (for example,
the original Constitution’s tacit approval of slavery or dated plans for federal taxation), the
appropriate response is not to engage in interpretive “subterfuge” but to correct the defect
by formal amendment (for example, the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Amendments, respec-
tively). U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XVI. See William Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitu-
tion: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209
(1983).
Scholars from opposing schools of thought argue that all constitutional interpretive
choices—including “originalist” interpretations—are equally subject to the hermeneutic
biases of the interpreter by virtue of the pockets of ambiguity inherently embedded within
written texts. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1032–34 (2002) (asserting that incorpora-
tion of historical understanding into modern constitutional interpretation is an “ir-
reducibly normative” endeavor); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of
the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 287 (2004) (reviewing the “vast
body of primary historical materials . . . that support a spectrum of constitutional meaning”
and the accordingly futile project of constraining judicial interpretation with originalist
principles); see also Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It
Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (1977); Robert Post, Theories of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990, at 13.  Although none dispute the
proper recourse to amendment for correcting clearly defective textual provisions, they ar-
gue that some degree of interpretive lawmaking is a necessary part of the judicial function
in applying vague constitutional commands to new controversies. See, e.g., Laurence H.
Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 68–72 (discussing the
problem of choosing the correct “level of abstraction” at which constitutional clauses
should be construed).  This Article proceeds from the latter assumption in finding deliber-
ate interpretive space in the model of dual sovereignty implied by the Constitution, most
directly in the text of the Tenth Amendment.
20. E.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (endorsing
regulatory approach to many environmental problems).
21. E.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (rev.
ed. 1978).
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Federalism excess, have suggested that American federalism is itself an
anachronistic artifact of earlier times, which may as well fade into the
same obscurity to which the distinction between law and equity has
retired.22  But the suggestion is as unlikely as it would be unwise.23  In
the United States, the real issue is not whether federalism but what kind
of federalism best serves the hopes and needs that we hang on the
continued vitality of our system of government.  My first proposition is
thus positivist but value-neutral: regardless of our competing views on
what constitutes good government, we should recognize that the inter-
pretive model of federalism we embrace is linked with this determina-
tion, as different blends of the foundational federalism values will
foster distinctive characteristics in governance.
Acknowledging that reasonable minds will disagree on the char-
acteristics of ideal government, I nevertheless take a normative stance
in my criticism of the New Federalism ideals, making the Article’s sec-
ond proposition less value-neutral.  In critiquing strict-separationist
dual sovereignty’s failure to account for the interjurisdictional gray
area, I proceed from the assumption that good government should
address those market failures, negative externalities, and other collec-
tive action problems that individuals are ill-equipped to resolve on
their own and that so threaten public welfare as to warrant a regula-
tory response24 despite the libertarian-highlighted risks that inher-
22. For example, Edward Rubin has observed that
[f]ederalism is indeed worth discussing; it is a basic, truly fundamental ques-
tion of political organization.  Fortunately, the United States has not needed to
confront this question, as a matter of practical politics, for nearly a century.  That
is what makes it so much fun to talk about.  Like a healthy person talking about
medical care, a congenitally thin person talking about dieting, or a rich person
talking about money problems, we can lavish exuberant attention on the subject
without any sense of urgency or danger. . . .  [T]here is also an intrinsic pleasure
in talking about how much one has of something that one does not need, and
that other people desperately require.
Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009,
1010 (1997).
23. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213–23 (1998) (arguing in favor of American federalism’s contin-
ued vitality despite cogent criticism of the New Federalism approach in the Tenth Amend-
ment context); cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 951 (1994) (conceding, despite skepticism, that the states
serve beneficial roles as mechanisms of decentralization and that American federalism
might retain value for reasons of historical and cultural identity).
24. The most basic examples include the provision of common defense, the policing of
border-crossing harms, and the facilitation of efficiency in commerce. See supra note 9; R
infra part IV.A.
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ently attend the exercise of governmental authority.25  As we face
interjurisdictional problems that meet these criteria, we deserve a
model of federalism that anticipates the competition between federal-
ism values that will arise in the interjurisdictional gray area so invisible
to New Federalism.
The New Federalism’s separationist project is evident in decisions
contesting both the scope of Congress’s affirmative powers and the
negative structural limitations on federal power, but it is the Tenth
Amendment that most directly represents the constitutional dual sov-
ereignty directive,26 and in which strict-separationist interpretive
choices are rooted.  Accordingly, this piece focuses on the Tenth
Amendment cases to highlight their overarching implication that the
check-and-balance value is the only federalism value worth protecting.
These decisions interpret the relatively ambiguous Tenth Amend-
ment27 as the arbiter of a bright-line boundary between exclusive state
and national jurisdiction, even at the interjurisdictional margin that
belies such clarity.  The New Federalism’s doctrinal and rhetorical em-
phasis on strict separation should concern us because, though the
boundary may often be well-drawn, contemporary society increasingly
faces regulatory dilemmas of the interjurisdictional variety that war-
rant more sophisticated consideration by Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence.  In a mature model of dual sovereignty, Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence would focus less on protecting the bright line where it
is illusory and more on adjudicating whether regulation in the in-
terjurisdictional gray area unduly compromises the federalism values
that underlie constitutional dual sovereignty itself.  Such adjudication
would require the development of the same kinds of jurisprudential
standards that enable more sophisticated interpretation of most provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights, including such apparent bright-line consti-
tutional dictates as “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”28
25. E.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 21, at 45–69 (outlining the dangers of state power ac- R
cumulation for private property rights and personal freedoms).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
27. As famously observed by then-Justice Stone, the Tenth Amendment is a textually
circular proposition, stating “but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered.”  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This sophistication has led to various tests for varying cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (articu-
lating one of many standards for determining when the government may abridge freedom
of speech and holding that core political speech may only be constitutionally abridged
when directed to produce imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action);
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At present, cooperative federalism still predominates in large ar-
eas of American law (such as environmental law,29 telecommunica-
tions regulation,30 products liability,31 and consumer finance law32),
but New Federalism ideals have posed a formidable challenge.  Legal
questions that seemed settled are newly uncertain, and it remains un-
clear whether the revolution that began in 1992 with New York v.
United States33 will soon taper or expand its reach.34  This Article ar-
gues that we should take what lessons are worthy from the New Feder-
alism experiment—perhaps the importance of “hard look” federalism
adjudication in the interjurisdictional gray area—and move forward
toward development of a model that accounts for the federalism ten-
sions that arise there, enabling more effective governance without sac-
rificing a healthy balance of state and federal power.  At the very least,
a federalism framework prepared for adjudication in the gray area
would facilitate the kinds of wrenching decisions called for in in-
terjurisdictional crises like Katrina-devastated New Orleans.  At best, it
would provide procedural tools for balancing the competing problem-
solving and check-and-balance federalism values at play.
To remedy the theoretical problems left unresolved by coopera-
tive federalism and those newly unleashed by New Federalism, this Ar-
ticle proposes that the Court embrace a model of Balanced
Federalism that better mediates between competing federalism values
and provides greater guidance for regulatory decisionmakers.  Bal-
anced Federalism may depart little from its predecessors in adjudica-
tion of the easy cases, but it would provide better tools for dealing
with more difficult cases by explicitly acknowledging each of the vari-
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (articulating the bal-
ancing test for permitting abridgement of free speech by “reasonable time, place, or man-
ner restrictions”).
29. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000) (allocating roles between
EPA and the states); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2000) (delegating standard-
setting authority to the federal government and program design and implementation to
the states).
30. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001) (discussing the role of cooperative federalism
in the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
31. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1357–58 (2006) (discussing the vast areas of state and federal concurrent juris-
diction in the legal treatment of products liability).
32. For example, bankruptcy law is uniformly federal, but relies on state law definitions
of property.  Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, “Leap of Faith” into Bankruptcy: An Examination of
the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 839, 889 (2005).
33. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
34. See infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text (discussing the likely impacts of the R
recent appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to the Court).
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ous values at play and the interjurisdictional gray area in which they
are pitted against one another.  It would provide a conceptual frame-
work for evaluating whether regulation implicating dual sovereignty
concerns poses an acceptable risk to check-and-balance values in ser-
vice of legitimate interjurisdictional problem-solving, or vice versa.
Where the New Federalism asks the Tenth Amendment to police the
boundary between mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal reg-
ulatory authority from crossover by either side, Balanced Federalism
asks the Tenth Amendment to patrol regulatory activity within the
gray area for impermissible compromises of fundamental federalism
values.  The Article concludes by introducing the outlines of a juris-
prudential standard for evaluating Tenth Amendment claims that is
sensitive to the issues that commonly arise in the gray area.  As Tenth
Amendment interpretation implicitly frames all other inquiries that
proceed from the dual sovereignty directive (for example, the reach
of the federal commerce power), a more refined understanding of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence will redound with greater clarity in
all corners of the federalism debates.  The Balanced Federalism
framework would foster a more thoughtful and dynamic equipoise be-
tween the various federalism values that, though in tension with one
another, have made our system of government so effective and
enduring.
Part II introduces the quest by reviewing how federalism con-
cerns may have contributed to the failed Katrina response in New Or-
leans, demonstrating the flesh and blood dimension of a discourse
that at times appears academic and removed.  Part III outlines the
New Federalism’s strict-separationist implications, compares its Tenth
Amendment cases to their predecessors, and explores how the Rehn-
quist Court’s federalism and preemption cases join to reify mutually
exclusive spheres of state and federal jurisdiction.  Part IV introduces
the marginal zone of interjurisdictional concern that belies the strict-
separationist ideal, highlighting water and air pollution, counterter-
rorism efforts, and the Katrina response as examples of interjurisdic-
tional regulatory problems.  Part V probes the principles of good
government on which federalism is premised, identifies the pragma-
tism embedded in the subsidiarity principle, and reveals how the tug
of war between these values has encouraged the evolution of succes-
sive federalism models over the course of the twentieth century.  Part
VI proposes a model of Balanced Federalism that accounts for each of
these values, and sets forth the elements of a jurisprudential standard
that would help realize Balanced Federalism’s goal of preserving both
checks and balance in an interjurisdictional world.
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II. THE STAKES: HOW THE NEW FEDERALISM FAILED KATRINA VICTIMS
A. Which Federalism?
Roughly defined, federalism refers to a system of government in
which power is divided between a central authority and regional politi-
cal sub-units, each with authority to directly regulate its citizens.  Fed-
eral governments worldwide display a variety of structural choices by
which this design is accomplished, but domestic federalism is well-
defined in the concurrent sovereign authority of the central United
States government and the fifty states, commonly referred to as “dual
sovereignty.”35  Americans are citizens of both the United States and
the individual states in which they reside, and subject to the respective
laws of each.  The Constitution enumerates those powers under which
the federal government is authorized to make law (e.g., the commerce
power, the spending power, and the war power),36 and the states may
regulate in any area not preempted by legitimate federal law.37
Yet the fact that Americans are citizens of two separate sovereigns
does not resolve the precise contours of the relationship between the
two.  Constitutional analysis sometimes reveals pockets of textual am-
biguity that must be resolved by application of some interpretive fed-
eralism theory—a model that describes how the given federal system
should work.38  Accordingly, there is more to the variety among mod-
els of federalism than the specific array of regional sub-units around a
centrality.  Even within a single structural polity, conceptual variation
may exist in construing the details of the relationship between sover-
eigns and the framework of federalism designed to protect it.  This
has been aptly demonstrated in the United States by the Supreme
35. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The US Experience, in
PATTERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119, 119 (Jo¨rg Fedtke &
Basil S. Markesinis eds., 2006) (“Every federalism responds to a unique history, and thus
every federalism is different from every other.”).  For example, the European Union, Ca-
nada, India, and Switzerland are all federalism-based polities whose federations exhibit
unique characteristics.  The American dual sovereignty principle is well illustrated in Collec-
tor v. Day, in which the Supreme Court stated that
[t]he general government, and the States, although both exist within the
same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately
and independently of each other, within their respective spheres.  The former in
its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the States within the limits of their powers
not granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment, “reserved,” are as inde-
pendent of the general government as that government within its sphere is inde-
pendent of the States.
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
38. See supra note 19. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 17  9-MAY-07 9:47
2007] FEDERALISM & THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 519
Court’s ongoing experimentation with federalism constraints, in pur-
suit of its evolving vision of the dual sovereignty that is mandated but
incompletely described by the Constitution.
American dual sovereignty is implied in various constitutional
provisions that refer to the separate states,39 but it is most encapsu-
lated as a constitutional directive in the Tenth Amendment’s affirma-
tion that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”40  This statement establishes that
the Constitution (1) delegates some powers to the federal govern-
ment, (2) prohibits some to the states, and (3) reserves powers that fit
in neither of these two sets to the states (or perhaps the people).
Standing alone, the Tenth Amendment’s only unique contribution is
to suggest that there are at least some unspecified powers that belong
wholly to the states.  But it does not specify what these are; we can only
parse them out by negative inference to other constitutional provi-
sions that specifically delegate federal authority or proscribe state ac-
tion.  It further (and unremarkably) affirms that the Constitution
delegates some authority to the federal government, and, read to-
gether with the inherently vague Supremacy Clause,41 suggests that at
least some of this authority may be wielded exclusively at the federal
level, preempting contrary state law.  However, neither the Tenth
Amendment nor the Supremacy Clause nor any other provision in the
Constitution decisively resolves whether there may also be regulatory
spaces in which both the states and the federal government may oper-
ate (if they have not been withdrawn from either’s commission by ex-
press constitutional limitation or purposeful preemption).  Drawing
the conclusion that such overlapping regulatory space exists requires
an interpretive leap, but so does the extrapolation of wholly mutually
exclusive spheres of authority.42  Either conclusion demands applica-
tion of some exogenous theory about what American federalism
means, or what, in essence, federalism is for.  That we have relied on
39. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States  shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  The Supremacy Clause tells us that federal law is
“supreme,” but from there to field preemption nevertheless requires an interpretive leap.
42. See infra notes 153–159 and accompanying text; see also Jackson, supra note 23, at R
2191 (noting that the Constitution’s assumption that states would continue to exist “does
not tell us whether states can be required to help carry out federal law”).
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one theory or another to resolve the matter (in ways that may eventu-
ally come to seem obvious if only by virtue of their repetition) does
not negate the role of federalism theory in getting us to that point.
What, then, is federalism “for”?  Ultimately, polities turn to feder-
alism to promote a set of governance values that they hope federalism
will yield.  As elaborated in Part V, foremost among them are the pres-
ervation of individual liberties through checks and balances on ac-
countable sovereign power43 and the promotion of diversity and
competition associated with local autonomy,44 both tempered with a
healthy regard for the role of government as the superintendent of
regional collective action problems.45  Nevertheless, these values are
suspended in a network of tension with one another.  Preserving local
autonomy can conflict with the protection of individual liberty.  Cen-
tralized resolution of collective action problems can undermine
checks and balances.  In protecting its preferred vision of dual sover-
eignty, each interpretive approach advances the fundamental federal-
ism values in some way, but the tension between them means that
emphasizing one value may result in the de-emphasis of another.46  In
deciding which values take precedence under what circumstances, we
choose, consciously or not, among different models of federalism that
then inform our lawmaking and adjudication.47
In the United States, political discourse has tended more and
more to treat the ideals of the diffusion of sovereign power and the
pragmatic concerns of problem-solving as a federalism thesis and an-
tithesis—principles in opposition to one another, rather than comple-
43. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. . . .  [F]ederalism secures
to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
44. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “in-
creases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more respon-
sive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”).
45. See infra Part V.A.
46. See infra Part V.
47. One might fairly ask, “[w]ho is the ‘we’ of whom you speak?”  James Boyd White,
Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 442 (1982) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 442–43 (“In place of the constituted ‘we,’ that it is
the achievement of our past to have given us, we are offered an unconstituted ‘we,’ or a
‘we’ constituted on the pages of law journals.”).  As aforementioned, this Article argues
that American federalism, as set forth in the text and structure of the Constitution, invites
interpretive choices by judges, legislators, and policymakers. See supra note 19 and accom- R
panying text.  The subject thus warrants consideration by all participants in the legal com-
munity, though it is ultimately the job of the Supreme Court to provide definitive
interpretive guidance to the rest (as the Article recommends).
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mentary elements of the overall federalism project.  Regardless, a
federalism model that subordinates pragmatic concerns to the mainte-
nance of formalist boundaries between the reservoirs of state and fed-
eral power is clearly a legitimate political choice.  Despite much of the
rhetoric attending the New Federalism, however, it is not the only in-
terpretive possibility, nor the only model true to the principles en-
shrined in the Constitution.48  The same principles support a variety
of other models, many of which have been experimented with over
the course of our nation’s history.49  Each serves a slightly different
understanding of the dual sovereignty relationship, promises a slightly
different construction of governmental priorities, and thereby leads to
slightly different substantive ends.
For interpreters of the American Constitution, then, the relevant
choice is not one between federalism and non-federalism, but of which
federalism—which model of federalism best promotes the kind of gov-
ernance that we seek.  These are, of course, the real stakes at hand.
And so it could certainly be that, in the end, most Americans want
exactly the kind of government promoted by the New Federalism
model, although popular reaction to the Katrina disaster raises serious
questions about such a proposition.50  Ultimately, I argue that the
New Federalism model is not the best available choice, given the con-
cerns raised here about its ability to contend with the interjurisdic-
tional problems that confront all levels of government.  Either way,
however, we should at least recognize the true nature of the choice as
one among alternatives—and make that choice with attention to the
stakes involved.  After all, this is not merely the stuff of political grand-
standing and academic navel-gazing; the costs of our choices about
federalism are very much extracted at the level of everyday lives (in
the most tragic of cases, many at a time).
For this reason, our discussion begins with a brief consideration
of the stakes of the federalism debate, illustrating the kinds of govern-
mental decisionmaking that take place in the shadow of the model of
federalism that we choose.  The catastrophic aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans provides such a scenario, one that called for
governmental response from the most local to the most national level,
48. See generally David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It’s Not Just a Battle
Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2006) (discussing
how different Supreme Court Justices have implicitly invoked different models of federal-
ism in justifying their analyses).
49. See infra Part V.B.
50. See infra Part II.B (discussing the relationship between federal restraint during the
Katrina aftermath and New Federalism ideals); infra note 101 (detailing public disapproval R
of federal restraint during the relief effort).
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requiring regulatory decisionmakers to contend with questions about
how federalism principles should dictate their interaction.  Surely, the
spectacularly failed response owes much to the unprecedented de-
mands of the circumstances (and perhaps to more ordinary problems
of incompetence) that have nothing to do with federalism.  And yet,
the additional overlay of federalism issues helped further derail what
might otherwise have been a more effective response, thanks to uncer-
tainty among state and federal actors about their respective roles.
This uncertainty appears to have stemmed from a set of beliefs about
the proper exercise of state and federal authority coincident with the
strict-separationist philosophy of the New Federalism revival.
B. Federalism and Katrina
Of all that was striking during the national tragedy of the Hurri-
cane Katrina aftermath, a few things stood out: the shameful images
of abject poverty within the United States,51 the inspiring heroism of
individuals who rose to the occasion, the staggering force of nature’s
fury, and the stunning failure of the most powerful nation on earth to
respond effectively to the foreseeable effects of a predicted storm.
But if we shouldn’t have been surprised by the poverty, heroism, or
storm surge, the latter failure was hard to fathom—and by many ac-
counts, proceeded from unprecedented confusion among federal,
state, and local responders regarding the allocation of their roles and
responsibilities, and how to proceed in the face of this uncertainty.52
1. “Operating System Crash” by the National Response Plan
According to eyewitness accounts and primary documents cata-
loging the relevant events,53 the response to Katrina was characterized
by failures in coordinated command and communications between lo-
cal, state, federal, and volunteer responders, as authorities struggled
to determine what the federalism directives in applicable federal laws
51. Equally shameful were the lingering dynamics of racial unfairness apparent in
these images of abject poverty. See, e.g., Representative John Lewis, “This is a National Dis-
grace,” NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 52 (“It’s so glaring that the great majority of people
crying out for help are poor, they’re black.  There’s a whole segment of society that’s being
left behind.”).
52. See, e.g., Joe Whitley et al., Homeland Security After Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go
from Here?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2006, at 3, 3 (describing the failures of state
and federal coordination during the Katrina response).
53. For a compilation of documents collected by congressional investigators, including
a conference call transcript between state and federal authorities before Katrina struck
New Orleans, see Eric Lipton, Key Documents Regarding the Government Response to Katrina,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/national/nationalspecial/10katrina-docs.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2007).
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mandated regarding whom should be responsible for which parts of
the response.  Revised after the 9/11 attacks and issued in 2004, the
new National Response Plan (NRP) recognizes that saving lives and
protecting the health of the public are top priorities of incident man-
agement.54  However, the NRP also demarcates that, in emergency sit-
uations, states will be responsible for the implementation of police
powers traditionally within their purview (such as local law enforce-
ment, fire protection, and delivery of food and shelter), and the fed-
eral government will act in a supportive capacity, responding to
specific requests by state authorities for assistance.55
Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)
seeming paralysis in the face of the post-Katrina crisis may suggest in-
competent leadership,56 it is also attributable to a federalism-related
“operating system crash” under the NRP, which faltered just as
software does when unable to parse unanticipated inputs.  According
to the NRP’s federalism directive, federal authorities could not act
preemptively, lest they tread in the protected realm of state sovereign
authority.57  However, state authorities were unable to make the spe-
cific requests for assistance anticipated under the NRP.  Local infra-
structure was so damaged by the storm that communications were
down,58 and state and local authorities were apparently so over-
54. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 6 (2004) [hereinafter
NRP].  For an excellent review of the federal statutory framework dictating federal involve-
ment in disaster response, see DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW:
KATRINA AND BEYOND 24–56 (2006).
55. NRP, supra note 54, at 8, 15. R
56. In particular, former FEMA Director Michael Brown did not fare well in media
accounts of his performance. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Effectiveness Thing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A23 (characterizing Brown’s performance as “ludicrous”); see also
Evan Thomas et al., How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 30, 38 (questioning
Brown’s credentials for appointment as head of FEMA).
57. See NRP, supra note 54, at 9. R
58. The New York Times described the crippling effect on the National Guard:
The morning Hurricane Katrina thundered ashore, Louisiana National
Guard commanders thought they were prepared to save their state.  But when 15-
foot floodwaters swept into their headquarters, cut their communications and dis-
abled their high-water trucks, they had their hands full just saving themselves.
For a crucial 24 hours after landfall on Aug. 29, Guard officers said, they
were preoccupied with protecting their nerve center from the waves topping the
windows at Jackson Barracks and rescuing soldiers who could not swim.  The next
morning, they had to evacuate their entire headquarters force of 375 guardsmen
by boat and helicopter to the Superdome.
It was an inauspicious start to the National Guard’s hurricane response,
which fell so short that it has set off a national debate about whether in the future
the Pentagon should take charge immediately after catastrophes.
Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2005, at A1.
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whelmed themselves that they did not know what to ask for.59  It may
also be that state authorities were simply unprepared or incompetent
to play the role anticipated of them by the NRP.60  But as former
FEMA Director Michael Brown would later testify before Congress in
defense of his agency’s decisionmaking: “The role of the federal gov-
ernment in emergency management is generally that of coordinator
and supporter. . . .  [a role] fully supported by the basic concept of
federalism, recognizing that the sovereign states have primary respon-
sibility for emergency preparedness and response in their jurisdic-
tions.”61  Thus, as Katrina bore down on the Gulf Coast, these
departures from the NRP’s script left regulatory responders struggling
to decipher, in essence, which parts of the response effort were the
proper purview of the state, and which the proper purview of the fed-
eral government.62
Global security specialist Joe Whitley, former general counsel at
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, made the following ob-
servations following the response to Katrina:
59. WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 42
(2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf.  Ac-
cording to the White House’s own report:
An important limiting factor of the Federal response . . . is that the Federal
response is predicated on an incident being handled at the lowest jurisdictional
level possible.  A base assumption to this approach is that, even in cases where
State and local governments are overwhelmed, they would maintain the necessary
incident command structure to direct Federal assets to where they are most
needed.  In the case of Katrina, the local government had been destroyed and the
State government was incapacitated, and thus the Federal government had to
take on the additional roles of performing incident command and other func-
tions it would normally rely upon the State and local governments to provide.
Id.
60. Michael Brown told Congress that his “biggest mistake was not recognizing, by Sat-
urday [August 27, 2005], that Louisiana was dysfunctional.” Hurricane Katrina: The Role of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency: Hearing Before the H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Inves-
tigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 12 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter September 27 Katrina Hearing] (testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA).
61. September 27 Katrina Hearing, supra note 60, at 3–4 (statement of Michael Brown, R
former Director, FEMA), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/09_27_05/
brown092705.pdf [hereinafter Brown Statement].
62. See Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Breakdowns Marked Path From Hurricane to
Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 1 [hereinafter Lipton et al., Breakdowns] (noting that
dozens of interviews with officials showed that “the crisis in New Orleans deepened be-
cause of a virtual standoff between hesitant federal officials and besieged authorities in
Louisiana”); Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Lipton et al., Political Issues] (“Interviews with
officials in Washington and Louisiana show that as the situation grew worse, they were
wrangling with questions of federal/state authority . . . .”); Thomas et al., supra note 56, at R
40 (reporting that as of September 2, “[a] debate over ‘federalizing’ the National Guard
had been rattling in Washington for the previous three days”).
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During the first few hours and days after landfall, we saw
breakdowns in communication within and among every level
of government: between federal, state and local officials;
and, perhaps most critically, between government and the
citizens of the affected areas.  We saw an inability to establish
with any certainty what was actually happening and to deploy
the appropriate resources to deal with each situation.  Many
citizens in the Gulf Coast region and elsewhere in the United
States may have lost confidence in the government’s ability
to respond to a catastrophic event.63
Whitley suggests that coordination failures stemmed partly from
inconsistencies between the two primary sources of procedural gui-
dance for state and federal cooperation during emergencies—the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the
Stafford Act)64 and the NRP—and partly from the tensions inherent
in catastrophic disaster management, due to the respect heeded by
federal and state actors for the principles of federalism.65
As he explains, the historic relationship between the federal,
state, and local governments is best described as a “pull” approach, in
which the federal government presumes that states and localities can
cope independently with a disaster unless they specifically request (or
pull) resources from the federal government.66  This view of federal-
ism in disaster response—that state officials are directly responsible
for the health and safety of their citizens and that federal assistance is
supplementary only—has long been the general rule, although the
63. Whitley et al., supra note 52, at 3.  Whitley, a current member of Alston & Bird R
LLP’s Global Security & Enforcement Practice Team, further observed:
From top to bottom, Katrina exposed some of our vulnerabilities as a nation.
State and local governments must continue to address communication issues that
were identified as crucial after the attacks of September 11, 2001.  They must
provide trained professional staff to manage response efforts.  Continued and ex-
panded coordinated training of federal, state, and local government officials is an
absolute must.  For emergency management lawyers, it is absolutely essential that
we share “best practices” and coordinate our educational and training efforts so
that government and the private sector at all levels better understands [sic] each
other’s needs and the legal requirements involved in disaster preparedness and
relief.
Critically, DHS must immediately address areas of potential ambiguity or per-
ceived confusion—who declares an emergency, who leads the response and re-
covery efforts, how are resources managed—and we must create an expedited,
transparent, and effective contracting and contract oversight process.
Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5205 (2000).
65. Whitley et al., supra note 52, at 4–6. R
66. Id. at 4.
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role has evolved toward greater expectations of federal assistance.67
Although this approach works in the majority of instances, Whitley
argues that disasters of Katrina’s magnitude show that federal policy
must enable a “push” approach where needed, in which the federal
government intervenes to provide assistance even without a direct re-
quest by the state or local government.68  After all, he explains, “[t]he
‘pull’ approach simply cannot work when the state and local govern-
ments are, as they were after Katrina, without communication, without
the ability to assess the extent of damages or needs, and without even
adequate personnel to make requests for everything needed.”69  Al-
though Whitley assigns a fair share of blame to state and local govern-
ments for their inadequate response, he holds the federal government
especially accountable for failing to “promptly trigger[ ] the necessary
federal legal authorities to begin the process of implementing federal
assistance in the immediate aftermath of the storms,” when the state
and local authorities were so incapacitated that they could not possi-
bly have followed the rituals anticipated by the Stafford Act or the
NRP.70  “Under such a catastrophic scenario,” Whitley concludes, “the
federal government, without being asked, must intervene more
promptly in the immediate aftermath of an event.”71
Even before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, NRP drafters
were aware that state and local governments might become over-
whelmed during the course of a catastrophic emergency.72  When Ka-
trina hit, they had nearly finalized a “Catastrophic Incident Annex” to
the NRP, enabling a push approach to address these concerns.73
However, this is a politically complicated innovation because it contra-
dicts the relevant language of the Stafford Act, which authorizes fed-
eral disaster assistance to the states, sets forth the primary role of state
and local responders, and clarifies the supplementary nature of fed-
eral support.74  Whitley suggests that the Stafford Act may also need to
be amended to enable a push approach in catastrophic circum-
stances.75  In the meantime, the Katrina experience recently moti-
vated passage of a new federal law that enables the President to deploy
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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the military in response to natural disasters and other major domestic
emergencies without consent of the states involved.76
Although Whitley’s blow-by-blow account of the post-Katrina fail-
ures are chilling, he also praises the great acts of generosity and self-
sacrifice by those involved in the relief effort, commending members
of the U.S. Coast Guard, FEMA, the National Guard, and first re-
sponders and law enforcement officers for their particularly heroic
efforts to save lives and offer comfort to victims.77  His seasoned obser-
vation of the details of the Katrina response indicate that failures were
not the result of callous or careless behavior by individuals, but were
institutional failures—namely, the rules or perceived rules of law that
convinced decisionmakers not to proceed with the “push” response
that was clearly necessary out of fear that doing so would, in essence,
violate the Constitution.
2. The President, the Governor, the Mayor, and the Stafford Act
Federalism concerns were not limited to managerial choices in
the field but pervaded the response effort up to the highest levels.
News reports indicated that “[f]or days, Bush’s top advisers argued
over legal niceties about who was in charge,”78 that “[i]nterviews with
officials in Washington and Louisiana show that as the situation grew
worse, they were wrangling with questions of federal/state author-
ity,”79 and that “the crisis in New Orleans deepened because of a vir-
tual standoff between hesitant federal officials and besieged
authorities in Louisiana.”80  The issues that most snarled the response
effort were uncertainty about the point at which the federal govern-
ment should stop waiting for instructions on how to assist the state
and take initiative via its superior command capacity (through the de-
76. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) [hereinafter Warner Act]; see also Michael Greenberger, Yes,
Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from
a Devastating Natural Catastrophe 1–2 (U. of Md. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-37),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946207 (arguing that the new law neither adds to nor
subtracts from the President’s existing powers but merely clarifies them after uncertainty
suggested during the Katrina emergency).
77. Whitley et al., supra note 52, at 3. R
78. Evan Thomas et al., The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 41, 48.
79. Lipton et al., Political Issues, supra note 62, at A1. R
80. Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 62, at §1; see id. (reporting that “interviews with R
dozens of officials” supported this contention).
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ployment of U.S. military or federalized National Guard troops),81
and after that, confusion about who would then be in charge.
Even as it became clear that federal assistance was necessary, un-
certainty unfolded among all three levels of government as to who
should be in control of the troops to be deployed.82  Apparently des-
perate for results, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin supported federaliz-
ing the response,83 while Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux
Blanco balked, and President George W. Bush, hesitant to offend fed-
eralism principles in this interjurisdictional no man’s land, waited for
clarity.84  In one infamous exchange four days into the crisis at a strat-
egy session aboard Air Force One, the distraught Mayor slammed the
conference table with his hand and asked the President “to cut
through this and do what it takes to have a more-controlled command
structure.  If that means federalizing it, let’s do it.”85  Mayor Nagin
recommended the Pentagon’s “on-scene commander,” Lieutenant
General Russel Honore´, to lead the flailing relief effort on behalf of
the federal government.86  According to another meeting participant,
President Bush turned to Governor Blanco and said, “[w]ell, what do
you think of that, Governor?”87  But Governor Blanco declined to dis-
cuss the matter except in a private meeting with the President, which
apparently followed the strategy session.88  However, there was still no
agreement over one week later,89 leaving idle the assistance of an esti-
mated 100,000 National Guard troops accessible on short notice in
neighboring states.90  News accounts suggest that Governor Blanco
did ask the President for 40,000 federal troops, but did not agree to
surrender oversight of the relief effort to the federal government.91
81. See Thomas et al., supra note 78, at 48–49 (“Beginning early in the week, Justice R
Department lawyers presented arguments for federalizing the Guard, but Defense Depart-
ment lawyers fretted about untrained 19-year-olds trying to enforce local laws . . . .”).
82. Thomas et al., supra note 56, at 40. R
83. Id.
84. See id.  The troops of each state’s National Guard report to their Governor unless
they are “federalized” by Presidential order in accordance with the terms of the Stafford
Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5191–5192 (2000) (authorizing the President to declare disaster
emergencies and direct federal government response).
85. Thomas et al., supra note 56, at 40. R
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. John M. Broder, Guard Units’ New Mission: From Combat to Flood Duty, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2005, at A13.
91. See Karen Tumulty et al., 4 Places Where the System Broke Down: The Governor, TIME,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 34, § 2. Time reported:
Further tangling the post-Katrina disaster effort was a struggle for power.  On
the Friday after the hurricane, as the Governor met with Bush aboard Air Force
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Had Governor Blanco surrendered her claim to control over the
relief effort,92 President Bush would have been able to reconcile the
urgency of providing needed federal assistance with the federalism
principles that he believed foreclosed such authorization in the in-
terim.93  Nevertheless, contemporaneous news accounts indicate that
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel researched the mat-
ter and “concluded that the federal government had authority to
move in even over the objection of local officials.”94  Indeed, many
commentators—including some close to the Bush Administration,
such as former Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo—argued
vigorously that the President did not need the Governor’s consent to
federalize the response in light of available jurisdictional hooks in the
Stafford Act, including state incapacity and federal obligation.95  In
One on the tarmac of the New Orleans airport, the President broached a sensitive
question: Would Blanco relinquish control of local law enforcement and the
13,268 National Guard troops from 29 states that fall under her command? . . .
[S]he thought the request had a political motive.  It would allow Washington to
come in and claim credit for a relief operation that was finally beginning to show
progress.
. . . Blanco asked for 24 hours to consider it, but as she was meeting at mid-
night that Friday night with advisers, [Chief of Staff Andrew] Card called and told
her to look for a fax.  It was a letter and memorandum of understanding under
which she would turn over control of her troops.  Blanco refused to sign it.
Id.; see also Katrina Aftermath, Louisiana: Don’t Want You On My Dance Card, AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL NETWORK, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 8, 2005, at 7 (discussing Governor Blanco’s rejection of
the White House proposal for federal control of troops in Louisiana).
92. It remains unclear why Blanco did not, given that the state resources at her disposal
had proved insufficient to manage the relief effort independently.  Viewed most gener-
ously, it may be that she was reluctant to turn control over to a federal government that
had so far shown nothing but incompetence in its own handling of the disaster.  Viewed
less generously, her decision to refuse federal aid in the face of state incapacity tyrannically
exacerbated the suffering of her own citizens by contributing to the delay.  If she refused
to relinquish control on federalism grounds while being unable to provide the needed
resources independently, then her view of federalism warrants just as much criticism as
that of the federal government. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing R
Michael Brown’s testimony on the role of federalism considerations during the response
effort).
93. Under both the Stafford Act and the NRP, the President may federalize emergency
response at the request of a state’s governor. See supra notes 55 & 84 and accompanying R
text.
94. Greenberger, supra note 76, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
95. John Yoo, Editorial, Trigger Power, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5; see also Green-
berger, supra note 76, at 14–19 (arguing that the President had clear authority to intervene R
even before passage of the Warner Act); Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fid-
dled Around, The Big Easy Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Govern-
ment’s Alibi for the Hurricane Katrina Disaster 39 (Jan. 1, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938249 (arguing that the Posse Comita-
tus Act did not bar the deployment of federal troops as part of the Katrina relief effort
because it does not prohibit the military from providing humanitarian aid).
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addition to the President’s authority to unilaterally federalize a State’s
National Guard in time of insurrection or war,96 the Act authorizes
the President to coordinate all disaster relief, including the use of Fed-
eral and State assets, in a time of crisis whenever “primary responsibil-
ity for response rests with the United States because the emergency
involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent re-
sponsibility and authority.”97  But what exactly does that mean?  What
counts as “a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent
responsibility and authority”?98
No court has interpreted this provision of the Stafford Act, be-
cause it has never arisen in a justiciable controversy.99  But it goes to
the heart of the federalism quandary: what does the Constitution tell
us about when the United States exercises “preeminent responsibility
and authority”?  Although John Yoo is convinced that the text autho-
rizes at least some measure of federal disaster response without a gu-
bernatorial request, the question is unsettled.  This uncertainty makes
President Bush’s decision not to invoke his potential authority, espe-
cially in the face of such hideous human suffering and public pressure
to act,100 all the more significant.
96. Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2000).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (2000).  Unlike 42 U.S.C. § 5170, this section does not require
the consent of a given state’s Governor, though it does require as much consultation with
the Governor as is practicable.  42 U.S.C. § 5191(b).  The Stafford Act leaves the determi-
nation of when the United States exercises preeminent responsibility or authority up for
interpretation, though commentators like Yoo have suggested that the particular circum-
stances after Katrina would have warranted unilateral federal action. See Yoo, supra note
95, at M5 (determining that Katrina would have qualified as a national emergency and that R
“[o]nce a national emergency has been declared, the president can send troops to provide
assistance and restore order”).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (emphasis added).
99. The Warner Act recently affirmed that the President may unilaterally deploy fed-
eral troops, including National Guard troops in federal service, to respond to a major
domestic emergency such as a natural disaster. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. R
However, the Warner Act does not provide additional bases of authority to federalize a
state’s National Guard in the first place, leaving the Stafford Act issue unresolved. See
Warner Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404 (2006) (to be codified at 10
U.S.C. § 333) (adding circumstances in which “[t]he President may employ the armed
forces, including the National Guard in federal service”).
100. For example, Anchor Brian Williams questioned Michael Brown:
Why can’t some of the Chinook helicopters and Black Hawks that we have heard
flying over for days and days and days simply lower pallets of water, meals ready to
eat, medical supplies, right into downtown New Orleans?  [“]Where is the aid?[”]
It’s the question [ ]people keep asking us on camera!
NBC Nightly News: FEMA Director Michael Brown Discusses Relief Efforts in Hurricane Zone (NBC
television broadcast Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NBC Nightly News].
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Indeed, President Bush’s reluctance to respond more proactively
was not well received by the public,101 prompting his subsequent re-
quest that Congress study proposals for guidance on federal initiative
in future scenarios.102  However, what is most significant about the
President’s decision is why he declined to exercise the potential Staf-
ford Act authority in the first place, given such overwhelming political
pressure to do so and his demonstrated confidence asserting untested
federal executive authority in other realms.103  One patent explana-
tion for the President’s hesitancy to explore all potential avenues of
authority during the most devastating natural disaster in U.S. history is
the profound influence of strict-separationist idealism.  Federalizing
the Louisiana National Guard and subjecting state and city police to
101. E.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Richard Morin, Bush’s Approval Rating Drops to New Low
in Wake of Storm, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A8 (“The bungled response to the hurri-
cane has helped drag down Bush’s job-approval rating, which now stands at 42 percent—
the lowest of his presidency—in the Post-ABC poll and down three points since the hurri-
cane hit two weeks ago.”).  Many members of the U.S. House of Representatives issued
press releases emphasizing a popularly held sentiment about the primary role that the
Federal Government should serve in disaster response and in providing aid to Katrina
victims. See, e.g., Press Release, Representative Marion Berry, Berry Issues Statement on
Presidential Address (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/berry/press-
releases/archive/katrina3.html (“One of the primary roles of the federal government is to
step in during times of national emergency.”); Press Release, Representative Elijah E.
Cummings, Cummings: Brown Demonstrates Blurred Hindsight (Sept. 27, 2005), available
at http://www.house.gov/cummings/press/05sep27a.htm (“Mr. Brown continues to
blame state and local officials, many of whom were storm victims themselves, while denying
the primary role of the federal government in helping its own citizens survive a catastro-
phe.”); Press Release, Representative Jan Schakowsky, Schakowsky Statement on the Ap-
proval of $10.5 Billion in Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Hurricane Victims
(Sept. 2, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/PressRelease_9_2_05_Ka-
trinaAid.html (“[I]t is the primary role of the federal government to aid these victims.”).
Newsweek’s Special Report: After Katrina “drew more than 1,000 letters,” most taking the fed-
eral government to task for its “inept response to the catastrophe.” Mail Call: In the Wake of
a Devastating Hurricane, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at 18.
102. See, e.g., Shane & Shanker, supra note 58, at A1 (noting that the hurricane response R
touched off “a national debate about whether in the future the Pentagon should take
charge immediately after catastrophes,” and that President Bush had requested that Con-
gress evaluate the question).
103. President Bush is often noted (both with praise and criticism) for expanding fed-
eral executive authority beyond that exercised by any previous administration in U.S. his-
tory. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Bush’s Leviathan State: Power of One, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 24,
2006, at 8, 8 (“One of the defining principles of the Bush administration has been a belief
in unfettered executive power. . . .  A conservative ideology that had always been devoted to
limiting government power has been transformed into the largest expansion of executive
power since FDR.”); Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement On Presidential Sign-
ing Statements (July 25, 2006), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200607/
072506a.html (“Whether it is torture, warrantless eavesdropping on American citizens, or
the unlawful detention of military prisoners, this Republican-led Congress has been willing
to turn a blind eye and rubber-stamp the questionable actions of this Administration, re-
gardless of the consequences to our Constitution or civil liberties.”).
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federal command would have blurred the very lines of regulatory au-
thority that New Federalism so endeavors to preserve.104  The best al-
ternative explanation—and one equally troubling—is that the White
House relied on New Federalism rhetoric for political cover in avoid-
ing any involvement with the unfolding mess.105  Either way, that New
Federalism ideals could stall effective governance at such a key mo-
ment or provide reliable cover to so monumental an abdication sug-
gests their infirmity.
In the end, reasonable people may disagree on how best to ap-
portion blame between the amply culpable local, state, and federal
authorities for the failed response, subsequently heralded as “a na-
tional disgrace.”106  That said, it remains difficult to digest the con-
firmed reports that after fifteen-foot floodwaters swept through the
Jackson Barracks headquarters of the Louisiana National Guard Head-
quarters—severing communication lines, flooding high-water trucks,
and converting the entire nerve center force into 375 more New Orle-
ans refugees in need of a water rescue107—White House officials
stalled in Washington, debating how the finer principles of constitu-
tional federalism dictated the scope of federal intervention.108  In
their defense, the debate was at least warranted by a faithful interpre-
tation of the federalism model advanced by the sitting Supreme
Court.  But it raises the fair question, in light of the stakes and the
results that can flow from that model—is this really the federalism we
intended?
3. The Price of Failure
While the President’s senior advisers fiddled with federalism, New
Orleans drowned.  The details of the debacle are by now painfully
well-known to most Americans, but they bear repeating to highlight
104. For example, Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director of Duke University School of
Law’s Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, believes that delays were caused not by
the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally precludes the use of federal
troops for domestic security concerns, but by confusion over the lines of authority between
President Bush and Governor Blanco: “I think the problem was you had two heads of
state . . . each having the authority, but one waiting for the other to act.”  Anne Plummer,
Loosening Restrictions on the Military Enforcing Civil Law Unwise, Say Critics, CONG. Q. WKLY.,
Sept. 24, 2005, at 2550 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See id.  Silliman’s interpretation, of course, suggests another possible explanation
for the administration’s reluctance to intervene despite an arguable legal basis for doing
so: the desire to pass the hot potato and avoid responsibility for an intractable situation.
See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
106. E.g., Lewis, supra note 51, at 52. R
107. Shane & Shanker, supra note 58, at A1. R
108. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. R
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the scope of the failed response.  Over a thousand residents perished
in their homes and neighborhoods,109 and up to thirty-four died in
the makeshift mass shelters at the New Orleans Superdome and con-
vention center,110 where some 39,000 evacuees were encamped with-
out adequate food, water, power, or sanitary facilities for up to seven
days.111  Two-thirds of the occupants were women, children, or eld-
erly, many of them infirm, and they huddled in darkness and 100-
degree temperatures amidst the unbearable stench of human waste
covering the floors and the ceiling debris fallen from holes torn from
the roof by the storm.112  Unchecked lawless behavior terrorized citi-
zens and local law enforcement alike, both within the emergency shel-
ters and on the flooded city streets.113  The near total collapse of
landline, satellite, and cell phone communications hindered the abil-
ity of local law enforcement and the Louisiana National Guard to co-
ordinate a response—even available radio channels were so jammed
with traffic that they became useless.114
The chaotic rescue and evacuation efforts impacted families as
well, as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children re-
ported in mid-September 2005 that 1,831 children from Louisiana,
Alabama, and Mississippi were reported as missing in the aftermath of
the storm, and that weeks later, only 360 of these cases had been re-
solved.115  At least a million evacuees took shelter in other cities and
states,116 and by March 2006 the federal government had committed
109. Katrina’s Official Death Toll Tops 1,000, CNN.COM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/21/katrina.impact.
110. Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 62, at A1 (quoting official reports of thirty-four R
deaths: ten at the Superdome and twenty-four at the convention center).
111. Id.  Food and water supplies stashed at the planned emergency shelter of the
Superdome ran out within the first few days after Katrina made landfall. Id.  After the
Superdome had filled beyond all capacity, an additional 15,000 refugees were directed to
the convention center, where there were no food or water supplies. Id.; see also John Riley
& Craig Gordon, Katrina—What Went Wrong, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 2005, at A4 (describing the
deplorable conditions in the convention center).
112. Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 62, at A1 (citing Chief Lonnie C. Swain, an R
assistant police superintendent who oversaw ninety police officers on patrol at the
Superdome).
113. See id. (quoting Captain Jeffrey Winn, head of the convention center’s police SWAT
team: “The only way I can describe it is as a completely lawless situation.”).
114. Shane & Shanker, supra note 58, at A1. R
115. Barbara Kantrowitz & Karen Breslau, Some Are Found, All Are Lost, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
19, 2005, at 51, 51.  Young children were often separated from parents during chaotic boat
rescues and bus evacuations. Id. at 52.
116. See Lester R. Brown, Global Warming Forcing U.S. Coastal Population to Move Inland,
EARTH POL’Y INST., Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2006/Up-
date57.htm (explaining that Hurricane Katrina forced one million people to move inland
from the afflicted coastal cities); see also Eric Lipton, Storm and Crisis: Hurricane Evacuees Face
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$6.9 billion in shelter and direct financial assistance to Gulf Coast re-
sidents affected by the hurricane.117  Countless thousands of starving
and injured companion animals continued to roam the streets or lan-
guish trapped within the homes of evacuated owners for weeks follow-
ing the storm,118 most perishing before rescue but not before ghastly
suffering.119
Damage to oil infrastructure was the worst ever experienced by
the industry.120  More than nine million gallons were reported
spilled,121 and gas prices skyrocketed to as high as $6 per gallon in the
following weeks.122  Chemical spills, rotting remains, and flooding re-
sulted in environmental hazards ranging from land-based toxic sludge
to poisoned water supplies that will continue to threaten human
health and safety into the foreseeable future.123  Approximately $88
billion in federal aid has already been allocated toward relief, recov-
ery, and rebuilding efforts, and an additional $20 billion has been re-
Eviction Threats at Both Their Old Homes and New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A20 (discussing
the large influx of displaced Katrina victims to Texas).  For a graphical depiction of Katrina
refugee displacement, see Kantrowitz & Breslau, supra note 115, at 53.  Refugees have fled R
to forty-nine different states and the District of Columbia. See Press Release, White House,
Fact Sheet: Gulf Coast Update: Hurricane Relief, Recovery, and Rebuilding Continues
(Mar. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Gulf Coast Fact Sheet], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060308-8.html (noting the federal aid
flowing to local education agencies in forty-nine states and District of Columbia for dis-
placed school children).
117. Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 116.  This is more than “double the combined R
total of Individuals and Households Assistance Program (IHP) dollars provided for six
major U.S. natural disasters occurring since 1992.” Id.
118. See, e.g., Oscar Corral, Stranded Pets Facing Starvation, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 5, 2005,
at A13 (noting that many pets were abandoned because their owners could not bring them
on evacuation buses); Norma Mendoza, Task Force Members Describe Devastation in New Orle-
ans, EDWARDSVILLE INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 11, 2005, at 1, 3 (“Another sad sight was the dogs
that were everywhere, strays and abandoned pets that rescue workers wouldn’t allow peo-
ple to bring with them.  Some died, trapped in the houses where they were left.  Others
were starving and the officers had nothing to give them.”).
119. See, e.g., Photo Gallery: Pets, Hurricane Katrina’s Other Victims, NATIONAL GEO-
GRAPHIC.COM, Sept. 8, 2005,  http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0908_
050908_katrina_pets.html (illustrating the anguish of animals abandoned in Katrina’s
wrath); cf. Karlyn Barker & Nia-Malika Henderson, Plight of Stranded Animals Worsening
Daily, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at B4 (estimating that thousands of animals abandoned by
their owners after Katrina were in peril).
120. See Pam Radtke Russell, Gulf Platform Damage Still Being Assessed, NEWHOUSE NEWS
SERV., Mar. 23, 2006 (on file with author) (explaining that the damage to oil and gas
platforms from Katrina was the worst ever seen in the Gulf of Mexico, and that the harm
caused by rigs was equally noteworthy).
121. Mike Taibbi, Oil Coats Homes, Water After Katrina, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 8, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9972220.
122. Robert J. Samuelson, Hitting the Economy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 54, 54.
123. See Thomas et al., supra note 56, at 34–35 (listing environmental hazards affecting R
public health).
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quested to assist a variety of federal agencies in their continuing relief
efforts.124  These moneys have been earmarked for programs includ-
ing unemployment assistance,125 community disaster loans to local
governments,126 housing assistance,127 and public assistance
projects.128  Separate grants have also been awarded, including a $1.6
billion special congressional appropriation to the Department of Edu-
cation for public and private schools where relocated students
enrolled.129
Americans watched their televisions (and increasingly agitated
journalists watched on the scene) in disbelief as day after day passed
before anything resembling an organized disaster response was assem-
bled in the devastated City of New Orleans.130  Public outrage
brimmed over in the days and weeks following the crisis, exemplified
by one news story’s observation that “[t]he descent of the Superdome
from haven to a fetid, crime-infested hellhole by the time mass evacua-
tions began Thursday was emblematic of what appeared to many to be
a government failure of epic proportions last week, leaving experts
and ordinary citizens alike puzzled and infuriated.”131
Of course, much of the devastation that Gulf Coast residents suf-
fered from the winds and rain of Katrina cannot be blamed on bad
disaster management.  Setting aside the degree to which anthropo-
genic climate change contributes to the intensity of hurricanes like
124. Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 116.  As high as this figure seems, it nevertheless R
falls short of the $150 billion of federal aid that experts had predicted would be necessary
for recovery efforts.  Nina J. Easton, Katrina Aid Falls Short of Promises, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
27, 2005, at A1.
125. See Press Release, FEMA, By the Numbers: FEMA Recovery Update in Louisiana
(Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=24505 (allo-
cating $165 million to disaster unemployment assistance).
126. See id. (allocating $700 million in loans to local governments in need of assistance).
127. FEMA has already dispersed checks in the amount of $3.5 billion for rental assis-
tance and home restoration. Id.
128. Over $1.9 billion has already been set aside for such public assistance undertakings.
Id.
129. Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 116. R
130. Even journalists of ordinarily studied neutrality found themselves challenging offi-
cial accounts of the relief effort.  For example, in an interview with FEMA Director Michael
Brown three days into the crisis, NBC Nightly News anchor Brian Williams incredulously
demanded to know why federal Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters circling the area
could not be used to deliver food, water, and medical supplies to the encamped evacuees.
See NBC Nightly News, supra note 100 (“[‘]Where is the aid?[’]  It’s the question [ ]people R
keep asking us on camera!”).  In response, Brown indicated that the federal government
had only just become aware of the thousands of desperate refugees that day. Id.
131. Riley & Gordon, supra note 111, at A4. R
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Katrina,132 hurricanes are a force of nature that we have long learned
to fear.  River and wetland management choices along the Mississippi
Delta exacerbated the flooding that proved the worst of New Orle-
ans’s battles,133 and Americans are right to ask for better long-term
planning from the local, state, and federal authorities responsible for
these activities.134  Still, it was the bungled humanitarian relief ef-
fort—the disorganized response that stranded the sick and injured,
separated young children from their parents, and left the most vulner-
able members of society struggling to survive amidst prolonged “Lord
of the Flies” conditions135—that triggered public outrage.
4. Coda: Which Federalism?
Given the proven ability of the United States to respond quickly
and effectively in the face of natural disaster (for example, our imme-
diate and ambitious relief effort in response to the South Asian tsu-
nami just nine months earlier136), what could possibly account for this
132. Compare Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Hurricanes and Global Warming-Is There a Connec-
tion?, REALCLIMATE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=181 (sug-
gesting that man-made increases in greenhouse gases have, at least in part, led to a rise in
ocean temperatures, which tends to cause more destructive hurricanes like Katrina), with
James K. Glassman, Katrina and Disgusting Exploitation, TCS DAILY, Aug. 31, 2005, http://
www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=083105JKG (refusing to acknowledge a nexus between
global warming and the severity of Hurricane Katrina).
133. See Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental Assessment:
Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 981,
990–97 (2006) (describing the natural resource management choices made along the Mis-
sissippi River that made New Orleans particularly vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina’s storm
surge).
134. Cf. John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006,
at A1 (reporting that an Army Corps of Engineers’ study concluded that the design of the
New Orleans levees was flawed and incapable of handling a storm the strength of Katrina).
135. See, e.g., Britons Describe Hurricane Ordeal, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2005, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4214746.stm (recounting the putrid conditions in the
Superdome); see also Kantrowitz & Breslau, supra note 115, at 51–52 (describing one family R
that was separated when rescue helicopters dropped the children off at one location and
rescue boats brought the parents to another); Evan Thomas, Taken by Storm, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 26, 2005/Jan. 2, 2006, at 47, 56 (recounting the same episode); Thomas et al., supra
note 78, at 44–45 (comparing the images of helpless families and children begging for R
food and water to third-world conditions in Mogadishu or Port-au-Prince).
136. See Brigadier General John Allen, Principal Director of Asia and Pacific Affairs,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Update—U.S. Government Relief Efforts in Asia,” For-
eign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://
www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050103-wh-presstranscript.shtml (“Within minutes of
our notification of this disaster, we began military planning to assist in the U.S. Govern-
mental response to this crisis . . . .  Within hours, U.S. forces began to move to the affected
area.”); BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GOING THE DISTANCE: THE
U.S. TSUNAMI RELIEF EFFORT 2005, at 1 (2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/
tsunami/tsunami.pdf (reporting that, at the height of the relief effort, “more than 15,000
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spectacular failure of governance?  In the face of such unimaginable
domestic despair, prompting ordinary Americans from the four cor-
ners of the nation to arrive at New Orleans’s doorstep with whatever
they had to offer, why couldn’t the United States government prop-
erly protect, feed, and evacuate its own?
In his post-storm congressional testimony, former FEMA director
Michael Brown provided perhaps the best answer, and in so doing
invokes several of the important federalism issues with which we be-
gan this Part.  In his poignant defense of his agency’s performance on
federalism grounds, he explained:
Princip[les] of federalism should not be lost in a short-term
desire to react to a natural disaster of catastrophic propor-
tions, for if that concept is lost, the advantages of having a
robust state and local emergency management system will
lead not only to waste of taxpayer dollars at the federal level,
but will inherently drive decision-making best left to the local
and state level, to a centralized federal government, which
inherently cannot understand the unique needs of each
community across this nation.137
Brown’s statement is important for three reasons.  First, he correctly
articulates a central problem of federalism: structural constraints are
only meaningful if they are followed in difficult times as well as easy
times.  For Brown, allowing the federal government to cross federal-
ism’s proverbial line in the sand to satisfy a short-term desire would
undermine the very principles of constitutional government.  But this
brings us to the second important point in Brown’s statement, which
is his invocation of the fallacy perpetuated by New Federalism rhetoric
that strict-separationist dual sovereignty is itself federalism, as opposed
to one vision among alternatives.  Although earlier federal interven-
tion might have violated the tenets of the strict-separationist ideal, it
might have been an acceptable move within an alternative conception
U.S. military personnel were involved in providing relief support in the affected region.
Twenty-five ships and 94 aircraft were participating in the effort.  The U.S. military had
delivered about 2.2 million pounds of relief supplies to affected nations . . . .”); see also
Ralph A. Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, South
Asian Tsunami: U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone’ For Relief Operation, EJOURNAL USA:
FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA (Nov. 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/
cossa.htm (noting, in ironic contrast to the later Katrina relief effort, that “[w]hile the
numbers of forces dedicated to the relief effort and the extent of aid they provided were
impressive, the most invaluable U.S. contribution focused around another Defense Depart-
ment unique capability: command, control, communications, and coordination. These at-
tributes, critical in wartime, proved equally critical in ensuring an effective, coordinated
response.”).
137. See Brown Statement, supra note 61, at 3. R
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of federalism (such as one that acknowledges the interjurisdictional
gray area).
This brings us to the third important reference point in Brown’s
statement—and as it happens, back to the core federalism question
raised by this article—namely, that of which federalism?  If there is a
legitimate interpretive choice among alternatives, we should choose
the model that best enables the kind of governance that serves the
values we ascribe to government.  For Brown, the regulatory impulse
“to react to a natural disaster of catastrophic proportions” is little
more than a “short-term desire,”138 a crassly self-satisfying move in the
foreground of a much greater drama about the grand diffusion of
separately sovereign power.  But to what end is power so divided, if
neither one nor the other level of government can intervene to pre-
vent the most galling (and continuing) episode of domestic human
suffering in this lifetime?  Is Michael Brown’s FEMA the kind of fed-
eral government that we want?  Or might it suggest the value of a dif-
ferent model of federalism, one that can afford meaningful
constraints without requiring a like sacrifice?
In the end, we must remember that clear errors were made by
federal, state, and local authorities that had nothing to do with feder-
alism (for example, New Orleans failed to consider the plight of many
citizens without the means or strength to evacuate themselves,139 and
the Army Corps of Engineers later acknowledged that levees protect-
ing the City had not been designed to withstand the combination of
known soil subsidence patterns140 and projected levee-top overflow
during a storm of Katrina’s magnitude141).  Still, we should be deeply
troubled by accounts like Michael Brown’s, which suggest that the
138. Id.
139. Joe Whitley observes that
[w]hile more than 1.2 million people were successfully evacuated from
coastal areas before Katrina hit, tens of thousands of people were not, including
citizens from two of Louisiana’s most populous localities, New Orleans and Jeffer-
son Parishes.  Despite the eventual declaration of a mandatory evacuation on Sun-
day before landfall, New Orleans officials were unable to provide adequate
transportation to evacuate the population.
Whitley et al., supra note 52, at 6. R
140. See Ryan, supra note 133, at 990–97 (noting how channelization of the Mississippi R
River has led to soil subsidence in the Delta and explaining its implications for New Orle-
ans during Hurricane Katrina).
141. Schwartz, supra note 134, at A1.  The Corps’ 6,113-page report was remarkably can- R
did about the failed levee system:
The region’s network of levees, floodwalls, pumps and gates lacked any built-in
resilience that would have allowed the system to remain standing and provide
protection even if water flowed over the tops of levees and floodwalls . . . .  Flaws
in the levee design that allowed breaches in the city’s drainage canals were not
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most devastating post-storm errors—those crystallized in the delayed
and uncoordinated relief effort—flowed from the good-faith but ill-
fated vehemence with which our leaders hewed to a principled read-
ing of the constitutional balance of state and federal power.  And
while this may surprise the average outraged American, it should
come as less of a surprise to those who have been following the trajec-
tory of the New Federalism ideals promoted by the Supreme Court
under the leadership of the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
III. THE NEW FEDERALISM’S “STRICT-SEPARATIONIST” APPROACH
A. Dual Sovereignty and the Boundary Problem
Michael Brown’s account of federal decisionmaking during the
Katrina crisis coincides with the vision of state-federal relations pro-
jected by the New Federalism jurisprudence, exemplified by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s memorably expressed conviction that “[t]he
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.”142  New Federalism is certainly not the first interpretive
movement to herald such a distinction, which owes provenance even
to such early champions of federal authority as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes.143  However, renewed political interest in the distinction
arose in the 1970s and gathered steam in the 1980s144 following Presi-
dent Reagan’s vow in his first inaugural address “to curb the size and
influence of the federal establishment and to demand recognition of
the distinction between the powers granted to the federal government
and those reserved to the states or to the people.”145  The movement
reached maturity during the mid-1990s, when Republican majorities
foreseen, and those floodwalls failed even though the storm waters did not rise
above the level that the walls were designed to hold.
Id.
142. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (emphasis added).
143. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(noting that the federal government should refrain from regulating traditional realms of
state sovereignty as “[c]ommerce depends upon population, but Congress could not, on
that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce”).
144. See, e.g., Paul D. Moreno, “So Long as Our System Shall Exist”: Myth, History, and the
New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 741–42 (2005) (noting that the New Feder-
alism began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s as a “cultural and intellectual reaction
against the centralization of American society”).  In the 1970s, President Nixon oversaw a
better differentiation of the roles of the federal and state governments in some of the
ambitious national regulatory endeavors that characterized his administration, including
the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.  However, these efforts are more akin to the
cooperative federalism model that the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism” has sought to
challenge. See infra Part V.B.3–5.
145. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at http://
www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/first.asp.  President Reagan further re-
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elected for the first time in four decades to both the House and Sen-
ate sought to devolve regulatory authority that had come to rest with
the federal government back to the state level.146  And yet it is the
legacy of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions during this pe-
riod—frequently referred to as the “New Federalism” cases147—that
have most drawn national attention to the revival of interest in feder-
alism issues (perhaps even disproportionately to their actual influence
on American governance148).
The New Federalism cases reinvigorate the distinction to which
Chief Justice Rehnquist alluded by adopting an especially rigid read-
ing of the dual sovereignty principle.149  Justice Scalia set forth the
New Federalism understanding of dual sovereignty in Printz v. United
States,150 the famed decision striking down portions of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) under the Tenth
Amendment as impermissibly compelling the participation of state
law enforcement officials in a federal gun control program.  Justice
Scalia explained:
It is incontestible that the Constitution established a sys-
tem of “dual sovereignty.”  Although the States surrendered
many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty . . . .”
This . . . [r]esidual state sovereignty was also implicit, of
minded the nation that “the federal government did not create the states; the states cre-
ated the federal government.” Id.
146. See CHUNG-LAE CHO & DEIL S. WRIGHT, The Devolution Revolution in Intergovernmental
Relations in the 1990s: Changes in Cooperative and Coercive State–National Relations as Perceived
by State Administrators, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 447, 450–51, 464 (2004) (noting
that “state administrators perceptions of national fiscal and regulatory influence declined
moderately yet significantly,” in contrast to the steady increase of national influence in
prior decades).
147. E.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377
(2001); Allison H. Eid, Teaching New Federalism, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 875 (2005); Richard W.
Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 1 (2003); Marci A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 WAYNE L. REV.
931 (2001).
148. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 147, at 940–41 (noting that “[t]he new federalism is R
intellectually fascinating, and scholars have something wonderful to chew on, but the
Court itself is nibbling,” due to the limited impact of the decisions on general federal
lawmaking practices).
149. See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.  For an early example of this princi-
ple, see also McCulloch v. Maryland:
No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to create a dependence
of the government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the
great powers assigned to it.  Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those
means alone was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
150. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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course, in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not
all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated
ones, . . . which implication was rendered express by the
Tenth Amendment[ ] . . . .
. . . The great innovation of this design was that “our
citizens would have two political capacities, one state and
one federal, each protected from incursion by the other”—
“a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establish-
ing two orders of government, each with its own direct rela-
tionship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by
it.”151
The premise of American dual sovereignty is hardly controversial; in-
deed, as Justice Scalia observed, the Constitution clearly anticipates a
system of government in which authority is housed at both the federal
and state levels,152 and there are clearly reservoirs of separate state
and federal powers that do not overlap.  However, the ongoing feder-
alism debate in the United States proceeds from unresolved questions
about the tricky margin between them—or where, exactly, state au-
thority begins and federal authority ends (and vice versa) when a reg-
ulatory matter triggers legitimate authority or obligation in both
spheres.  In contrast to more pragmatic models of American federal-
ism (such as contemporary cooperative federalism), the New Federal-
ism approach adopts a “strict-separationist” ideal of dual sovereignty,
characterized by exclusive realms of state and federal authority that
are protected from mutual incursion by a clearly defined boundary.
The Constitution’s presupposition that states would survive the
Union falls short of providing a clear directive in this regard, nor does
it establish the exact protocols in the relationship between state and
federal authority when areas of legitimate national and local regula-
tory interest overlap.153  The Supremacy Clause tells us that federal
law will prevail against conflicting state authority when it is enacted
pursuant to constitutionally enumerated powers,154 and McCulloch v.
Maryland155 made clear that the state and federal governments are not
151. Id. at 918–20 (citations omitted).
152. See id. at 919 (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414 (1938), for the pro-
position that the Constitution “presupposes the continued existence of the states”).
153. See supra Part II.A; see also Jackson, supra note 23, at 2191 (noting that the Constitu- R
tion’s assumption that states would continue to exist “does not tell us whether states can be
required to help carry out federal law”).
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
155. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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“dual in the sense of equal,”156 characterizing the respective sovereign-
ties of the federal and state governments as that “between the laws of a
government declared to be supreme, and those of a government
which, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.”157  However,
the New Federalism Tenth Amendment cases suggest that even consti-
tutionally enacted federal laws may not intrude upon a specially pro-
tected realm of “inviolable” state sovereignty158 by commanding state
agents (other than judges) to execute federal laws.159
1. Take 1: National League of Cities, Garcia, and the Sovereign
Functions Test
The Rehnquist Court’s efforts to protect the boundary between
state and federal regulatory authority reflect similar attempts earlier
in the century to restrict the reach of the federal government into
traditional realms of state power.  These included the Court’s 1918
and 1922 decisions invalidating federal regulation of industrial child
labor practices in Hammer v. Dagenhart160 and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co.,161 and the Court’s 1935 rejection of New Deal efforts to regulate
agricultural and industrial pricing and production in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States.162  The more significant precursor to the
New Federalism’s boundary-drawing enterprise is the Court’s 1976 de-
cision in National League of Cities v. Usery163 that the Tenth Amend-
156. Jackson, supra note 23, at 2196 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis R
added).
157. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
158. Even the vigorous dissenters in the New Federalism cases have recognized an area
of “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (B.
Wright ed., 1961) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But this vision of state sovereignty
leans on the constitutional structure itself, allowing the tripartite structure of the federal
government and its system of checks and balances to determine the realms of federal and
state authority. Id. at 550–52.
159. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); see also infra Part III.A.2.
160. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal prohibition on the shipment in inter-
state commerce of certain goods manufactured by children under the age of fourteen).
161. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (striking down a prohibitive federal tax on goods manufactured
with underage child labor).
162. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act that
attempted to regulate industrial labor standards, production, and competition).
163. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).  This decision overruled contrary precedent in Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855; see Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(rejecting a challenge to the application of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state
employees, on the grounds that such employees participate in the national market for
employment and are thus regulable under Congress’s commerce authority).  In National
League of Cities, then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that even Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority is subjected to structural limitations implied by the Tenth Amendment.  426 U.S.
at 842–43.
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ment prohibited the application of federal minimum wage and
maximum hour laws to State employees.164
Foreshadowing a subtle but important element of the approach
the Rehnquist Court would later take in its Tenth Amendment cases,
National League of Cities adopted a “sovereign functions” test, requiring
that adjudicators distinguish between ordinary activities of state gov-
ernment that could be made subject to federal law (e.g., requiring
that state employees conform their behavior to federally mandated
environmental laws and safety standards)165 and the essentially sover-
eign activities that could not be (e.g., requiring that state employees
earn a federally mandated minimum wage).166  State and federal ac-
tors struggled to make sense of the sovereign functions test for the
following ten years until National League of Cities was finally overturned
(and the test held “unworkable”) in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.167
In comparison to these earlier attempts to create judicially en-
forceable federalism constraints, the New Federalism has been much
more ambitious—invalidating large numbers of federal laws at an un-
precedented rate.168  However, it is also more measured, in that it es-
164. For an excellent comparison/contrast of approaches taken in National League of
Cities and the New Federalism cases, see Barron, supra note 48, at 2085–2100. R
165. Indeed, Justice Blackmun specified in his concurrence in National League of Cities
that the Court’s opinion “does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility com-
pliance with imposed federal standards would be essential.” Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  In dissent, Justice Stevens listed additional areas of
federal authority, where the federal government should be able to
require the State to act impartially when it hires or fires the janitor, to withhold
taxes from his paycheck, to observe safety regulations when he is performing his
job, to forbid him from burning too much soft coal in the capitol furnace, from
dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent waterway, from overloading a state-
owned garbage truck, or from driving either the truck or the Governor’s limou-
sine over 55 miles an hour.
Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 847–52 (majority opinion).
167. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
168. Professor Leon Friedman notes:
From the 1994–95 Supreme Court Term to the 1999–2000 Term, the Court
has held twenty-five separate federal laws unconstitutional . . . .  This rate is un-
precedented in our history.  The Supreme Court has nullified a total of 150 acts
of Congress on constitutional grounds since Marbury v. Madison, . . . an average of
slightly less than one act per year.  The recent trend in striking down an average
of more than four statutes each year is exceptional.
Leon Friedman, Federalism, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 13, 15 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Prac-
tice, Course Handbook Series No. H0-009C 2000) (citations omitted).  That said, it is also
possible that the high rate of reversal is attributable to boundary-testing on the part of
congressional lawmaking.
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chews the comparatively vague “sovereign functions” test for more
easily administrable, rule-based constraints—at least in its affirmative
federal power and state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.169  By con-
trast, the New Federalism Tenth Amendment cases preserve a key ele-
ment of the earlier approach even within their simple, bright-line rule
proscribing the commandeering of state entities to enforce federal
regulations.170  Although seemingly straightforward, the anti-
commandeering rule proves more complicated in application, requir-
ing renewed reliance on considerations evocative of the sovereign
functions test to distinguish between appropriate federal compromise
of state sovereign authority (such as that upheld in Reno v. Condon171)
and impermissible commandeering of state authority (such as that in-
validated in Printz v. United States172).173
2. Take 2: New York, Printz, and Condon
In New York v. United States,174 the Court first set forth the anti-
commandeering doctrine in overturning a provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (1985 Act).  The
Act required that states without adequate disposal facilities either lo-
cate an in-state facility in accordance with its terms or assume legal
liability for the waste in lieu of in-state producers.175  The Court held
that this “take-title” provision unconstitutionally commandeered the
State’s legislative function, a “ ‘residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty,’ . . . reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amend-
ment.”176  The Court further extended the anti-commandeering rule
to protect state executive function in Printz v. United States,177 in which
it struck down the Brady Act’s requirement that state police adminis-
ter background checks on potential gun purchasers during an interim
in which the federal infrastructure to perform the checks would be
created.  In Printz, the Court emphasized that “[i]t is an essential attri-
169. See Barron, supra note 48, at 2095–98. R
170. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the anti-commandeering rule).
171. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
172. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
173. See Barron, supra note 48, at 2097–98 (noting that the Tenth Amendment cases R
“raise the same conceptual difficulty posed by the sovereign functions test,” though the
focus on commandeering distinguishes them from the National League of Cities test).
174. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
175. Id. at 153–54.
176. Id. at 188 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (citation omitted)).
177. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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bute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent
and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”178
Despite the controversial facts that attended these cases,179 the
anti-commandeering rule that emerged seems at least more adminis-
trable than the National League of Cities sovereign functions test, and
most observers have been content to distinguish them on this ground.
As Justice O’Connor wrote in New York, “[w]hatever the outer limits of
[state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regu-
latory program.”180  Nevertheless, the third decision in the New
Federalism’s Tenth Amendment trio belies the simplicity of the anti-
commandeering rule.
In Reno v. Condon,181 the Court held that the Driver’s Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1994 (DPPA) did not commandeer state executive au-
thority in forbidding state motor vehicle departments from making
drivers’ personal information available to interested parties in the free
market.  Both Printz and Condon involved Tenth Amendment chal-
lenges to federal laws alleged to commandeer the regulatory authority
of state executive agents: the former by requiring them to exercise
their sovereign authority in an undesired way (to conduct background
checks) and the latter by requiring them to cease exercising sovereign
authority in a way they had desired (to stop selling drivers’ personal
information).  The Court distinguished Condon from Printz not on the
legally shaky grounds of an act/omission distinction,182 but by finding
178. Id. at 928.  The Court added that “[i]t is no more compatible with this indepen-
dence and autonomy that their officers be ‘dragooned’ . . . into administering federal law,
than it would be compatible with the independence and autonomy of the United States
that its officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws.” Id. (citation
omitted).
179. In New York, the Court’s decision was controversial in part because, prior to filing
its Tenth Amendment lawsuit, New York had been part of a group of states that lobbied
Congress to pass the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (1980 Act) and its
amendments in the 1985 Act (rather than enact preempting federal legislation), effectively
ratifying a state compact in which New York promised to build an in-state disposal site to
temporarily preserve continued access to existing sites like South Carolina’s overwhelmed
Barnwell facility. See New York, 505 U.S. at 189–99 (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).  In this regard, New York’s Tenth Amendment claim appeared unsavorily
strategic. Printz was controversial primarily for its extension of the commandeering doc-
trine from the legislative policymaking realm to the ministerial activities of the executive
branch. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 926–33.
180. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
181. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
182. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr. Greve, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 91,
93–94 (2005) (arguing that the act/omission distinction is unavailing in the context of the
anti-commandeering inquiry).  Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele reject the distinction
between acts and omissions as untenable with respect to government regulation:
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that the federally regulated activities of the state motor vehicle agents
were not within the protected sphere of inviolable state sovereignty.  Instead,
the Court reasoned that the regulated activities were of a market-par-
ticipant variety—even though the market is one in which the only ven-
dors are state motor vehicle departments.183  Only the states can
compile such complete files of citizens’ personal information, as only
the state can compel citizens to relinquish such information in ex-
change for official identification and authorization to drive on public
roads.  Although such a motor vehicle department is clearly acting
within a zone of authority available only to the state, it is apparently
not within the zone of inviolable state authority that is protected by the
Tenth Amendment.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Printz suggests a similar dis-
tinction.  Though she agreed that “[t]he Brady Act violates the Tenth
Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement
officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun own-
ers,”184 she also made clear that “the Court appropriately refrains
from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting require-
ments imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to
its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid.”185  For example, in
Justice O’Connor’s view, the Printz decision did not reach require-
ments like those on state and local law enforcement agencies to relay
information about missing children to the U.S. Department of Justice,
which coordinates interstate searches for abducted children.186  But
what distinguishes the “ministerial” nature of reporting on missing
children from the sovereign function of reporting on criminal
history?
At least one court struggling with the distinction concluded that
it is not because the administration of criminal justice is a core feature
In our view, any effort to distinguish between acts and omissions goes wrong by
overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent.  If correct,
this point has broad implications for criminal and civil law.  Whatever the general
status of the act/omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy, the distinc-
tion is least impressive when applied to government, because the most plausible
underlying considerations do not apply to official actors.  The most fundamental
point is that, unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice
between or among possible policies for regulating third parties.  The distinction
between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it
is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermuele, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  Acts, Omissions,
and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 720–21 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
183. Condon, 528 U.S. at 147, 150–51.
184. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 936.
186. Id.
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of state sovereign power.  In American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey,
Inc. v. County of Hudson,187 a New Jersey appellate court relied on Con-
don to overcome Tenth Amendment objections raised after a federal
regulation requiring nondisclosure of the identities of detained ter-
rorist suspects was promulgated specifically to preempt a New Jersey
law requiring that names of prisoners held in state facilities be re-
leased.188  The court reasoned that this federal law regulated New
Jersey not as a sovereign state but merely as the owner of a database of
prisoners’ personal information, just as the DPPA regulated the states
as owners of databases about their citizens personal information.189
The court observed that even then, “while the states have traditionally
administered and regulated the issuance of drivers licenses, they have
never been empowered to regulate immigration and naturalization
matters.”190
Indeed they have not, but states have always been empowered to
regulate the administration of criminal justice in accordance with
state constitutional considerations of due process that may exceed the
federal floor.  This conflict highlights the interjurisdictional nature of
the problem (which may ultimately offer the more compelling ratio-
nale for the outcome, if the compelling nature of the federal interests
outweighed those of the state in this particular corner of the gray
area).  But it also reveals how the anti-commandeering inquiry forces
the adjudicator into a posture that is awkward at best (and disingenu-
ous at worst), either evaluating whether the compromised sovereign
function is worthy of Tenth Amendment protection or selectively
characterizing the inquiry to obscure the task.
Examples like these show that, while the New Federalism ap-
proach appears tidier than its predecessors, it nevertheless draws from
the same conceptual realm as the National League of Cities zone of inte-
gral state authority.191  In comparison to the earlier approach, the
187. 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
188. Id. at 638–39, 654–55.
189. See id. at 655 (“If federal regulations restricting the release of information compiled
by state motor vehicle departments pass constitutional muster, then regulations restricting
the release of information compiled by state correctional facilities about INS detainees
certainly do as well.”).
190. Id.
191. See Barron, supra note 48, at 2097 (observing that the categories of New Federalism R
cases “protecting state sovereign immunity and . . . barring commandeering . . . appear to
rest on something like a sovereign functions test,” but concluding that the anti-comman-
deering cases most directly raise the same difficulties posed by the invalidated National
League of Cities test).  Although the anti-commandeering cases do require the Court to “in-
dependently classify[ ] certain state functions . . . as being more ‘sovereign’ than others,”
Professor Barron notes that both the sovereign immunity and anti-commandeering cases
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New Federalism Tenth Amendment cases focus on the more limiting
prohibition against commandeering.  But in differentiating between
the state activities with which federal interference constitutes com-
mandeering and the rest, the decisions inadvertently resurrect a strict-
separationist understanding of dual sovereignty, complete with mutu-
ally exclusive state and federal spheres.  Especially in application to
the murkier realm of state executive action, the anti-commandeering
rule requires that courts distinguish between the truly “sovereign” ar-
eas of state authority that are inviolable by federal regulatory com-
mands and other areas of state authority that remain vulnerable to
federal compulsion.192
State legislative authority most clearly falls within the zone of pro-
tected sovereignty, and it is easy to see why that would be so, but the
realms in which state executive agents wield their authority are harder
to differentiate.  State authority implicated in performing a back-
ground check on state citizens is protected, but state authority impli-
cated in gathering and reporting information about state citizens
(e.g., missing children to the federal government, or drivers’ informa-
tion to willing buyers) is not.  The Court explains that the distinction
hinges on whether the federal law requires a state to regulate its own
citizens as part of a federal regulatory program,193 a consideration
that certainly holds currency in the defense of dual sovereignty.  Nev-
ertheless, the degree of parsing required by the distinction becomes
troubling when comparing (1) the activity protected by the Tenth
Amendment in Printz, where the state would have provided informa-
tion to citizens (gun dealers) in accordance with the same federal law
that tells those citizens to whom they may sell guns, and (2) the activ-
ity left unprotected in Condon, where compliance with the relevant
federal law requires that the state refrain from disseminating informa-
tion directly to its own citizens.  Unless the two are distinguished as act
and omission—a distinction so riddled with problems that it simply
cannot bear the weight this constitutional discrimination calls for194—
attempt to overcome the “unworkability” problem by focusing on a prohibited mechanism
of enforcement (e.g., citizen suit, commandeering), rather than on attempting to define
“the distinction between those functions associated with sovereignty and those that are
not.” Id. at 2097–98.
192. See id. at 2097 (noting that the Tenth Amendment decisions distinguish between
the types of state activity protected by the New Federalism stance, “making state regulation
somehow more sovereign than state service provision or even state information gathering
and dissemination”).
193. E.g., Condon, 528 U.S. at 150–51 (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505,
514–15 (1988)).
194. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 182, at 93–94.  Taking the challenged federal law R
in Printz as an example, Professor Chemerinsky notes that although the requirement that
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then it is hard to understand without some recourse to sovereign-
functions-like reasoning.
To the extent the anti-commandeering rule invokes the same
conceptual difficulties that undermined the National League of Cities
sovereign functions test, the New Federalism Tenth Amendment cases
leave an unsettled jurisprudential wake.  They also demonstrate how
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence will inevitably do more than simply
state a rule, such as the seemingly simple anti-commandeering rule.
Rather, interpreting the Tenth Amendment puts flesh on the bones of
constitutional dual sovereignty, providing contour to the theoretical
model of federalism in play.   As the principal representation of the
dual sovereignty directive, the Tenth Amendment is the primary
guardian of the federalism values implied by dual sovereignty, and in
any given federalism model, made justiciable to vindicate that model.
New Federalism renders the Tenth Amendment justiciable in terms of
the anti-commandeering rule, in service of the strict-separationist
ideal.
3. The Jurisprudential Quest for Absolutes
The debate over conflicts between essential state and federal reg-
ulatory authority have preoccupied Americans since the founding of
the republic.195  It continued through the Civil War era and its after-
math, during the industrial revolution and its accompanying period of
Lochnerian “laissez-faire constitutionalism,” and into the New Deal
and post-New Deal eras.196  What is novel about the New Federalism
approach is the ease and absoluteness with which it purports to recog-
nize the distinction that so troubled the Supreme Court in both Garcia
states run background checks before issuing firearms permits has been characterized as a
congressional command, it is just as easily characterized as a prohibition against states
issuing permits unless they run background checks.  Moving on to Condon, he explains that
it seems that [the DPPA] is a prohibition against states from releasing driver’s
license information.  The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 says that state
Departments of Motor Vehicles cannot release certain information, such as home
addresses, Social Security numbers, and driver’s license information.  Dr. Greve
said that is a prohibition.  I think it just as easily can be understood as a com-
mand.  Congress commanded the states to keep this information secret.  Com-
mand or prohibition, I think they are interchangeable.  To me, what is important
is when do [we] allow the states to make the choices, and when not.  And I think
that we should empower the states to make choices unless there is clear congres-
sional prohibition.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Sunstein & Vermuele, supra note 182, at 720–21 (discussing R
the problems of applying the act/omission distinction to government action).
195. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
196. E.g., Barron, supra note 48, at 2085–87. R
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and National League of Cities,197 positing mutually exclusive state and
federal regulatory spheres despite increasingly troubling areas of in-
terjurisdictional concern.198  Articulating the conviction that most ani-
mates the New Federalism decisions, Justice Scalia warned in Printz
that “[i]t is an essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty
that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper
sphere of authority”199—but without clarifying exactly what that
“proper” sphere of authority is.200
Doubts about the theoretical resilience of this alleged boundary
between the “proper spheres” of state and federal regulatory authority
have engendered both scholarly criticism and practical confusion.
Some have argued that the Court’s invocation of mutually exclusive
spheres of state and federal jurisdiction reflects an anachronistic no-
tion of federalism that ignores well-established realms of concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction,201 including commercial, consumer,
and economic affairs,202 criminal law,203 and the environment.204
197. It is noteworthy that in National League of Cities, there appeared to be no true major-
ity adherence to the proposition that the distinction between inviolable and violable state
functions could be categorically distinguished.  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion re-
quired the vote of Justice Blackmun to overcome the dissenting Justices.  In his concur-
rence, Justice Blackmun made clear that he believed the distinction could be made, at best,
through a balancing test. See supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text. R
198. See infra Part IV.A.
199. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
200. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 23, at 2193 (noting that the Printz Court’s recognition R
of spheres of state sovereignty “begs the question of what that proper sphere of authority
is”).  Justice Scalia’s statement is notably similar to the National League of Cities approach,
which asserted that the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal laws from interfering with the
sovereign functions of the states, without clearly establishing how to identify such pro-
tected state functions.  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851–55 (1976).
201. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831–32,
938–39 (1998) (deeming the New Federalism’s view of mutually exclusive state and federal
regulatory spheres as “palpably untrue”); Jackson, supra note 23, at 2196 (discussing the R
“outmoded” basis for the dual sovereignty approach); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1564–66 (1994) (critiqu-
ing the New Federalism model’s reliance on the territorial view of federalism).
202. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1382–85 (describing overlapping R
state and federal jurisdiction in products liability law); A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commer-
cial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 299–300 (2003) (discussing the advent of cooper-
ative federal commercial laws, with particular emphasis on the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdic-
tion, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 145 (2001) (noting that
“[s]tate and federal governments have broad concurrent regulatory authority over the
economy”).
203. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1541, 1553 (2002) (“[W]here federal criminal laws regulate conduct already regulated by
the states, such federal legislation does not displace the state criminal-justice system, but
rather supplements it with concurrent jurisdiction.”).
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Even if those realms were regarded as recent examples of federalism
failure,205 vast areas of state and federal law have long been closely
intertwined.  For example, the law of bankruptcy—explicitly dele-
gated by the Constitution to the federal government206—relies heavily
on state law definitions of property.207  Confusion following the
Court’s charge to protect this disputed boundary has already spawned
uncertain legal challenges and regulatory failures in interjurisdic-
tional contexts.208
Meanwhile, others have applauded the New Federalism’s
boundary-drawing enterprise, stressing the need for judicially enforce-
able federalism constraints that protect strict-separationist dual sover-
eignty,209 lest expanding Commerce Clause jurisdiction enables
Congress to legislate on whatever subject it chooses so long as the bill
is cloaked in the disingenuous but legitimizing guise of a putative rela-
tionship to interstate commerce.210  Even proponents of the New Fed-
eralism have taken it to task for its failure to fully protect the
boundary by limiting the spending power, concerned that it enables
the federal government to sidestep all other federalism constraints by
coercively bribing the states to participate in federal regulatory
programs.211
204. See, e.g., Hubert H. Humphrey III & LeRoy C. Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in
Environmental Enforcement: A Proposal for a More Effective And More Efficient Relationship, 14
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 7, 13–14 (1990) (discussing shared federal and state jurisdiction over
environmental regulation and enforcement).
205. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 131–33 (2005) (arguing that the federal government has become
overly involved in some areas of environmental regulation in which the states would per-
form better in less centralized programs of regulation); Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra
in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 104–06
(2006) (critiquing federal integration of state criminal law).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
207. See, e.g., Nadborny, supra note 32, at 889 (noting that although certain property R
interests are determined by federal standards, “[i]t is in fact common for bankruptcy
courts to look to state law for guidance in determining what constitutes property of the
bankruptcy estate”).
208. See infra Part IV.A.1.b.
209. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 128 (2001) (discussing the necessity for judicial review of
federalism questions to restrain Congress); Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 132, 137–43 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court could “pursue
a more ambitious theory of structural federalism” to restrict Congress’s powers).
210. William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in
the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 782–83, 797–98.
211. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Federalism and the Spending Power from Dole to Birmingham
Board of Education, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 205, 205–06 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006)
(discussing how South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 703 (1987), provides a loophole through
which Congress may continue to regulate the states beyond what is condoned in other
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In any event, the New Federalism cases jarred decades of congres-
sional complacency about the breadth of national power by rejecting a
series of federal laws held to transgress the reinvigorated boundary
between state and federal jurisdiction.  In the standard litany of New
Federalism decisions, the Court has disqualified federal attempts to
compel state participation in federal regulatory regimes,212 champi-
oned state immunity from citizen suits (despite congressional at-
tempts to hold states accountable to federal antidiscrimination and
other laws),213 and asserted the limits of federal regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause214 and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.215  These decisions have been variously characterized as
a revival of judicial enforcement of structural limitations on federal
power,216 an assault on national antidiscrimination norms,217 a renais-
areas of the New Federalism jurisprudence); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting
Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499–500 (2003) (arguing that the Court’s decision
in Dole allows Congress to pursue goals under the Spending Clause that it otherwise could
not have pursued); cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1523–26, 1531–32 (2004) (suggesting ways
for the Rehnquist Court to tighten its Commerce Clause jurisprudence and to clearly sig-
nal Congress of its intentions).
212. See supra notes 174–185 and accompanying text. R
213. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (holding that Title I of
the ADA does not abrogate state immunity from private citizen damage suits); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78–79 (2000) (precluding the ADEA from abrogating states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by private individuals); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress does not have Article I power to subject states to
citizen suits in their own state courts without consent); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (striking down a federal statute,
which explicitly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity, because it exceeded Congress’s
power under Article I); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (concluding that federal courts did not maintain jurisdiction to
entertain individual suits against states where sovereign immunity was not waived or prop-
erly abrogated by a federal statute); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287–88
(1997) (refusing to allow a Native American tribe to file claims against state officials in
federal court on state sovereign immunity grounds); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause
to eliminate the states’ sovereign immunity).
214. See cases cited supra note 1. R
215. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (determining that the private damages remedy
against states in Title I of the ADA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (finding the federal civil remedy sec-
tion of the VAWA unconstitutional under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82–83 (deeming the requirements imposed on state and local govern-
ments by the ADEA as outside the scope of congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking application of
the RFRA to the states because it exceeded Congress’s power under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
216. E.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 951–52 (2001) (arguing, that because states are not properly
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sance of state sovereignty,218 and an assertion of judicial supremacy.219
Some opponents view the decisions as the purely partisan pursuit of a
substantively conservative agenda,220 while some proponents call for a
rounding out of the New Federalism jurisprudence by articulating
clearer boundaries on Congress’s regulatory authority under the
Spending Clause.221  The decisions have attracted considerable atten-
tion among jurists, lawmakers, and scholars,222 and if they have not
protected by “political safeguards,” the federal courts play an important role in protecting
state sovereignty (internal quotation marks omitted)).
217. E.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142
(2002) (suggesting that “an anti-anti discrimination agenda, deeply felt but as yet poorly
theorized, is working itself out in the current Court’s jurisprudence”).
218. E.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual
Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819,
821 (1999) (defending the Court’s rhetoric about the inherent respect for states as sepa-
rate sovereigns). But see Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93,
97–98 (2002) (critiquing the “dignity” theme of the Court’s state sovereign immunity cases
within a framework otherwise sympathetic to the New Federalism cases (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
219. E.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001) (noting “a subtle, unacknowledged shift in the Court’s under-
standing of judicial review that has troubling consequences for constitutional doctrine and
for constitutionalism generally” as the “Court no longer views itself as first among equals,
but has instead staked its claim to being the only institution empowered to speak with
authority when it comes to the meaning of the Constitution”).
220. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1255 (2002) (critiquing the Rehnquist Court’s record as “a jurispru-
dence of judicial results, not of judicial method—nothing more and nothing less”).
221. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 211, at 1528 (suggesting that the Justices have not R
clearly articulated the boundaries of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); Gar-
nett, supra note 147, at 5–6 (maintaining that the Court’s Spending Clause decisions are at R
odds with the New Federalism jurisprudence); cf. Baker, supra note 211, at 218 (positing R
that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seemingly inconsistent Spending Clause opinions can be
understood when one focuses on the issue of whether Congress is regulating an area where
the states are historically sovereign or regulating an area that is traditionally federal).
222. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 205, at 172–76 (discussing the federal government’s envi- R
ronmental management tactics and the negative consequences on state environmental pol-
icy); Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the
Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 847, 859 (1982) (explaining the New Federalism’s
implications for public lands and natural resources management issues in the Western
United States); Berman, supra note 211, at 1489–90 (addressing how the Court’s decision R
in Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003), which affirmed a federal statute restricting
certain information collected by governmental agencies from use as trial evidence, fits into
the larger New Federalism jurisprudence); Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Feder-
alism in Progressive Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 403, 404–05 (2002) (discussing the interaction between the New Feder-
alism and the “living Commerce Clause” constitutional theory); Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative
Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 65 (Daphne A. Kenyon
& John Kincaid eds., 1991); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 570, 570–71 (1996) (arguing that the decentralization movement is problematic in
the environmental context, where central administration is often needed); Hills, supra
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significantly altered the continued intermingling of state and federal
jurisdiction in many areas of American law,223 they have at least
changed the way the legal community thinks about American federal-
ism.  The vocabulary of the New Federalism has altered the lexicon of
the legislators (and their staff) who make new laws and the judges
(and their law clerks) who interpret them—and as an entrenched ele-
ment of law school constitutional law curricula,224 it is likely to con-
tinue to do so for some time.
B. Federalism, Preemption, and the Reallocation of Authority into
Mutually Exclusive Spheres
Despite varying emphases in analysis, most accounts share the un-
derstanding that a unifying theme among the New Federalism deci-
sions is the “vindication of state authority relative to the federal
government.”225  However, examining them in the context of the
note 201, at 817–18 (proposing a functional theory, rather than the New Federalism’s dual R
sovereignty approach, to determine the proper limits on state autonomy); Jackson, supra
note 23, at 2181–83 (maintaining that the categorical rule adopted in Printz is insufficient R
to retain the flexibility required to preserve a working model of federalism); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 189, 237–40 (2002) (addressing the relationship between a model of collabora-
tive ecosystem governance and decentralized environmental management); John Kincaid,
The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal Democracy, in COMPETI-
TION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 87 (positing that competitive feder-
alism, as opposed to the cooperative model of federalism that rose to prominence in the
New Deal era, is the proper solution for current federalism problems); Robert A. Schapiro,
Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1413–17
(1999) (noting that despite the Court’s insistence that the states and the federal govern-
ment operate in separate spheres, federal courts should be an available forum for ex-
panded individual rights in state constitutions); Van Alstyne, supra note 210, at 782–83 R
(observing that congressional use of the Commerce Clause is dubious if used for areas of
traditional state authority, like marriage and divorce); Phillip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitu-
tional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 666 (2001) (proposing a
view of cooperative federalism that addresses the concerns of the New Federalism move-
ment and retains elements of federal regulatory power).
223. As discussed throughout this Article, cooperative federalism remains the norm in
federal-state regulatory partnership approaches to consumer finance, air and water pollu-
tion, telecommunications, national security, criminal law enforcement, and many other
areas of the law.
224. See, e.g., Eid, supra note 147, at 875 (examining the role of the New Federalism on R
the approach and extent to teaching federalism in law school); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT (2003) (containing sections on the “Rehnquist
Revolution” in the Commerce Clause context and on general limits of federal power).
225. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1355; see also Barron, supra note 147, at R
411–12 (“Although the limitation has been criticized from many perspectives, even the
critics assume that the limitation protects local autonomy.”); John O. McGinnis, Reviving
Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV.
485, 487 (2002) (“The Rehnquist Court jurisprudence is designed to sustain this more
decentralized system of order by protecting the autonomy of decentralized ‘discovery ma-
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Rehnquist Court’s overall jurisprudence—especially its preemption
cases over the same time period—suggests a broader project of differ-
entiating mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal regulatory au-
thority and protecting each from incursion by the other side.  While
the federalism cases doctrinally protect a realm of state authority from
federal incursion, the preemption cases functionally protect an ex-
panded realm of federal authority from state incursion—despite the
long-standing presumption against preemption in cases with signifi-
cant federalism implications.226
1. Increased Protection of the Local Sphere from National Incursion
According to the common wisdom, the Rehnquist Court’s juris-
prudence has resurrected political regard for state government as the
best and most democratic champion of the will of the people,227 and
invested with judicially enforceable clout the notion that public deci-
sionmaking should take place as locally as possible.228  Accordingly,
Professor Richard Garnett observes that the New Federalism has
“brought back to the public-law table the notion that the Constitution
is a charter for a [federal] government of limited and enumerated
powers, one that is constrained both by that charter’s text and by the
structure of the government it creates and authorizes.”229  In addition
to the standard litany, he points to several other areas of the Rehn-
quist Court’s jurisprudence that further reflect an effort to protect a
zone of state authority from federal incursion, including: (1) the
Court’s increasing use of the “avoidance canon,” which exhorts judi-
cial interpretations that avoid raising difficult constitutional issues
chines’ for social norms, like mediating institutions and state government, from the en-
croachments of more centralized power.”).
226. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“In all pre-emption cases,
and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Wis.
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605–06 (1991) (applying presumption against
preemption to a local regulation).
227. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 225, at 490–91 (explaining that the New Federalism R
rediscovers sections of the Constitution that leave decisionmaking authority to the citizen,
state, or local levels).
228. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 147, at 378 (noting that “the current federalism revival R
draws strength from the current skepticism towards centralization—with the specter of big
government and the constraints that it raises—and the current ascendancy of decentraliza-
tion, with the prospect of self-government and freedom that it offers”).
229. Garnett, supra note 147, at 12.  Nevertheless, Professor Garnett takes the New Fed- R
eralism to task for stopping short of setting meaningful limits to Congress’s authority
under the Spending Power. Id. at 5–6.
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(e.g., the scope of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause);230 (2) the Court’s body of habeas corpus cases, which “reflect
New Federalism-style deference to state-law procedures, state-court de-
terminations, and state legislatures’ policy preferences;”231 and (3)
the Court’s evolving Establishment and Free Exercise Clause jurispru-
dence, which promote “more variation, experimentation, and accom-
modation by States and localities.”232
2. Increased Protection of the National Sphere from Local Incursion
However, a closer look at the entirety of the Rehnquist Court’s
decisions reveals a more complex jurisprudence that champions local
government less consistently than suggested by the rhetoric in the ar-
eas identified by Professor Garnett.  The list of New Federalism cases
that curtail federal authority in favor of the states are partnered with a
less conspicuous litany of aggressive preemption decisions that effec-
tively curtail traditional state and local authority in favor of expanded
exclusive federal jurisdiction233—even in close cases involving areas of
traditional state prerogative, such as tort, health, and safety law.234
230. Id. at 13–14 & n.63.
231. Id. at 14.
232. Id. at 14–15.  Curiously, Professor Garnett also points to the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence as an example of this trend, but his argument here is less persuasive and
supported by reference to positions taken mostly in dissenting opinions. Id. at 14 & n.67.
233. E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); see also Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra
note 31, at 1356–58 (noting the quiet rise of federal preemption decisions by the Rehn- R
quist Court in the state commercial law context); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s
Judicial Passivity,  2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369 (noting that “[t]he five Justices most protec-
tive of state autonomy in constitutional federalism cases are the Justices who most often
join opinions finding state laws preempted”); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, DIS-
SENT MAG., Spring 2005, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=249 (noting
that the Rehnquist Court pursued a nationalist agenda to find many state consumer pro-
tection laws preempted by federal mandate). But see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick,
Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
43, 47 (2006) (presenting empirical data that suggests “no clear decisional trend in pre-
emption law”).  However, Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey suggest
that trends are evident in the voting patterns of individual Justices.  Issacharoff & Sharkey,
supra note 31, at 1366–67 n.42; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehn- R
quist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 569, 571, 611–12 (2003) (positing
that Justice Scalia, a staunch advocate of states’ rights in most aspects of the New Federal-
ism agenda, departs from the conservative bloc to approve preemption in some contexts).
234. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1356–57, 1382–84, 1420–21 (not- R
ing the trend of preemption of claims in areas of products liability, medical malpractice,
and punitive damages despite the fact that tort law is among the most traditional realms of
state common law).  This stands in contrast to the Court’s past deference to traditional
areas of state regulatory authority such as public health and safety. See Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (“Legislation designed to free from
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While the federalism cases doctrinally enlarge an exclusive realm of
state authority from federal regulatory incursion, the preemption
cases functionally enlarge a realm of federal authority from state and
local regulatory incursion, rounding out the strict-separationist ideal
in which the states and federal government occupy mutually exclusive
spheres without overlap.  Voting coalitions are less coherent in the
preemption cases (and some decisions more Solomon-like, preempt-
ing some but not all claims under review).235  But within them, New
Federalism concerns often appear inverted: many Justices most likely
to protect state authority from federal incursion in the standard New
Federalism decisions are also most likely to vote in favor of federal
preemption of state and local law in preemption cases.236
Of course, the Supremacy Clause clearly invests the federal gov-
ernment with superior power in the jurisdictional realms it is dele-
gated by the Constitution,237 and the preemption decisions—
essentially statutory interpretation cases—cannot be understood as
formal statements by the Court on the question of federalism.  How-
ever, neither are they wholly insignificant in a review of the functional
impact of the Court’s decisions since the onset of the New Federalism
revival.238  In one sense, preemption cases ask the Justices not to con-
sider their own views about the proper balance of state and federal
power, but to determine what Congress intended in passing the fed-
pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most
traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.”).
235. See, e.g., CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 673, 675 (finding that the Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970 preempted negligence claims regarding excessive speed of the train but did
not preempt claims for failure to warn); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530–31 (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted a common
law failure to warn and a fraudulent misrepresentation claim but did not preempt all state
law damages claims).
236. For example, in Cipollone, New Federalism champion Justice Scalia wrote separately
to find that all claims were preempted under ordinary principles of statutory interpreta-
tion, 505 U.S. at 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part),
while New Federalism opponent Justice Blackmun found that none of the claims were pre-
empted. Id. at 531–32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).  New Federalism proponents also joined opinions finding
federal preemption in Geier, 529 U.S. at 863 (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
JJ.), and Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 530 (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, JJ.).  Justice Thomas is a notable exception, a faithful member of the New Feder-
alism coalition who tends to be leery of preemption. See, e.g., CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 676
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that none of respondent’s claims was
preempted).
237. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
238. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 939–41 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Court had disingenuously avoided the patent federalism issues raised
by the Court’s statutory interpretation upholding Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act, espe-
cially in light of its previous holding in Raich).
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eral statute at issue.  On the other hand, the Rehnquist Court’s noted
shift from the “legislative intent” to the “plain-meaning” approach to
statutory interpretation empowers the Court at the expense of Con-
gress in deciding what a statute should be taken to mean.239  This be-
comes especially important when coupled with the Court’s threshold
decision of whether or not to not allow federalism considerations to
inform the statutory analysis.
For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,240 the Court began its analysis
of a Missouri constitutional provision mandating judicial retirement
age with a famous statement of federalism principles that ushered in
the New Federalism era.241  The Court upheld the Missouri provision
against the plaintiffs’ claim that it violated the federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,242 but only after reviewing how the principles of
federalism informed its interpretation.243  “As every schoolchild
learns,” Justice O’Connor began, “our Constitution establishes a sys-
tem of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment,” establishing a baseline of federalism concerns from which to
consider the relationship between the competing state and federal
laws.244
By contrast, the most controversial preemption cases that fol-
lowed were decided without overt consideration of federalism princi-
ples—except in the vociferous dissents.  For example, in its unusually
broad endorsement of federal preemption in Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co.,245 the Court held that a common law defective design claim
for failure to equip an automobile with a driver-side airbag was pre-
empted by a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard.  Interestingly,
Justice Breyer’s pro-preemption majority opinion was joined by four
of the most consistent champions of the New Federalism cases (Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy),246
while most of the usual New Federalism opponents dissented (Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, along with New Federalism supporter
239. See, e.g., Note, Michael Gadeberg, Presumptuous Preemption: How “Plain Meaning”
Trumped Congressional Intent in Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 453 (2005) (arguing that preemption analysis must
rely either on legislative intent or plain meaning, and that in rejecting legislative history for
the textualist approach, the Court empowers itself at the expense of Congress).
240. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
241. Id. at 457.
242. Id. at 473.
243. Id. at 457–64.
244. Id. at 457.
245. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
246. Id. at 863–64.
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Justice Thomas).247  Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens quoted
from recent New Federalism cases in admonishing that “[t]his is a
case about federalism, that is, about respect for the constitutional role
of the States as sovereign entities.”248  He further explained that the
Court’s holding
raises important questions concerning the way in which the
Federal Government may exercise its undoubted power to
oust state courts of their traditional jurisdiction over com-
mon-law tort actions.  The rule the Court enforces today was
not enacted by Congress and is not to be found in the text of
any Executive Order or regulation.  It has a unique origin: It
is the product of the Court’s interpretation of the final com-
mentary accompanying an interim administrative regulation
and the history of airbag regulation generally.249
Given that “[t]ort law in America is built on the bedrock of state com-
mon law,”250 the majority’s preemption finding indicates the impor-
tance it must have attached to the national interest in what has
historically been an area of traditional state concern.
Likewise, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,251 an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas,252 the Court held that state regulations
prohibiting cigarette and cigar advertising on billboards within 1,000
feet of a school or playground were preempted by the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).  Joined by Justices Gins-
burg, Breyer, and Souter, Justice Stevens dissented,253 invoking a long
line of precedent counseling judicial restraint before federal statutes
are construed to preempt “the historic police powers of the States,”
given that the state law “implicate[s] two powers that lie at the heart of
the States’ traditional police power—the power to regulate land usage
and the power to protect the health and safety of minors.”254
247. Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 236 (discussing Justice Thomas’s R
voting record against preemption as a marked exception to the generalization at issue).
248. Id. at 887 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).
249. Id.
250. Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (1997).
251. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
252. Id. at 530, 550–51.
253. Id. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In a less divided case, Engine Manu-
facturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, the Court similarly overturned
both lower courts in holding that local regulations requiring the purchase and leasing of
fuel efficient vehicles by state-connected fleet operators was preempted as an emission
“standard” under the Clean Air Act (CAA).  541 U.S. 246, 258–59 (2004).  The Ninth Cir-
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One wonders whether the statutory interpretations in Geier and
Lorillard might have proceeded differently had the Court began with
the same kind of historical federalism inquiry with which it com-
menced its analysis in Gregory.  Either way, the text of Gregory itself pro-
vides a rationale by which to distinguish them that reinforces the New
Federalism’s resurrection of the hapless National League of Cities sover-
eign functions distinction.  Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor
emphasized: “[t]he present case concerns a state constitutional provi-
sion through which the people of Missouri establish a qualification for
those who sit as their judges. This provision goes beyond an area tradi-
tionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most fundamen-
tal sort for a sovereign entity.”255  Again, the implication is that
different state laws possess different degrees of sovereign integrity,
warranting different levels of judicially enforceable federalism protec-
tion.  In this realm, the “more sovereign” the state law, the more def-
erential to state interests the preemption analysis should be.
Partnered with the standard New Federalism cases, the Rehnquist
Court’s willingness to expand federal regulatory reach into traditional
cuit had affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the local agency had not set imper-
missible emission standards but instead permissibly regulated the purchasing choices by
state agents and state contractors of vehicles already in production and certified for sale
within the state (and that it legitimately did so to protect citizens from the disproportion-
ate incidence of asthma and other respiratory health problems suffered in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area).  Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 309 F.3d 550,
551 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 158 F.
Supp. 2d 1107, 1109, 1117–20 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).  New Federalism champion Justice Scalia
authored the terse majority opinion, Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 248, which was joined
by all other Justices except New Federalism opponent Justice Souter, whose passionate
dissent invoked federalism concerns about this incursion into the traditional realms of the
state’s police power to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 260–61 (Souter,
J., dissenting).  As Justice Souter explained:
[I]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those [where] Congress has legis-
lated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. . . .
The pertinence of this presumption against federal preemption is clear enough
from the terms of the [Clean Air] Act itself: § 101 states that “air pollution pre-
vention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any measures, of the
amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air pollution con-
trol at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.”  42
U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) . . . .  The resulting presumption against displacing law en-
acted or authorized by a State applies both to the question whether Congress
intended any pre-emption at all and to questions concerning the scope of
[§ 209(a)’s] intended invalidation of state law.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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realms of state law256 suggests that its federalism project is not so sim-
ply about the vindication of state authority.  Though both sets of cases
concern the allocation of regulatory authority between the state and
federal governments, the Court’s more strident rhetoric in the New
Federalism decisions is matched by quieter tones in the preemption
opinions257 that attract less attention but send potentially more power-
ful reverberations into the balance of state and federal power.  In-
deed, in stark contrast to the states’ rights tenor of New Federalism,
the increasing federal preemption of state laws was recently character-
ized by Georgia State Senator Don Balfour as “unwanted power grabs
by the federal government [that] subvert the federal system, choke off
innovation, and ignore diversity among states.”258  The Court’s takings
jurisprudence over the same time period shows a similar willingness to
second-guess the regulatory judgment of state and local governments
in the traditional state realm of land use law,259 contrasting with the
256. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 48, at 2112 (consumer protection law); Keith R. Fisher, R
Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Pro-
tection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 994–98 (2006) (state banking laws); Is-
sacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1382–85 (products liability law); Catherine M. R
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 19–21), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900020) (deference to federal agencies encroaching on tradi-
tional areas of state law).
257. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (warning that the Court
must not allow the growth of federal regulatory jurisdiction to “obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized govern-
ment” (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))), with Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding simply that “[t]he rule of state
tort law for which petitioners argue would stand as an ‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment of
[the federal standard].  And the statute foresees the application of ordinary principles of
pre-emption in cases of actual conflict.  Hence, the tort action is pre-empted.”).
258. John Pendergrass, States Heating Up As Feds Cool Off, 23 ENVTL. FORUM 8, at 8 (May/
June 2006).
259. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627–30 (2001) (rejecting state
administrative agency’s determinations in regulatory takings context); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388–96 (1994) (finding that a municipally imposed exaction consti-
tuted a taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–32 (1992) (finding that
a state coastal preservation statute constituted a regulatory taking); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838–42 (1987) (concluding that a municipally imposed exaction
constituted a taking). But see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005)
(finding that municipal condemnation of distressed lands for economic development ful-
filled the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341–43 (2002) (declining to find a municipal
temporary moratorium on regional development a per se taking).  Similar to the preemp-
tion cases, the voting coalitions are notably reversed in the takings cases, with the New
Federalist champions most likely to reject state and local regulations as takings, and the
usual New Federalism dissenters most likely to uphold the state and local regulations
against takings challenges.
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New Federalism rhetoric of inviolate state “dignity” in the state sover-
eign immunity cases.260
Intended or otherwise, the combined effect of the New Federal-
ism and coincident preemption cases is to galvanize a particular as-
signment of regulatory roles within the strict-separationist dual
sovereignty ideal.  That the preemption cases carve out a zone of fed-
eral authority from incursion by the states is unsurprising; after all,
preemption cases have always done this.  The very nature of a preemp-
tion case recognizes that there are arenas in which both the states and
the federal government may regulate until the federal government
chooses to displace state efforts under the Supremacy Clause.  Still,
preemption cases from the New Federalism era stand out—partly be-
cause they appear to have disregarded the presumption against pre-
emption in realms that implicate “the historic police powers of the
States”261 and partly because they do so at the same time that the New
Federalism asserts the inviolability of conceptually related realms of
state sovereignty.
Considered holistically, then, perhaps the best characterization of
the Rehnquist Court’s federalism legacy is that it not only seeks to
protect a zone of local authority from national incursion, but also to
reallocate powers between the states and the federal government into
separate spheres according to a specific vision about the proper home
for different kinds of regulatory authority.262  Drawing these links be-
tween the New Federalism cases and the accompanying preemption
and takings cases, Professor David Barron observes that
the current “federalism” revival does not simply protect
states’ rights.  It reallocates powers between the federal gov-
ernment and state and local ones, simultaneously limiting
Professor David Barron, among others, has accordingly observed that
[h]istorically, [the Takings] clause required the government to compensate pri-
vate owners when it seized their land, but not when it merely regulated how they
could develop it.  Over the last decade or so, the Court has treated more and
more land-use regulations—such as restrictions on beachfront development or
requirements that developers take steps to limit the costs imposed on the public
by new construction—as if they were outright land grabs.  As a result, the govern-
ment increasingly risks multimillion-dollar claims by developers.  By changing
constitutional doctrine in this way, the Court departs from its view of states and
localities as autonomous sovereigns entitled to respect.  Instead, it intimates at
times that they are nothing more than petty extortionists seeking to rob private
businesses.
Barron, supra note 233. R
260. See supra note 213 (listing the New Federalism state sovereign immunity cases). R
261. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text. R
262. Barron, supra note 48, at 2116. R
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and extending the scope of each. . . .  When it comes to
nonmarket social issues, the Court carves out a domain of
state and local power that is immune to federal legislative
interference because of the “economic” requirement. . . .
With respect to market matters, by contrast, the Court con-
sistently decides against “overreaching” by states and locali-
ties and legitimates business-backed federal efforts to curb
state and local regulations.  So, the Court finds that federal
statutes trump state consumer protection laws or that local
government land-use measures are unconstitutional.263
In this regard, and consistent with the separationist tenor of the Na-
tional League of Cities sovereign functions test, the Court’s jurispru-
dence during the New Federalism era may be better understood as
curtailing federal regulatory reach into areas considered the proper
realm of state authority (usually those concerning matters involving
social issues, such as equal protection claims), while also limiting the
assertion of state authority into realms considered the proper purview
of the federal government (usually those with direct economic im-
pacts, such as the financial liability of businesses).264
C. The Tenth Amendment as New Federalism’s Line in the Sand
Whether viewed through the “state-vindication” lens preferred by
Professor Garnett or the “reallocation” lens proposed by Professor
Barron, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s admonition that we ought to distin-
guish between the “truly national” and the “truly local” aptly captures
the essence of the New Federalism as a project devoted to better defi-
nition of the boundary in between.265  The ideological trajectory of
the New Federalism cases suggests that courts and policymakers
should identify and segregate zones of properly local and national reg-
ulatory authority, and protect each from incursion by the other.  The
effect of this enterprise is akin to “bright-line rule jurisprudence,” in
which the judiciary articulates “clearly defined, highly administrable”
rules that establish easily identified lines separating permissible from
impermissible activity.266
263. Barron, supra note 233; see also Barron, supra note 147, at 377–80 (critiquing the R
New Federalism for failing to advancing its purported goal of protecting local autonomy).
264. Barron, supra note 233. R
265. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).
266. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (introducing the adjudicative rhetorical dichotomy between clear,
generally applicable rules and “equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with rela-
tively little precedential value”); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577 (1988) (demonstrating the fluid movement between rules-based and standards-
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As the constitutional champion of dual sovereignty, it is the
Tenth Amendment that stands watch over the line,267 earnestly if cir-
cularly promising that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people.”268  The Tenth
Amendment tells us that there will be realms of respective state and
federal authority, without squarely telling us what powers lie in which
realm.269  However, the New Federalism reads the famously ambigu-
ous text of the Tenth Amendment270 with new clarity, thanks to its
strict-separationist premise and the bright-line rules it has developed
in other federalism venues that help identify affirmative boundaries
for federal action.271  Although the very vagueness of the Tenth
Amendment makes its jurisprudence less amenable to absolute state-
ments, the New Federalism decisions nevertheless invoke the Tenth
Amendment as the flip-side of the affirmative limits it has defined on
Congress’s power, so organically related that bright lines in one realm
suggest bright lines in the other.  As Justice O’Connor explained in
New York:
The actual scope of the Federal Government’s authority with
respect to the States has changed over the years . . . but the
constitutional structure underlying and limiting that author-
ity has not.  In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or
half full, it makes no difference whether one views the ques-
tion at issue in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of
the power delegated to the Federal Government under the
affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discern-
ing the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the
Tenth Amendment.  Either way, we must determine whether
[the challenged law] oversteps the boundary between federal
and state authority.272
based approaches to adjudication, and suggesting that the apparent cleavage between
them may be more rhetorical than real).
267. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 174–77 (1992) (setting forth the
Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine).
268. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
269. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. R
270. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. R
271. For example, the Court has stated that Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause
authority, may regulate only those interstate activities that are directly economic in nature,
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609, and pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, may
regulate to enforce but not create rights.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519
(1997).
272. New York, 505 U.S. at 159.
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Defining this boundary with precision has plagued jurists since the
time of the framing,273 and in closer memory, since the Court’s at-
tempt to define it in National League of Cities.274
On the surface, the small handful of New Federalism Tenth
Amendment cases define the Amendment as a simple rule against fed-
eral commandeering of state apparatus.  They do not pose an explicit
doctrinal barrier to all regulation within the interjurisdictional gray
area discussed further in Part IV.  Yet the disjuncture between its ap-
plication in Printz and Condon—not to mention the missing children
reporting requirements distinguished in Justice O’Connor’s Printz
concurrence,275 the preempted New Jersey rules of due process in
criminal justice,276 or the many other imaginable scenarios in which
such differentiation becomes necessary277—suggests a more ambitious
role required of the Tenth Amendment within the overall New Feder-
alism project.  It must do more than simply decide whether the fed-
eral government has compelled state participation in a federal
regulatory program; it arbitrates between federal compulsion in pro-
tected and unprotected realms of state authority, reifying the strict-
separationist ideal and framing the resolution of all other federalism
inquiries.  The combined doctrinal and rhetorical force of the entire
New Federalism canon constructs the Tenth Amendment as all mod-
els of federalism do: as the guardian of its operative model of dual
sovereignty.  In the New Federalism model, the Tenth Amendment
stands watch over the strict-separationist line in the sand, even as we
continue to struggle with mapping it.  Perhaps more than anything
else, it is the mindset encouraged by this strict-separationist ethic that
discourages needed regulatory initiative in the gray area.
If it has not settled this elusive boundary, the Rehnquist Court
has at least reignited the debate.  Attention to the quandary has once
again surged, fueled most recently by the Court’s decisions to uphold
expansive federal law enforcement jurisdiction over medical mari-
juana278 and to scale back the federal government’s jurisdiction under
273. For example, the failure of the Articles of Confederation is largely credited to its
unworkable allocation of power between the centrality and the states, leading the famous
public dialogue about the proper allocation of power in the Federalist Papers. See THE FED-
ERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
274. See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. R
275. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. R
276. See supra notes 187–190 and accompanying text. R
277. See infra notes 349–351 and accompanying text (describing how a sovereign func- R
tions-like analysis might be required in adjudication of the CWA’s stormwater regulatory
efforts).
278. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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the Clean Water Act (CWA).279  Following the medical marijuana de-
cision, some suggested that the New Federalism revolution may be
over280—but the recent Supreme Court appointments of conservative
jurists John Roberts and Samuel Alito (as well as their votes in the
CWA cases)281 suggest that the unstable federalism coalition may shift
again toward the Court’s New Federalism interpretive alliance.282
Though it may not produce the grail to end the quest, this Article
reveals the true debate as one over competing interpretive models of
federalism that mediate differently between the conflicting values un-
derlying the American federal system.  In so doing, it critiques the
model of dual sovereignty from which the New Federalism approaches
its boundary-drawing enterprise, and disputes the singular claim its
proponents lay to what the Court has called “Our Federalism.”283  Al-
though some contend that a faithful reading of the Tenth Amend-
279. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
280. Among them was Justice O’Connor herself, who suggested in her dissenting opin-
ion in Raich that the death knell had been sounded on the principles in Lopez and Morrison
for which the New Federalism is best known. Raich, 545 U.S. at 46–47 (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting); see also John Yoo, Commentary, What Became of Federalism?, L.A. TIMES, June 21,
2005, at 13 (asserting that the decision “makes a mockery of the efforts of the Constitu-
tion’s framers to place limits on federal powers”).
281. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion cabining the scope of navigable waters under the
CWA was joined by both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at
2214.
282. A widely cited signal that Chief Justice Roberts might join the New Federalism in-
terpretive alliance was his dissent as a D.C. Circuit judge from the court’s denial of rehear-
ing en banc a case upholding the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act under
the Commerce Clause.  Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting the panel decision’s
inconsistencies with Lopez and Morrison); see also 151 CONG. REC. S10481 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
2005) (statement of Sen. Reed) (noting that “Judge Roberts’ short record raises troubling
signs that he may subscribe to this new Federalism revolution”).  Similarly, cues to Justice
Alito’s allegiance to the New Federalism cause could be found in the sole dissent he au-
thored as a Third Circuit judge.  United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996)
(Alito, J., dissenting).  In Rybar, the court held that a federal law prohibiting the transfer or
possession of machine guns did not offend the Commerce Clause. Id. at 285 (majority
opinion).  Then-Judge Alito contended that although Congress had the authority to regu-
late the interstate sale of machine guns, the individual sale of a machine gun within a state
did not affect interstate commerce and was thus beyond the regulatory reach of Congress.
Id. at 291–94 (Alito, J., dissenting).  The appointments may have an effect on social issues
as well. See Press Release, Senator John McCain, Statement on Marriage Protection
Amendment (June 6, 2006), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/press_office/
view_article.cfm?id=34 (arguing that a constitutional marriage amendment would unneces-
sarily contravene the principles of federalism, given his confidence that the recent appoint-
ments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will result in respect for the decisions of
states banning gay marriage).
283. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (defining the concept of “Our Feder-
alism” as the idea that the federal government will perform best if “the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 65  9-MAY-07 9:47
2007] FEDERALISM & THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 567
ment requires the New Federalism approach,284 others argue that
neither its text nor its history requires the bright-line rule, and that
interpretive flexibility is preserved for interactive exercise of state and
federal authority when necessary and within meaningful federalism
constraints.285  In service of its strict-separationist ideal, the New Fed-
eralism advances an important principle that undergirds American
federalism: the preservation of a healthy balance between state and
federal power.  Yet, as explored further in Part V, it privileges this goal
at the expense of other good governance values that also inform our
federalism, including the problem-solving value that is partnered with
the preference for localism in the subsidiarity principle.
Of course, if regulatory problem-solving could effectively take
place within the separate spheres of state and federal authority ideal-
ized by this model, then this objection to New Federalism disappears.
Problem-solving could simply proceed from within the appropriate
sphere, preserving the boundary against erosion and enabling both
levels of government to perform the obligations with which they have
been respectively charged by their constitutions.  A clear boundary
would encourage better regulatory performance all around, as the
side charged with unequivocal responsibility for a given problem
would likely invest more in its solution.  All would be well in this uni-
verse of clean lines and discrete regulatory problems—which may well
constitute the lion’s share of those we confront.  But what of those
that remain—that is, those problems that don’t fit cleanly within one
sphere or the other, inhabiting that murky zone between?
IV. THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL GRAY AREA
A. Interjurisdictional Regulatory Problems
Against this backdrop of a federalism jurisprudence neatly
cleaved between the truly national and the truly local, this piece asks
how “Our Federalism” can better account for the tricky regulatory
matters that straddle the boundary between them.  Interjurisdictional
regulatory problems—ranging from the environment to telecommu-
nications to national security—simultaneously implicate areas of such
284. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–20 (1997) (finding that dual sover-
eignty is “incontestible” under a textual approach to the Constitution).
285. E.g., Hills, supra note 201, at 942–43 (concluding that federalism should allow for a R
“certain minimum of discretion in [its] implementation”); Jackson, supra note 23, at 2237 R
(arguing that there is no bright dividing line that carves out impermissible federal regula-
tory spheres); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV.
L. REV. 1335, 1344–45, 1364–65 (1934) (asserting that the Framers intended to give the
federal government as much control over commerce as would in the future be necessary).
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national and local obligation or expertise that their resolution de-
pends on exercise of authority by both a federal and a state actor.
Identifying this third sphere of interjurisdictional concern should fa-
cilitate the development of a more stable American federalism by re-
vealing where the strict-separationist premise of New Federalism fails.
Where the New Federalism seeks to distinguish the local from the na-
tional,286 interjurisdictional problems monkey-wrench the system by
being simultaneously both.  This is so either because neither side has
all the jurisdiction it needs to effectively solve the problem,287 or be-
cause compelling circumstances make a partnership approach neces-
sary to solve the problem de facto even if the federal government could
theoretically preempt all local jurisdiction de jure.288
The legal concept of an interjurisdictional problem is nothing
new, having been recognized in the United States at least since the
early border-crossing cases involving interstate litigation,289 criminal
law enforcement,290 air pollution,291 water pollution,292 waterway
management,293 and species protection.294  However, the advancing
reach of local impacts in the post-industrial era has also given rise to
interjurisdictional problems that the Framers could never have fore-
286. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).
287. For example, this is arguably the case with regard to the problem of stormwater
pollution, which stems both from land uses regulated by municipal governments and water
uses regulated by the federal government. See infra notes 333–334 and accompanying text. R
288. In other words, in this type of interjurisdictional regulatory problem, though the
national government could theoretically preempt local involvement as a legal matter, the
regulatory target so implicates an area of local concern or expertise that to do so would
obstruct, rather than facilitate, meaningful resolution of the problem (as is so regarding
such national security matters as the NRP).
289. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (finding that federal courts
hearing state law claims under diversity jurisdiction are to apply the substantive laws of
those states and not federal common law).
290. E.g., Logan, supra note 205, at 66–67 (examining the federal government’s use of R
state law “to help effectuate its burgeoning criminal justice authority” while simultaneously
“infus[ing] federal law with the normative judgments of the respective states”).
291. E.g., Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of CERCLA, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2005) (discussing the arbitration
decisions in the 1930s and early 1940s between Canada and the U.S. regarding the Trail
Smelter, a facility near the border of British Columbia that pumped sulphur dioxide into
Washington State).
292. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981) (finding that an
interstate sewage discharge claim should be resolved under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, rather than by federal common law).
293. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52 (1829) (ac-
knowledging overlapping state and federal concern in upholding the legality of a state-
authorized dam through a waterway subject to the federal navigational servitude).
294. E.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2000) (prohibiting interstate
taking, killing, or transporting migratory birds, and their eggs, parts, and nests).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 67  9-MAY-07 9:47
2007] FEDERALISM & THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 569
seen—including such powerful environmental problems as
stormwater pollution,295 greenhouse gas emissions,296 and mass ex-
tinctions,297 but also such non-environmental problems as telecom-
munications law,298 public health crises (e.g., bird flu),299 and
localized threats to national security and infrastructure (such as fail-
ures of the power grid300 or Internet backbone301).  Moreover, the
growing economic interdependence that accompanied us into the
new millennium has transformed many problems that might once
have been purely local into the interjurisdictional variety.302  Products
liability is such a realm, drawing attention by Professors Samuel Is-
sacharoff and Catherine Sharkey to the “undertheorized attempts of
federal courts (particularly the Supreme Court) to mediate the ten-
sions between the claimed commitment to the states as sovereign over-
seers of the quotidian affairs of their citizens and the reality that the
lives of citizens are increasingly accountable to broader market com-
295. E.g., John R. Nolon, Katrina’s Lament: Reconstructing Federalism, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 987, 987–91 (2006) (examining the overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdic-
tion of stormwater runoff); Donald J. Kochan, Runoff and Reality: Externalities, Economics,
and Traceability Problems in Urban Runoff Regulation, 9 CHAPMAN L. REV. 409, 414–19, 427–28
(2006) (outlining regulation of stormwater pollution and the problems of traceability).
296. E.g., Associated Press, Agreement Close for Multistate Pollution Reduction Plan,
MAINETODAY.COM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://news.mainetoday.com/apwire/D8COLE481-
263.shtml (discussing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative).
297. E.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000) (banning the
“taking” of threatened or listed species).
298. E.g., Weiser, supra note 222, at 675–77 (discussing interjurisdictional regulatory R
problems arising under the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
299. E.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Recent Spread of Bird Flu Confounds Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2006, at A6 (discussing the potential global scope of the bird flu pandemic).
300. E.g., Seth Schiesel, In Frayed Networks, Common Threads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at
G1 (examining the vulnerabilities of the vast, interconnected power networks that led to
the summer 2003 blackout); Power Returns to Most Areas Hit by Blackout, CNN.COM, Aug. 15,
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/15/power.outage (quoting New York Governor
George Pataki’s statement that the summer 2003 blackout was “the largest blackout in the
history of America”).
301. E.g., David McGuire & Brian Krebs, Large-Scale Attack Cripples Internet Backbone,
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2002, at E5 (describing a coordinated attack on computers that serve
as master directories for most computer networks and Websites around the world).
302. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1410–12 (discussing the increase in R
federalization of areas traditionally regulated by state law).  For example, if a hurricane of
similar strength to Katrina hit New Orleans a century earlier, it would have triggered fewer
national interests than it does today, since the nerve center of oil and gas infrastructure
that now exists seaward of New Orleans was nonexistent, and the Port of New Orleans was
less central to the nation’s economy. See Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 17–18 (2006) (explaining the development of oil and gas infrastructure in
Louisiana from the early 1900s to present); see also Simon Romero, A Barren Port Waits
Eagerly For Its People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at C1 (noting the significance of the Port of
New Orleans to the national economy).
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mands.”303  Public servants at the national, state, and municipal levels
are working overtime to address modern problems that defy jurisdic-
tional boundaries—but the strict-separationist premise associated with
the New Federalism ideal leaves them unclear on the rules for solving
them.
In proposing the category of “interjurisdictional regulatory prob-
lem,” I should note first what I am not proposing to do.  Although I
believe that we can meaningfully discuss regulatory problems in gen-
eral terms, I offer no unifying theory about the features of problems
that make them more or less susceptible to regulatory solutions, other
than to note that I am generally referring to such classic regulatory
targets as market failures, negative externalities, and collective action
problems that respond favorably to intervention.304  Reasonable
minds may differ about the margin between the set of problems re-
solvable by government and the set of those that are not, but this defi-
nition enables a conversation about the best decision rules for
government actors in a federal system regardless of that margin.  In
other words, to continue the conversation from here, we need only
agree that there is such a thing as “regulatory problems” in some
shape or form, allowing individuals to substitute different values for
the variables in an otherwise stable equation.305
Similarly, reasonable minds may disagree on the absolute bound-
aries between legitimate local and national regulatory concern, and this
is ultimately the more important problem.  It is, of course, the central
federalism problem itself, and the fact that we have failed to achieve
consensus on this point thus far suggests that it will not be easily forth-
coming even if we can agree to acknowledge the existence of some set
of interjurisdictional problems.  I return to this problem in Part V,
where I propose the outlines of a jurisprudential standard to assist in
303. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1358. R
304. For example, while common defense and law enforcement are probably widely ac-
cepted as regulatory problems in the United States, compliance with the tenets of relig-
iously based faith would not be viewed the same way.  A problem caused by externalized
harms that are poorly internalized through the free market (e.g., cross-boundary air pollu-
tion) may be suitably characterized as a regulatory problem, while a problem relating to
the outpacing by demand for the supply of a particular manufacturer’s widget would prob-
ably not be.
305. The best counterargument against the existence of interjurisdictional regulatory
problems would be the assertion that, in fact, no authentic regulatory problems exist.
Some might contend that the government has, in the past, purported to take actions that
solve problems, but that no problems are truly solved by governmental methods. See ROTH-
BARD, supra note 21, at 73–78 (cataloging ills that stem from government regulation). R
Given that most individuals allow for some sphere of governmental action, and believe that
a realm exists where regulatory action can effectively solve at least some problems, this
Article concerns itself only with the boundaries of that sphere.
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differentiating between legitimate interjurisdictional crossover and
unjustifiable breach.  But again, in this Section, I put off debate about
the margins to make the case for the more basic proposition that
there are at least some problems that truly implicate both local and
national regulatory obligations—in a way that warrants attention from
both.
I believe this is an easy case to make; indeed, it has already been
argued persuasively in federalism scholarship such as that by Profes-
sors Robert Schapiro,306 William Buzbee,307 Kirsten Engel,308 and Jody
Freeman.309  As a nation, we may lack consensus about the extent to
which local regulation should be held vicariously accountable under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA),310 or to which the federal govern-
ment should be able to regulate gay marriage.311  But few now argue
that the federal government should not play a role in disaster manage-
306. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,
248–49 (2005) (proposing the concept of polyphonic federalism, where the focus is placed
upon the interaction between state and federal authority, rather than upon where the two
spheres diverge); Schapiro, supra note 222, at 1416–17 (applying the polyphonic concept R
to a defense of federal interpretations of state constitutions).
307. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108,
108–09 (2005) (noting the benefits of regulatory overlap and cooperative federalism struc-
tures); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2003) (examining how the “regulatory commons problem” can
generate regulatory gaps for interjurisdictional problems like urban sprawl and global
warming).
308. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 155 (2006) (arguing that the static allocation of regulatory authority to either
the state or federal government obstructs good environmental management, and that
broadly overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdiction is needed).
309. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
4–8 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative governance that involves coop-
eration between agencies and government in the administrative process).
310. The most famous example of such “vicarious” liability for takes prohibited by the
ESA arose in Strahan v. Coxe, in which held a state agency was held responsible for illegal
takings of endangered whales because it authorized the placement of fixed gear for com-
mercial fishing operations near the whales’ spring feeding grounds.  127 F.3d 155, 161–66
(1st Cir. 1997).  A more controversial instance arose in Loggerhead Turtle v. Council of Volusia
County, in which the Eleventh Circuit ordered a county government agency to better regu-
late nighttime lighting on beaches where endangered loggerhead turtles hatched.  148
F.3d 1231, 1258 (11th Cir. 1998).  In Loggerhead Turtle, the problem was that young turtles
instinctively head from the beach sands where they hatched toward the ocean, following
the reflection of the moonlight in the water, but the bright lights from beachside develop-
ment caused excessive hatchling mortality by encouraging the turtles to head in the wrong
direction. Id. at 1234–36.
311. Current proposals for a federal constitutional amendment banning the states from
recognizing gay marriages sometimes proceed from arguments about border-crossing
harms. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5517 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (dis-
cussing the state role in defining marriage and family matters and noting that the federal
government’s respect for these laws “is the essence of federalism”).
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ment (an area of regulatory authority traditionally assigned to the
states), or that state law enforcement should not play a role in domes-
tic efforts to prevent terrorist attacks initiated abroad (a realm in
which the federal government might, if absurdly, preempt state partic-
ipation as a matter of international affairs).312  Similarly, the federal
government is more often criticized for failing to address the bird flu
threat313 than it is for intruding on a classic realm of the state police
power, and few argue that the federal government should assume top-
to-bottom control over intrastate administration of the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts, which would vastly increase the size of the federal
bureaucracy in an ironic move to protect the boundary between state
and federal authority.314
No assertion about the proper realms of state and federal regula-
tory authority will be without controversy, but the following discussion
affords sufficiently uncontroversial examples that the assertion of an
interjurisdictional gray area should be convincing at least in this small
sampling.  Even if the boundaries of this zone remain disputed, the
existence of an uncontroversial core that warrant consideration in a
workable federal system pierces the armor of the bifurcated theoreti-
cal model preferred by New Federalism.  We need only agree that
some interjurisdictional regulatory problems exist, in that their effec-
tive resolution depends on the exercise of regulatory authority by
both a local and a national actor, for one of two reasons.
1. De Jure Interjurisdictional Problems
In the first instance, resolution of the problem depends on activ-
ity by both a local and a national actor because neither side has all the
312. Cf. ACLU of N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 654–55 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (allowing a federal regulation requiring that the identities of terrorist
suspects be kept secret to preempt a preexisting state law requiring that their identities be
disclosed).  The court observed that “while the State possesses sovereign authority over the
operation of its jails, it may not operate them, in respect of INS detainees, in any way that
derogates the federal government’s exclusive and expressed interest in regulating aliens.”
Id.
313. James Gerstenzang, Bird Flu Warning Would Ravage U.S., White House Warns, L.A.
TIMES, May 4, 2006, at A6 (noting that as the Bush Administration presented its bird flu
report, Senator Edward Kennedy issued a scathing report of his own, criticizing the admin-
istration for failing to prepare the country for a possible flu pandemic).
314. By contrast, some have argued that the federal government should devolve more of
such regulatory responsibility to the states. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 205, at 135 (“Because R
most environmental problems are local or regional in nature, there is a strong case that
most . . . environmental problems should be addressed at the state and local level.” (foot-
note omitted)).  Despite these arguments, however, few propose the abolition of the fed-
eral Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, which fulfill a classic centralized regulatory role of
preventing negative externalities and remedying collective action problems.
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legal jurisdiction it needs to meaningfully address the problem.  Ex-
amples of such de jure interjurisdictional problems include state and
federal management of coastal and submerged lands under the
Coastal Zone Management Act (which recognizes distinct areas of
state and federal jurisdiction and requires a consultation process be-
tween the two for implicated activities);315 the destruction of wetlands
(which may be subject to both federal water pollution regulations and
state land use regulations);316 and the intersection between the ESA
and state wildlife regulation and land use laws.317
De jure interjurisdictional problems such as these often arise due
to an overlap between a federally regulated interest (such as water
pollution or endangered species preservation) and a local land use
policy (the traditional province of state and local governments).318
They may also arise due to an overlap between the traditionally local
police power obligation to protect public safety and the related na-
tional interest in protecting national infrastructure and policing bor-
der-crossing effects.  The devastation following a hurricane that hits a
major port city like New Orleans—triggering the state’s police power
to protect public safety but also projecting hundreds of thousands of
refugees into neighboring states and jeopardizing such national secur-
ity infrastructure as the nerve center of Gulf Coast oil and gas produc-
tion—is an easy example.319
315. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1465 (2000).
316. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (rejecting the application of the Corps of Engineers’ “Migra-
tory Bird Rule” under the CWA as infringing on traditional state land and water use au-
thority); see also Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224–25 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (interpreting the meaning of “the waters of the United States” under the CWA
and the interplay between federal and state regulatory authority).
317. See supra note 310 (discussing the problem of vicarious takings by state and local R
government agencies, which sometimes authorize private activity that violates provisions of
the ESA); see also Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 499–504 (4th Cir. 2000) (addressing the
federalism concerns stemming from an ESA regulation governing the intrastate popula-
tion of red wolves on private land).
318. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–84 (2005) (balancing a
municipality’s economic development plan with the public purpose requirements of the
Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause); Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205
F.3d 688, 705–06 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing the regulatory and constitutional clash be-
tween local land use regulation and the Telecommunications Act of 1996); Cape May
Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 192–93 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing the federal gov-
ernment’s interest in limiting floodplain development, but finding that local government
maintained authority for coastal zone management).
319. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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a. Water Pollution
A prime example of the de jure interjurisdictional regulatory
problem is that of water pollution because nearly all water passes
through subsequent realms of state and federal jurisdiction on its hy-
drological journey from sky to sea.  This is not simply a matter of rivers
and lakes that straddle state boundaries; water moves through state
and federal jurisdiction even within state lines.  When rain hits the
ground, it occasionally falls directly onto areas of federal jurisdiction
(federal lands, the sea, or a large body of water already under federal
jurisdiction),320 but most often falls on state or privately held land.  As
this water makes its journey through increasingly larger watersheds
back to the sea, it begins by traversing land subject to the regulatory
jurisdiction of the states or their municipal subdivisions, which con-
trol the kinds of land-based contaminants this water might encounter
before draining into a lake or stream.  The water will dissolve traces of
motor oil and automotive fluids, lawn fertilizer and pesticides, house-
hold and chemical effluents, and whatever else it comes across,321 car-
rying the pollutants into the wetlands or small creeks that may fall
under either local or national regulatory jurisdiction, depending on
their relationship to navigable waters.322  Eventually, all will flow or
percolate into larger bodies that clearly fall under federal CWA juris-
diction (roughly speaking, any that are themselves navigable or that
maintain a continuous surface connection to navigable waters323).
Under the CWA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regu-
lates the passage of pollutants into these waters by “point source” dis-
charges (those that enter through the end of a pipe), requiring them
to be permitted under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES).324
320. Several statutes regulate federal lands, the sea, or large bodies of water. See, e.g.,
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1465 (2000); Rivers and Harbors Appro-
priations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
33 U.S.C.); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000); Submerged Lands Act, ch.
65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
321. See Ryan, supra note 133, at 983 (discussing the movement of land-based marine R
pollutants from land to sea).
322. For the Supreme Court’s most recent obfuscation of what this means, see Rapanos
v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2235 (2006) (plurality opinion) (limiting CWA § 404 juris-
diction over waters that do not maintain a continuous surface connection with navigable
waters). See also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (limiting CWA § 404 jurisdiction
over isolated wetlands).
323. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235.
324. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
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Say, then, that you want to clean up the Chesapeake Bay’s infa-
mously hypoxic “dead zone,”325 or make it safe to eat fish caught in
mercury-laced Lake Michigan,326 or enable swimming in the entero-
coccus-rich Boston Harbor.327  Assuming the EPA is able to perfectly
regulate point source discharges under the NPDES program, should
you then feel safe sending your children into the waters of Boston
Harbor, or feeding them fish caught in Lake Michigan?  Not if you
like your kids!  NPDES regulation of conventional point source dis-
charges has done much to improve water quality, but the greatest
threat to the health of our nation’s waters is now acknowledged to be
from stormwater328—the diffuse surface water that rains down from
the heavens and picks up whatever contaminants it meets on the
ground while working its way toward these larger water bodies down-
stream.  Until you can reduce the delivery of land-based contaminants
into the hydrological chain, fish and swimming remain dangerous,
and state and federal agencies regularly advise against it.329
The problem in this scenario is that the accumulation of these
contaminants on the surface of private and state lands is generally be-
yond the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction; it is usually the states
and municipalities that have authority over the local land uses that
lead to such accumulation, as well as the storm sewer systems that
channel collected stormwater into downstream rivers, lakes, and
harbors.  Some of the contaminated stormwater enters the chain at
the top of the watershed, passing into the local streams and wetlands
that ultimately flow to the bottom, while the rest enters after being
collected in municipal storm sewers that discharge directly into the
325. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 133, 1005–07 (discussing the Chesapeake Bay’s “dead R
zone,” which is a “region so polluted that it lacks sufficient oxygen to sustain marine life”).
326. The EPA has issued fish consumption advisories for fish caught in Lake Michigan
on account of elevated levels of mercury, PCBs, dioxins, and chlordane.  EPA, FACT SHEET:
NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH ADVISORIES 3 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/fish/
advisories/factsheet.pdf.
327. See, e.g., Brian Fitzgerald, The People’s Harbor: Metropolitan College’s Bruce Berman
Charts the Boston Harbor Cleanup, BOSTONIA, Fall 2004, http://www.bu.edu/alumni/bos-
tonia/2004/fall/harbor/ (noting that although the cleanliness of Boston Harbor has im-
proved greatly since the construction of improved regional sewage treatment facilities,
“[t]here are still frequent beach closures when the counts of Enterococcus bacteria in
swimming areas exceed the federal and state standard for swimming. . . .  The culprit: filthy
stormwater and sewage, much of it from leaky pipes and illegal hookups emptying into
storm sewers and then into the harbor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
328. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 840–41 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“[s]tormwater runoff is one of the most significant sources of water pollution in the nation,
at times comparable to, if not greater than, contamination from industrial and sewage
sources” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
329. See supra notes 326–327. R
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federally protected water bodies that drain the watershed.  At present,
no technology exists to remove these pollutants from stormwater at
the point of municipal discharge, but even if it did, this would elimi-
nate only one source of the problem.  Land-based contaminants
would still enter the chain at the top of the watershed, where
stormwater passes into creeks and wetlands after running over pol-
luted surfaces but before entering a municipal storm sewer (which
generally collects water toward the bottom of the watershed).330
Moreover, the most powerful technology for removing contami-
nants from stormwater before it enters free-flowing downstream water
bodies remains the natural filtration feature of wetlands, which (for
this reason) have become a bitter battleground between claims of
state and federal jurisdiction.331  The Supreme Court’s recent wet-
lands cases have narrowed federal regulatory reach over the destruc-
tion of wetlands, leaving regulation of both the land uses that lead to
the accumulation of contaminants and the fate of wetlands that re-
move them from the hydrological chain in predominantly state juris-
dictional hands.332
In this way, the problem of alleviating stormwater pollution is a
tricky interjurisdictional regulatory matter, a cross-media problem of
local land-based pollution flowing into federally protected waters.333
Though most land and land uses causing water pollution are under
state regulatory authority, the water bodies that ultimately drain pol-
330. Even if the federal government were to deny NPDES permits allowing discharge of
collected stormwater runoff from sewer systems to federally protected waters, it could not
prevent the contamination of federal waters by contaminant-bearing flows entering pro-
tected lakes, rivers, or coastal waters from non-navigable tributaries.  Even if the federal
government can regulate point-source discharges to these non-navigable tributaries, it can-
not prevent their pollution by overland contaminants passively picked up by nonchanneled
stormwater runoff.  Regulation of land-based activities (like real estate development, lawn
pesticide use, and oil-leaking motor vehicles) that commonly contribute to such contami-
nation is a matter of state concern.  Thus, the only effective way to prevent stormwater
pollution is to pair state regulation of land-based activities that initiate the stormwater pol-
lution cycle with federal regulation of water bodies that absorb the pollution. See City of
Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 659–60 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing the NPDES CWA permit
process, where municipalities work with the EPA to prevent the discharge of pollutants in
stormwater from reaching municipal sewer systems); S.F. BayKeeper v. Whitman, 297 F.3d
877, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the CWA requires states to monitor the total
maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of a pollutant that a particular water body can receive per
day without violating the water quality standard).
331. See supra note 322. R
332. See supra note 322. R
333. See, e.g., Nolon, supra note 295, at 1431–32 (noting that the success of a State of R
New York stormwater protection program was due to its integrated approach in addressing
local, state, and federal interests in water quality).
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luted stormwater runoff are under federal regulatory authority.334  If
the federal government must allow stormwater discharges by states to
the nation’s waters,335 then the stormwater pollution problem can
only be solved by regulatory activity by both local actors (who govern
where the pollution starts) and national actors (who govern where the
pollution ends), ideally in coordination.
b. The Phase II Stormwater Rule and Environmental Defense
Center, Inc. v. EPA
Accordingly, Congress authorized the EPA to propose rules for
regulating the discharge of collected stormwater under the CWA as a
point source discharge, since what originates as nonpoint source dif-
fuse surface runoff is converted to a point source discharge when it is
collected in the storm sewer and then piped to the receiving river,
lake, or harbor.336  At the end of the pipe, the discharge of collected
stormwater looks like any other point source discharge into the lake—
but these regulations would be unlike previous NPDES permitting
programs, which usually regulate industrial discharges.337  By contrast,
stormwater is almost exclusively collected and discharged by munici-
palities.338  Sensitive to the federalism implications of regulating state
334. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. R
335. As discussed in the next section, the Ninth Circuit’s curious about-face in Environ-
mental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA (EDC I), suggests that the federal government may have to
accept such discharges.  319 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and superseded by Envtl. Def.
Ctr., Inc. v. EPA (EDC II), 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003).  In EDC I, the majority suggested
that if a municipality was unwilling to comply with the terms of the federal permit, then it
could find other ways of dealing with stormwater—recycle it, build terminal evaporation
basins—besides discharging it to federally protected water bodies. EDC I, 319 F.3d at
414–15.  A vigorous dissent asserted that this reasoning was absurd, because gravity forces
stormwater toward those bodies of water, and because the municipal management of
stormwater into such bodies of water is an aspect of municipalities’ core sovereign func-
tion. Id. at 450–54 (Tallman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In its decision
following rehearing, the panel appeared persuaded enough by the dissent as to reverse
itself on this point. EDC II, 344 F.3d at 847 & n.22.
336. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4) (2000) (authorizing EPA to promulgate “Phase I” and
“Phase II” Stormwater Rules).
337. See id. § 1342(p)(3) (permitting EPA to regulate municipal and industrial
stormwater discharges).
338. E.g., EPA, Permits for Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4s), http://
www.epa.gov/region8/water/stormwater/municipal.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (not-
ing that “[p]olluted storm water runoff is often transported to municipal storm sewer sys-
tems and ultimately discharged into local rivers and streams without treatment”).  Other
dischargers include federal agencies, Indian Tribes, and private dischargers operating
large compounds, such as university or corporate campuses. E.g., EPA, PERMITTING
STORMWATER DISCHARGES FROM FEDERAL FACILITY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS (2006), http://
www.epa.gov/Region8/water/stormwater/downloads/Federal%20facility%20construction
%20guidance.pdf (federal construction projects); OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, FINAL GUIDANCE
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agencies in their performance of a traditional municipal function (the
maintenance of storm sewers), the EPA convened a working group of
stakeholders (including representatives from the National Governors
Association, the Environmental Council of the States, the Association
of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Authorities, and six
state departments of natural resources) to collaborate on the develop-
ment of a workable regulatory solution to this thorny interjurisdic-
tional problem.339  After nearly a decade of negotiation, the EPA
promulgated two phases of regulations that were endorsed by all work-
ing group participants.  The first regulation applied only to the largest
cities, while the second, the “Phase II Stormwater Rule,” applied to
the vastly larger number of small municipalities with populations of
less than 100,000.340
To minimize federalism problems associated with this unusual
regulatory partnership, the Phase II Rule was designed to accomplish
pollution controls while conferring as much discretion as possible to
covered municipalities.  The Rule enables states to seek coverage
under a general permit that allows municipalities to discharge so long
as they propose stormwater management plans ensuring that
stormwater discharged to federal waters arrives as clean as possible.341
Although the specifics of the management plans are left to each mu-
nicipality, they must at least address a set of six primary concerns (the
“minimum measures”), including a plan to discover and prevent ille-
gal storm sewer discharges and a means of raising public awareness
about the prevention of stormwater pollution.342  However, one of the
minimum measures required that municipalities mitigate construc-
tion-related pollution by issuing permits for construction projects that
require their compliance with applicable terms in the overall munici-
pal stormwater program.343  Acting independently from the State of
ON AWARDS OF GRANTS TO INDIAN TRIBES UNDER SECTION 106 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
(2006), http://www.epa.gov/owm/cwfinance/final-tribal-guidance.pdf (Indian Tribes);
EPA, The Best Management Practices (BMP) Catalog: Water Management Case Studies,
http://www.epa.gov/ne/assistance/univ/bmpcasestudies_watermgt.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2007) (colleges and universities).
339. OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STORM WATER DISCHARGES POTENTIALLY ADDRESSED BY
PHASE II OF THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM STORM WATER PRO-
GRAM 1-21 to -22 (1995); Brief of Respondent-Intervenor Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., at 50, EDC II, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-70014, 00-70734, 00-70822),
2001 WL 34092891 (listing participants of the Phase II Subcommittee).
340. OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: FACT SHEET 2.1, at 2
(2005), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fact2-1.pdf.
341. OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: FACT SHEET 2.9, at 3
(2005), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fact2-9.pdf.
342. EDC II, 344 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2003).
343. Id. at 845–46 & n.20.
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Texas, a group of Texas municipalities sued to invalidate the Rule on
Tenth Amendment grounds, arguing that the construction measure
required them to regulate their own citizens in violation of the New
Federalism’s anti-commandeering rule.344
The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the Rule against the Tenth
Amendment challenge, but not without controversy.  Writing for the
court in its initial decision, Judge Browning found that the Tenth
Amendment challenge failed because it compelled no state behavior;
municipalities that objected to the terms of a general permit were free
to file for permission to discharge under an alternative individual per-
mitting framework that, while more administratively onerous, omitted
the requirements of the construction minimum measure.345  How-
ever, Judge Browning volunteered the further possibility that the
Tenth Amendment challenge would fail for lack of coercion because a
municipality that did not want to comply with the terms of a general
permit could simply choose not to engage in the appropriately feder-
ally regulated activity of managing discharges to the waters of the
United States.346  Invoking spending-power-like reasoning, Judge
Browning suggested that the federal government is free to condition a
privilege it is not obligated to provide on the performance of a related
obligation it might not otherwise compel.347  Municipalities remained
free to dispense with stormwater by other means, such as the creation
of wetlands, recycling facilities, or terminal evaporation basins, and
the fact that these may be more expensive than simply discharging to
the downstream water body did not alter the constitutional
calculus.348  Judge Tallman dissented from the majority’s alternative
reasoning on this point, arguing that although the federal regulation
was indeed within Congress’s commerce power, the suggestion that
the federal government could prevent municipalities from discharg-
ing stormwater in the direction of gravity was nonsensical, as such rea-
soning would enable the federal government to encroach upon a
realm of inviolate state sovereignty—the protection of property from
damage by the management of local storm sewers.349
344. Id. at 843–45.  The Phase II Rule was also challenged on other grounds by the
National Association of Home Builders, the American Forest & Paper Association, and the
Environmental Defense Center. Id. at 843.
345. EDC I, 319 F.3d 398, 413–14, 416–19 (9th Cir. 2003).
346. Id. at 414–16.
347. Id. at 416.
348. Id. at 415.
349. Id. at 451–53 (Tallman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (discussing the traditional state role of regulating land and water
use).
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Although the panel denied the Texas municipalities’ subsequent
petition for rehearing, the court issued a second opinion that re-
scinded the alternative reasoning, this time with the consensus of
Judge Tallman.350  That the court proceeded this way is unsurprising;
otherwise the panel would have been forced to engage in the very sort
of sovereign functions test that plagued National League of Cities.351  Is
the municipal management of storm sewers a sovereign function on
par with the performance of background checks by state officers in
Printz, or the provision of a service like the personal information made
available by the state motor vehicle department in Condon?  Is the
problem that the construction permitting process requires the munic-
ipality to directly regulate its own citizens?  If so, why then did Judge
Tallman not object to portions of the Rule that require the municipal-
ity to regulate illicit discharges by its citizens to storm sewers?  Is one
more “sovereign” than the other?
The Texas petitioners unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court re-
view, and the Ninth Circuit’s second decision was left standing.352  But
the evolving line of argument through the Ninth Circuit’s progression
of decisions and dissents demonstrates the fretful task of interpreting
regulatory responses to interjurisdictional problems within the con-
fines of the strict-separationist approach.  The decisions suggest that
the panel basically considered the Rule a respectful means of navigat-
ing the state and federal considerations at issue.  Although they were
inclined to uphold what appeared to a reasonable regulatory partner-
ship, doing so within the New Federalism framework proved tortuous.
2. De Facto Interjurisdictional Regulatory Problems
An interjurisdictional regulatory problem may also require the
exercise of authority by both a state and federal actor because, even
though the federal government could theoretically exercise plenary
regulatory authority all the way down the causal chain, the regulatory
endeavor implicates a matter of such local concern and/or expertise
that it would not make sense to attack the problem as an exclusively
national regulatory project.  In the de facto context, the only effective
regulatory result flows from a collaborative approach.
350. EDC II, 344 F.3d 832, 847–48 & n.22 (9th Cir. 2003).  Judge Tallman concurred in
this portion of the opinion, but dissented in others. Id. at 880 (Tallman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
351. See supra Part III.A.1.
352. Tex. Cities Coal. on Stormwater v. EPA, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) (denying the petition
for certiorari).
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a. Air Pollution
A prime example of a de facto interjurisdictional problem is the
management of air pollution under the Clean Air Act (CAA).353  The
CAA authorizes the federal government to set ambient air quality
management goals but delegates design and enforcement authority to
the states, which implement individually tailored State Implementa-
tion Plans (SIPs).354  It makes sense that the federal government
should set uniform air quality management goals for the nation; this
avoids the negative externality problems that could arise if upwind
states were allowed to choose high thresholds for pollution borne by
downwind states, who would be powerless to stop the polluting activi-
ties in the upwind states.  Preventing such negative externalities is a
classic regulatory function of government, as is the prevention of
“race to the bottom” collective action problems that might ensue if
regional authorities competed with one another for industry by pro-
gressively lowering pollution standards that could ultimately leave all
worse off.355
However, although the federal government could theoretically
exert its commerce authority at every level of the regulatory en-
deavor,356 consensus emerged that better results would flow from a
partnership approach, in which each state decides how best to meet
the federal standards in light of its unique geographical and industrial
353. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2000).
354. Id. §§ 7409(a), 7410(a); see also EPA, The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act,
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg_caa/pegcaa02.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
355. The “race to the bottom” theory of federal environmental regulation, once sacro-
sanct, is not without challenge. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 556 n.2 (2001) (reviewing the
wealth of academic dialogue on the viability of the “race to the bottom” theory in the
environmental context).  For example, while Professor Richard Revesz argues that such a
race is apocryphal, Professors Saleska and Engel assert that empirical data prove otherwise.
Compare id. at 583–625 (suggesting that stringent state environmental protection measures
may result in a race to the top rather than to the bottom), with Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R.
Saleska, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the
Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55,
60–61 (1998) (finding that some states have actively relaxed environmental standards to
attract industry).  Perhaps the best account of this debate is a growing consensus that,
although there was indeed a time when many states had been caught in an environmental
race to the bottom, it may be that such a time has now passed for many of those states. See,
e.g., Freeman, supra note 309, at 41–47, 97–98 (discussing a recent example of collabora- R
tive governance between states, federal agencies, and private interests in the environmental
regulation context that produced implementable solutions).
356. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (authorizing the EPA to deny SIPs submitted by the
states in whole or in part); id. § 7413(a)(2) (granting enforcement power to EPA where a
state fails to enforce its SIP program).
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features.357  For example, the unique topography and weather pat-
terns of the Los Angeles basin might lead to different regulatory de-
sign features than a program designed for the flatlands of Houston,
Texas—even though both cities face the kinds of serious air pollution
problems that are the focus of the CAA.358  Similarly, air pollution
challenges related to the auto manufacturing industry in Michigan
might require different regulatory design features than plans for
resolving air pollution problems associated with coal mining in West
Virginia.  The CAA’s classic cooperative federalism partnership ap-
proach enables both levels of government to remain involved in regu-
lating a problem of concern to each, though accountability concerns
may arise if the federal government unreasonably requires unfunded
regulatory activity by states.359
Other examples of interjurisdictional regulatory problems that
may lean toward the de facto side include products liability,360 some
interstate criminal law enforcement,361 the enforcement of provisions
in the Telecommunications Act,362 and public health crises.363  De
facto problems often arise in contexts where externality-producing or
interstate commercial activities of national concern are matched with
enforcement media most efficiently situated at the local level.364
357. The best counterargument of note is probably that regional experts could be em-
ployed by the federal government to supply the localized expertise that states would other-
wise provide, and indeed, the EPA has regional offices in ten administrative districts across
the country.  However, to truly build a federal system matching state governments’ full
array of resources and expertise would require creating a bureaucracy that extends all the
way to the most local level, absurdly duplicating efforts already in place at the state level.
358. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2000) (expressing congressional findings regarding
“the growth . . . and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial
development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles”).
359. See infra notes 478–482 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of un- R
funded mandates).
360. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1358 (observing that legislation in the R
products liability context is generally unclear, as “Congress acts, in limited product realms,
to define standards of liability but leaves to state law the need to provide remedies”).
361. See Logan, supra note 205, at 66–67 (noting that despite the vast federalization of R
certain aspects of criminal law, the federal government still looks to state criminal law to
effectuate its criminal justice authority).
362. The Telecommunications Act merges a federal regulatory regime with state imple-
mentation. See Weiser, supra note 222, at 677 (noting that in its current form, the Tele- R
communications Act allows state agencies to engage in “measures that the agencies would
not otherwise be authorized to do under state law”).
363. Public health crises implicate both the state’s police power to regulate for health
and safety and the federal concern with border-crossing and commercial impacts—for ex-
ample, bird flu management and human influenza vaccine production. See, e.g., Rosen-
thal, supra note 299 (discussing the potential global implications of avian flu on humans). R
364. De facto examples are an admittedly more difficult animal to classify than de jure
examples, since the defining criteria that “the regulatory endeavor implicates such matters
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b. Domestic Counterterrorism Efforts
Still, the very fact that some problems draw simultaneously on
state and federal concerns creates a gray area for even this typology,
making it occasionally disputable whether an interjurisdictional prob-
lem is more of the de jure or de facto variety.  Some interjurisdictional
regulatory problems may merge elements of both, such as the mainte-
nance of antiterrorism efforts and national security.365
The Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Plan
requires cooperation between federal and state agencies,366 both out
of respect for the traditional role of the states in providing for the
safety and welfare of their citizens,367 and because federal preemption
of local contributions (permissible in some cases that implicate clearly
national interests)368 would be absurdly inefficient.  Even if the fed-
eral government could preempt local involvement in domestic antiter-
rorism programs through its plenary power over international affairs,
to what end?  Especially in the post-9/11 world, effective national se-
curity programs must draw on both the global intelligence and exper-
tise only available via the CIA, and the local intelligence and expertise
of peculiarly local concern” is vague (and subject to varying degrees of expansion if consid-
erations of cost and politics are taken into account).  However, the jurisprudential stan-
dard proposed in Part VI attempts to create more meaningful constraints around claims
for interjurisdictional regulatory crossover on such grounds. See infra Part VI.
365. National security seems easily understood as a truly national regulatory concern,
but some commentators have noted that the term “national security” is rarely defined, or
given limiting contours. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, The Mismatch Between State
Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 15, 37
(2004) (noting that policymakers have “move[d] away from defining national security ex-
clusively in geo-strategic military terms”); Donald Kerwin, The Use and Misuse of ‘National
Security’ Rationale in Crafting U.S. Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 749,
750 (2005) (observing that despite the rhetoric over immigration restrictions “‘national
security’ has not been rigorously defined or applied in the U.S. immigration context”);
David B. McGinty, The Statutory and Executive Development of the National Security Exemption to
Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act: Past and Future, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 67, 80 (2005)
(critiquing contemporary definitions of national security as “negligibly more helpful than
no definition” at all).  An open-ended definition of national security might dangerously
threaten the check-and-balance value of a federalist system. See infra Part V.A.1.
366. See NRP, supra note 54, at 15 (explaining the interdependent relationship of fed- R
eral and state agencies in disaster response management).
367. See Whitley et al., supra note 52, at 4 (quoting a post-Katrina October 2005 state- R
ment by the National Governor’s Association that “[g]overnors are responsible for the
safety and welfare of their citizens and are in the best position to coordinate all resources
to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters”).
368. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (2000) (authorizing the President to coordinate all disas-
ter relief in a crisis, including federal and state assets, whenever “primary responsibility for
response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for
which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises
exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority”).
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only available at the municipal level.  Not only would complete federal
preemption foreclose the value of local expertise and inefficiently du-
plicate efforts, it would hardly please the champions of federalism.
Nobody, it would seem, wants a federal government extensive enough
to take the place of local police, fire fighters, and other emergency
service providers;369 state agents are simply better able to provide the
needed services due to their local placement and expertise.  But
whether they are more de jure or de facto, such problems help flesh
out the interjurisdictional gray area of overlapping state and federal
and concern.
B. Crossover into the Interjurisdictional Gray Area
1. Regulatory Crossover
Interjurisdictional problems are troubling to the strict-separation-
ist model of dual sovereignty because they invite what might be
deemed “regulatory crossover.”  In strict-separationist terms, the rele-
vant boundary is the line between proper state and federal authority,
and crossover from one clearly defined side of this line to the other is
impermissible.  But in interjurisdictional terms, crossover is some-
thing slightly more nuanced, describing a state or federal actor’s deci-
sion to step beyond what we might consider “the uncontroversial
sphere” of its traditional regulatory authority and into the gray area of
interjurisdictional concern.  The difference is well illustrated by re-
cent regulatory responses to wetlands loss and mobile source air
pollution.
a. Wetlands Regulation
When the federal government tries to preserve water quality by
regulating end-of-pipe discharges from a factory directly into the Wis-
consin River, it is regulating within the uncontroversial sphere of its
Clean Water Act authority under the Commerce Clause.  But when it
tries to preserve water quality in the Wisconsin River watershed by reg-
ulating the dredging and filling of a small, seasonal pond on a private
dairy farm (a so-called “hydrologically isolated intrastate wetland”), it
has moved beyond the uncontroversial sphere of its CWA regulatory
369. See, e.g., Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the
Alarm or “Crying Wolf?”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1338 (2000) (“Americans have innately
distrusted ‘the concentration of broad police power in a national police force, and . . . have
long resisted the evolution of such a broadly powerful national police force, as distin-
guished from specialized national police agencies.’” (alteration in original) (quoting TASK
FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, ABA, REPORT ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1998))).
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authority and crossed over into the gray area of state and federal con-
cern.  Indeed, while holding in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)370 that the
Army Corps of Engineers had exceeded its statutory CWA authority in
regulating certain isolated wetlands,371 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opin-
ion further suggested that it may even have exceeded the federal com-
merce power.372  The destruction of intrastate wetlands may have real
consequences for the quality of the nation’s waters, triggering legiti-
mate federal concern,373 but the regulation of intrastate land use deci-
sions also triggers a core area of traditional state concern.374  Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion in the most recent (and fractured) wetlands
case, Rapanos v. United States,375 explicitly invokes the New Federalism
canon in rejecting the Army Corps’ extended assertion of wetlands
jurisdiction.376
b. Fuel-Efficient Purchasing Requirements
Similarly, when a state tries to reduce asthma-causing auto emis-
sions by constructing special parking lots and traffic lanes to en-
370. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
371. This might be true if the only basis on which the federal government claimed regu-
latory jurisdiction was under the old “migratory bird rule.” Id. at 164–67.  Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act might still confer federal jurisdiction under several other possible
causal links to the federal commerce power, but notable regional variation in enforcement
has followed the SWANCC decision, demonstrating that such authority, while potentially
grounded in good law, is at least controversial. See Duane J. Desiderio, Ditching It Out . . .
But Can the Corps Take It?, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER, (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington,
D.C.) May–June 2005, at 3, 3–4 (noting federal circuit splits in interpreting SWANCC and
continuing regulatory uncertainty regarding artificial ditches); Jeffrey M. Eustis, An Inch
Becomes A Mile, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER, (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.)
May–June 2005, at 6, 7 (detailing lower court’s varying interpretations following the
SWANCC decision); Patrick Parenteau, Preemptive Surrender, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER,
(Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.) May–June 2005, at 9, 9 (arguing that Army Corps
districts are making “inconsistent and questionable jurisdictional calls” in the wake of
SWANCC).
372. 531 U.S. at 173–74.
373. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2252 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters have an impact on the
nation’s waters by “providing habitat for aquatic animals, keeping excessive sediment and
toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters, and reducing downstream flooding by absorbing
water at times of high flow”); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the CWA was an extension of federal regulatory authority to combat se-
verely polluted waters).
374. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–83 (2005) (discussing the broad
deference afforded to state governments).
375. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (plurality opinion).
376. See id. at 2224 (rejecting federal government’s interpretation of the CWA as infring-
ing on traditional state control over land and water use and as stretching the furthest limits
of congressional commerce power).
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courage carpooling, it is regulating within the uncontroversial sphere
of its police powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens.377
But when it tries to reduce the same asthma-causing auto emissions by
requiring that all state agents and contractors purchase from an ap-
proved list of fuel-efficient vehicles when purchasing new “fleet” vehi-
cles (e.g., police cars, garbage trucks),378 then it is regulating beyond
the uncontroversial sphere of its reserved police powers and has
crossed over into the interjurisdictional gray area.  In Engine Manufac-
turers v. South Coast Air Quality Management District,379 Justice Scalia ex-
plains that this is so because even such a “demand-side” regulation
may be too close in kind to the “supply-side” emission regulations that
are federally preempted under the Clean Air Act.380
2. The Gray Area as Regulatory “No-Man’s Land”
The notion of “crossing over” implies that a regulatory authority
has crossed some kind of line.  But it is important to isolate exactly
what line this is.  As discussed in Part III, the New Federalism’s strict-
separationist ideal would characterize such crossover in clear terms:
(1) there is a sphere of state concern and a sphere of federal concern,
each reflected by corresponding realms of state and federal authority;
(2) targets of legitimate regulation fall within one or the other; and
(3) the Tenth Amendment polices this boundary in service to the
principles of constitutional federalism.  “Crossover” thus implies that
one side has transgressed the bright line that easily differentiates the
federal from the state realm—and by corollary, any such crossover al-
ways violates the Tenth Amendment.  Yet, at least in these interjuris-
dictional contexts, the line between state and federal concern is not
always so clear.  Instead, there is an area of overlap that implicates
both state and federal concern, such that regulatory crossover is not
necessarily from one clearly defined sphere of concern and authority
377. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 260 (2004)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting the CAA’s recognition of the primary role of the states in
preventing air pollution “at its source”).
378. Id. at 249–50 (majority opinion).
379. 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
380. Id. at 254–56.  His holding, however, appears to contradict congressional intent, at
least according to the ample legislative history on point. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at
261–62 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Gadeberg, supra note 239, at 478–80 (argu- R
ing that in rejecting legislative history in favor of a textualist approach to statutory interpre-
tation, the Court empowered itself to override Congress’s intentions with regard to local
efforts like the one at issue).  In so doing, the opinion violated the presumption against
preemption of state law in traditional police power contexts unless Congress has done so
explicitly. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 260–61 (Souter, J., dissenting); Gadeberg,
supra note 239, at 483. R
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into the other, but from one clearly defined sphere into the interjuris-
dictional gray area.
The strict-separationist ideal chills regulation in the interjurisdic-
tional gray area by fostering a view of federalism that interprets depar-
tures from the uncontroversial spheres of state and federal authority
as constitutional violations.  Its binary rule assumes that a regulatory
concern must be addressed from within the properly local or national
sphere, as informed by an enumerated powers analysis and history,
without crossover.381  But discouraging regulatory activity in the invisi-
ble interjurisdictional gray area allows pressing interjurisdictional
problems to fester, either because motivated parties fear legal liability
if they stray too far from their uncontroversial sphere, or because un-
motivated parties use the gray area as an excuse to abdicate
responsibility.
a. The Risk of Crossover: Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South
Coast Air Quality Management District
Even motivated regulators might avoid the interjurisdictional
gray area for fear of defending against legal challenge in this uncer-
tain zone of authority.  For example, the South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District, the regional agency that manages air pollution
controls in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, was concerned about
the relationship between respiratory disease among its citizens and
the exceedingly poor quality of its air.382  Pollution levels in the Los
Angeles South Coast Air Basin are the worst in the nation, because its
bowl-like geography traps emissions from extreme levels of traffic gen-
erated by the massive fleet of regional commuters and the constant
stream of trucks and barges using the Port of Los Angeles shipping
corridor.383  The L.A. Basin is the only region in the nation that has
been designated an “extreme nonattainment area” for safe ozone
levels as defined by the CAA.384  The agency thus attempted to reduce
vehicular emissions by requiring that the operators of vehicular fleets
purchase only low emissions replacement vehicles, and the Engine
381. See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and
Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1203–05 (2003) (dis-
cussing the Court’s rigid, unitary focus in its recent Commerce Clause cases).
382. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1108–09 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
383. See id. at 1109 (describing the polluting effect of vehicular traffic in the Los Angeles
area).
384. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 259 at n.1
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting from data in the United States’ amicus brief).
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Manufacturers Association challenged the program as preempted by
the Clean Air Act’s emission standards.385
Although the District prevailed at the trial and lower appellate
levels, the Supreme Court vacated the lower judgment and remanded,
concerned that the District’s standard was indeed preempted by the
CAA386 (and that the agency had thus overstepped its permissible
sphere of local authority).  A more risk-averse municipal agency, espe-
cially one with fewer resources, would be very cautious before ventur-
ing into anything that looks like an interjurisdictional gray area, even
if it strongly believed (as the District argued) that it was not only regu-
lating within its proper sphere of authority but obliged to do so to
protect the health and safety of its citizens.
b. The Risk of Abdication: New York v. United States
The New Federalism’s failure to recognize a gray area may also
invite more self-serving behaviors by underachieving civil servants.  An
interjurisdictional problem may seem so expensive or politically un-
palatable that the relevant actors on both sides of the line might pre-
fer to pass it off as the other’s problem to solve—abdicating
responsibility under the cover of federalism.  For example, the protag-
onists in New York v. United States387 (the case that launched the New
Federalism revival), had been faced with the particularly unpalatable
problem of low-level radioactive waste disposal.  Because nobody
seems to want a radioactive waste disposal facility in his or her backy-
ard, almost none had been built, and so only two to three existing
sites—one in South Carolina, one in Washington State, and at times,
one in Nevada—existed for the disposal of all low-level radioactive
waste produced and disposed of in all the other states.388  When the
Washington and Nevada sites temporarily closed, South Carolina’s fa-
cility was left to accept all the hazardous waste in the nation, and its
unhappy citizens threatened to stop accepting out-of-state shipments
(though they would need congressional authorization to do so, given
the implications of rejecting this stream of distasteful but undeniably
interstate commerce).389
385. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 249–51.
386. See id. at 258–59.
387. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
388. Id. at 150.
389. Id.  South Carolina would have probably needed congressional authorization to bar
the out-of-state shipments, given the dormant Commerce Clause implications of closing its
borders to a distasteful but undeniable stream of interstate commerce.
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Congress considered mandating a federal solution, but the Na-
tional Governors Association urged Congress to leave the problem to
the states, and developed an interstate accord by which the sited states
(South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada) agreed to continue ac-
cepting out-of-state shipments until 1986.390  In the interim, the non-
sited states would work in regional partnerships to develop local dis-
posal sites that would relieve the unfair burden currently placed on
the sited states.391  At the request of the states, Congress ratified this
agreement as the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980,
thereby resolving the dormant Commerce Clause problem that would
otherwise confound the sited states’ plans to close their borders to
waste shipments in 1986.392  However, as 1985 ended, not a single new
disposal site had been built.  The states reconvened negotiations and
urged Congress to amend the Act with a new schedule of sanctions
they had developed to incentivize compliance by the non-sited
states.393
New York was among the states that lobbied Congress in support
of the new penalties, and Congress passed the amendments without
incident.394  However, when New York later failed to convince any of
its localities to host the disposal facility it had agreed to site, it sued
under the Tenth Amendment to be relieved of the obligations im-
posed by the new sanctions.395  Despite New York’s distastefully strate-
gic posture, it persuaded the Court that Congress had moved beyond
the uncontroversial sphere of its regulatory powers and comman-
deered state sovereign authority by requiring New York to either build
a facility or take title to the waste.  As detailed in Part III.A.2, the well-
known outcome of the case is that New York prevailed, the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act was defanged, and the Tenth Amend-
ment anti-commandeering doctrine was born.  The outcome less well
known is that, in the fifteen years since that time, not a single net-addi-
tional waste facility has been sited.396  The states have made no true pro-
gress in creating additional disposal sites for low-level radioactive
waste; the nation remains tethered to a mere three overwhelmed facil-
ities: Barnwell in South Carolina, Hanford in Washington State, and
390. Id. at 150–51.
391. Id. at 151.
392. Id. at 150–51.
393. Id. at 151.
394. Id. at 180–81.
395. Id. at 154.
396. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Locations of Low-Level Waste Facilities,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/locations.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
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Clive in Utah (replacing the now defunct Nevada facility).397  South
Carolina continues to accept the bulk of waste generated in the East-
ern United States.398  Virtually nothing more has been done to ad-
dress the crisis of limited low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities
that set the states into a conflict requiring congressional mediation.
Considering the stakes involved, the lack of progress is stunning.
South Carolina became so incensed over what it considered unfair
exploitation by neighboring states that it engaged in a high-stakes con-
stitutional standoff with North Carolina, from whom it decided to stop
receiving shipments of waste in 1995 after North Carolina repeatedly
failed its promises to the Southeast Compact to site its own facility.399
The Governor of North Carolina threatened to sue South Carolina
under the dormant Commerce Clause,400 though no suit was ever
filed (perhaps due to recognition of its own unclean hands, or per-
haps because the Utah site became available to accept its waste around
that time).401  However, four other states in the Southeast Compact
are currently suing North Carolina for some $90 million in light of its
various failures to comply with the terms of the Compact.402
South Carolina’s plight suggests the dilemma of a gray area “hot
potato problem” for which nobody wants to claim responsibility.  Con-
gress can claim that it is respecting federalism by staying out of the
regulatory arena that the states requested be left to them, while the
non-sited states can claim that the Supreme Court invalidated (on fed-
eralism grounds!) their best attempt at handling the problem.  Each
side can point a finger at the other, abdicating regulatory responsibil-
ity in this interjurisdictional gray area of particularly radioactive con-
cern.  Indeed, some have suggested that the failed Katrina response
indicates similar abdication of responsibility in a no-win zone of in-
terjurisdictional responsibility.403
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 17 (2006),
available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Sep/RL33461.pdf.
400. See Jim Clarke, N.C., S.C. at Odds Over Who Can Use Barnwell Landfill, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, June 26, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 1767874.
401. LLW Compacts: Emerging Private Initiatives May be Big News in New LLW Efforts, NU-
CLEAR WASTE NEWS, Sep. 5, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 3101706.
402. See Alabama v. North Carolina, 539 U.S. 925 (2003) (granting leave to file com-
plaint); 540 U.S. 1014 (2003) (appointing a special master to handle the litigation).  The
case is presently ongoing.  E-mail from John F. Maddrey, Assistant Solicitor General, North
Carolina Department of Justice, to author (Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
403. E.g., Peggy Noonan, Editorial, The Scofflaw Swimmer: Government Takes Too Much Au-
thority and Not Enough Responsibility, WSJ.COM, Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.
com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110007328 (“No one took charge.  Thus the postgame
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3. The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
Within this framework, we can understand the Katrina crisis as a
colossal interjurisdictional regulatory problem.  Especially in hind-
sight, it is hard to imagine a serious argument that preparation and
response should have proceeded at an exclusively national or local
level.  Nevertheless, in accordance with the strict-separationist model,
the White House viewed the Katrina response as a properly state regu-
latory affair, declining to take more aggressive federal initiative be-
cause it viewed avoiding interference with (let alone commandeering)
state resources as its highest obligation.404  Nothing could have
proved this view more tragically simplistic than our actual experience
in the aftermath of the hurricane.
Katrina was clearly a local problem, demanding the protection of
public health and safety and the maintenance of domestic law and
order that lie at the heart of traditional state function.405  State regula-
tory concern was implicated in the dispatch of first responders with
localized expertise, the provision of humanitarian aid for intrastate
evacuees, and the protection and salvage of state infrastructure and
private property.  However, to the extent that the crisis implicated the
channels of interstate commerce, the national economy, and the care
of interstate evacuees, it was also a matter of national concern.  The
Port of New Orleans is the largest shipping port in the United States
(measured by tonnage handled),406 and a sizeable percentage of our
domestic energy supplies are pumped, delivered, or shipped via its
channels.407  In addition, a network of 20,000 miles of oil and gas dis-
tribution lines embedded in the New Orleans wetlands provide critical
supplies to the rest of the nation,408 lines so vital that the federal gov-
ernment tapped into the national oil reserves to make up for the
commentary in which everyone blamed someone else: The mayor fumbled the ball, the governor
didn’t call the play, the president didn’t have a ground game.”).
404. See supra Part II.B.2.
405. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 313 (2006) (noting that the “state cannot
surrender, abdicate, or abridge its police power”).
406. Rip Watson, New Orleans Port Opens to Relief Ships After Katrina, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000082&sid=adNXIjdn4Z
8Q.
407. Thanks to the convenient proximity of rich carbon-based fuels in the Gulf of Mex-
ico to the Port of New Orleans, this region is perhaps the most important energy hub in
the continental United States, supplying nearly twenty percent of domestic demand for oil
and natural gas.  Robert Viguerie, Coastal Erosion: Crisis in Louisiana’s Wetlands, 51 LA. B.J.
85, 86 (2003).
408. Stemming the Tide: The Mississippi River Delta and the Davis Pond Freshwater Diversion
Project, LACOAST.GOV, http://www.lacoast.gov/programs/DavisPond/stemming-the-tide.
htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
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shortfall when the network went offline.409  Residents left homeless
and destitute in the wake of the storm soon became refugees requir-
ing assistance in countless other states.410  Federal responsibility in the
crisis may also attach to the federal role in constructing what the Army
Corps of Engineers now itself concedes were structurally faulty lev-
ees.411  Finally, it has even been argued that the anarchy following Ka-
trina rendered federal intervention necessary to fulfill the
Constitution’s Guarantee Clause,412 which, in guaranteeing each state
“a Republican Form of Government” implicitly promised federal ac-
tion to preserve at least some functioning governance in New Orleans
when state and local government had collapsed.413
Thus, responding to Katrina was indeed the state’s obligation, but
it was also the nation’s obligation.  Despite the NRP’s promise to pro-
tect lives, the relief effort failed the thousands of residents who died in
their neighborhoods and nursing homes and the thirty-four who died
in the Superdome and convention center.414  Hundreds of thousands
of evacuees sought shelter and employment in cities and towns across
the nation, and federal expenditures on emergency housing for them
amount to millions of dollars each day.  Oil spills and damaged infra-
structure spiked the price of fuel nationwide, triggering fears ranging
from a national recession to an increase in domestic terrorist activity.
With up to twenty-five percent of New Orleans’s housing stock con-
demned,415 an epidemic of crime that has persisted more than a year
after the storm,416 and environmental hazards threatening health and
409. Jad Mouawad & Vikas Bajaj, Gulf Oil Operations Remain in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2005, at C1.
410. See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. R
411. See supra note 134 (recounting reports that the Army Corps conceded that the levee R
designs were flawed).
412. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
413. Greenberger, supra note 76, at 23. R
414. See supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. R
415. See Adam Nossiter, Thousands of Demolitions Near, New Orleans Braces for New Pain,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at § 1 (noting that over 50,000 of the city’s 180,000 homes could
be demolished).
416. See Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution
After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 135–54 (2006) (describing the collapse of the
criminal justice system in post-Katrina New Orleans); Adam Nossiter, Storm Left New Orleans
Ripe for Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at A24 (“The storm of violence that has burst
over this city since New Year’s Day can be traced in part to dysfunctional law enforcement
institutions, aggravated by a natural disaster that turned the physical and social landscape
of New Orleans into an ideal terrain for criminals.”)
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safety into the foreseeable future,417 there is no quick end to the crisis
in sight.
In other words, everyone had a stake—but as we now well know,
the bifurcated disaster response itself proved disastrous.  As the stories
of failure after failure in the relief effort unfolded, culpability fell on
city, state, and federal agencies alike.  The City of New Orleans proba-
bly should have considered how the 100,000 New Orleans residents
without motor vehicles would be able to heed Mayor Nagin’s evacua-
tion command.  The State of Louisiana probably should have consid-
ered the wisdom of moving the National Guard headquarters that
would coordinate hurricane response to higher ground before the
storm.  The federal government apparently failed to heed National
Weather Service warnings about the scope of the storm and failed to
deploy FEMA resources appropriately before the storm.  The federal
government probably should have intervened sooner when it became
clear (at least to the average American watching the nightly news) that
local efforts to confront the hurricane aftermath were insufficient,
and when it finally did intervene, it should have been able to provide
a more effective chain of command to facilitate decisionmaking.
From the constitutional perspective, it is these last failures that
are most troubling, given reports about the White House debate over
the federalism implications of taking initiative418 and former FEMA
Director Michael Brown’s congressional testimony explaining the re-
luctant federal response (disingenuously or not) in overtly New Feder-
alist terms.419  The New Federalism decisions themselves may not have
erected an explicit doctrinal barrier to the interjurisdictional response
needed after Katrina,420 but they define a trajectory pointing state and
federal leadership toward the strict-separationist extreme that either
convinced or confused them about the available regulatory choices.
The fact that the crisis was a legitimate matter of state concern did not
foreclose the fact that it was also a matter of legitimate federal con-
cern, demanding proactive federal intervention from within the feder-
alism order.
The Katrina debacle illustrated the risks of applying a binary deci-
sion rule in interjurisdictional contexts—characterizing matters as “ei-
417. See EPA, Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Frequent Questions, http://www.epa.gov/
katrina/faqs.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (providing a forum to address a host of con-
tinuing health and safety related issues for the residents of the New Orleans area).
418. See supra Part II.B.2.
419. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. R
420. That said, the anti-commandeering rule of New York and Printz may well have dis-
couraged the White House from “federalizing” the Louisiana National Guard without gu-
bernatorial consent.
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ther/or”: if national, then not local; if local, then not national.421
Taken to its extreme, this approach obstructs effective governance by
assigning jurisdiction over a matter requiring both a local and na-
tional response to either state or federal agents exclusively, and then
zealously guarding the boundary against defensible (even desirable)
crossover by the other.  But this is a nonsensical approach when the
problem requires both local and national competencies.  The strict-
separationist model regards regulatory activity as permissible if it fits
neatly within the state or federal box anticipated by its test, and imper-
missible if it does not.  But what if the problem is not with the activity,
but with the limitations of a simple, two-box test?
If nothing else, Katrina has taught us that interjurisdictional regu-
latory problems require us, quite literally, to think outside the New
Federalism boxes.  Indeed, Michael Brown memorably intoned (from
squarely within the box) that the “princip[les] of federalism should
not be lost in a short-term desire to react to a natural disaster of cata-
strophic proportions,” fretting that a more proactive federal response
would have undermined the very foundations of dual sovereignty.422
His testimony sadly demonstrates that the New Federalism failed Ka-
trina victims not for lack of good intentions, but for lack of
imagination.
Now that the 39,000 refugees have left the “Third World hell-
hole” that became New Orleans in the first few days after the storm,423
it is easier to find sympathy for how White House officials became
mired in the federalism problems suggested by the response.  After
all, they were fairly interpreting the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s
recent federalism rulings,424 and thus hesitated to invoke potential
Stafford Act authority to intrude upon the state’s primary role as pro-
vider of intrastate relief and law enforcement services.  But the in-
terjurisdictional nature of the Katrina emergency demonstrates how a
problem shaped beyond the comprehension of the strict-separationist
model can cause the entire system to crash.  Indeed, interjurisdic-
tional problems spawn circumstances that exacerbate the inherent
tension between underlying federalism values, with which the New
Federalism is ill-equipped to handle.  Although symptoms of this mis-
421. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 381, at 1203–05 (arguing that the Rehnquist R
Court’s narrow federalism perspective threatens to impermissibly impinge on proper fed-
eral legislative power).
422. Brown Statement, supra note 61, at 3. R
423. Thomas et al., supra note 56, at 40. R
424. See supra Part III.B (discussing the distinct spheres of state and federal power in the
New Federalism).
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match were evident in foundering regulatory responses to less
mediagenic interjurisdictional problems preceding Katrina (e.g., the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste and the management of respira-
tory disease in Los Angeles), the Katrina debacle brought home to the
nation a clear message: a legal framework built around a theory that
does not track the real-world targets of regulatory response is unstable
and unsustainable.
It also suggested an alternative, at least in the Katrina response
that most Americans collectively imagined was possible.  In this vision,
the federal government would have assessed claims by the emergency
to its own regulatory responsibility, and then weighed the regulatory
crossover alternative (here, proactive federal intervention) against
each of the federalism values at stake—the reasons for our federal
system of government in the first place.  It would have considered the
severity of the problem, the capacity of the state and local govern-
ments to respond, and the relative risks to dual sovereignty checks and
balances of crossing into the interjurisdictional gray area.  The state
and local governments would have made a similar evaluation, to the
extent of their capacity.  Most Americans apparently believed that the
federal interest in saving the lives and relieving the human suffering
of its own citizens far overwhelmed the risks to inter-sovereign diplo-
macy, but in any event, a conclusion would have been reached more
efficiently and decisively if freed from the paralysis provoked by the
New Federalism approach.425
This paralysis reflects perhaps the most serious trap of binary
thinking promoted by the New Federalism, which is its essential sug-
gestion that we must choose between either federalism or interjurisdic-
tional problem-solving.  Either we are faithful to the constitutional
ideal of dual sovereignty, or we can effectively grapple with the collec-
tive action problems that we ask regulation to help us control.  New
Federalism frames this as the choice by positing the check and bal-
ance value as synonymous with federalism in general.  But as impor-
tant as they are, checks and balances are only one of the principles of
good government that undergird American federalism.  Indeed, there
are a host of others—accountability, localism, problem-solving—all in
tension with one another.  The interpretive model of federalism that
we choose determines how we mediate this tension, and New Federal-
ism’s solution is to privilege checks and balances over all others.  So
does faithfulness to federalism require that we forsake interjurisdic-
425. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (reviewing public disapproval of the fed- R
eral response).  To facilitate an efficient decisionmaking process, this Article proposes a
jurisprudential standard. See infra Part VI.
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tional problemsolving?  It depends on the operative federalism model.
New Federalism suggests so, but this Article suggests not.
Instead, the Court’s future federalism jurisprudence should draw
from a model of federalism that continues to protect our important
interest in the balance of state and federal power while also affording
the flexibility necessary for government at all levels to meaningfully
address the problems we entrust to their care.  To the extent that the
New Federalism model cannot accommodate the dimensions of the
interjurisdictional gray area, then it must be adjusted until it can, ena-
bling more effective governance in accordance with a more robust
theoretical model.  Whether an act of regulatory crossover should be
considered a constitutional violation should depend on a considera-
tion of all federalism values that lead us to the system of dual sover-
eignty symbolized by the Tenth Amendment, not just the strict
separation of state and federal powers for its own sake.  Once again, it
is not a choice about federalism or not, but rather which model of
federalism realizes the best balance of the values that motivate federal-
ism to begin with.
Which leads us to consideration of what exactly those values are,
or the underlying question, why federalism?
V. FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN
A. Why Federalism?
In building a workable model of federalism, we must understand
the reasons for federalism, or for creating a federal system in the first
place.  What are the underlying values promoted by federalism that
make us willing to struggle with these problems in the first place?
With unsurprising uniformity, federalist governments have histor-
ically arisen through the union of separately functioning polities or
distinctive cultural groups, such as the American colonists’ original
thirteen states,426 the provinces of Canada,427 or the nation-states of
the European Union.428  The choice of a federalism-based system
426. See Laycock, supra note 35, at 125 (noting that the original thirteen colonies were R
independent political identities before the ratification of the Constitution).
427. See Allen M. Linden, Flexible Federalism: The Canadian Way, in PATTERNS OF REGIONAL-
ISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK, supra note 35, at 17, 21–22 (discussing the R
agreement to form a federal union between Canada East, Canada West, and the maritime
colonies).
428. See Sanford Levinson, Is Secession the Achilles Heel of ‘Strong’ Federalism?, in PATTERNS
OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK, supra note 35, at 207, 211 (compar- R
ing the current transformation of sovereign nation-states into the European Union to the
original thirteen American colonies).
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makes intuitive sense in such cases, as it draws efficiently on the estab-
lished competencies of preexisting laws and authorities while offering
protection for the potentially diverging interests of members of the
political sub-units, who may have initially organized themselves
around differences of language, ethnicity, religion, and/or culture.
Enthusiasm for federalism among the early Americans is under-
standable on these grounds alone, given eighteenth-century uncer-
tainties about whether the new union they would form would really be
any “more perfect” than the status quo.  But two centuries of success
later, the value of American federalism rests on somewhat different
grounds from those that support many other federalism-based systems
that continue to negotiate between culturally distinctive sub-poli-
ties.429  Red and blue state politics notwithstanding, the modern
United States are characterized by remarkable homogeneity.  With
some exceptions, we share a dominant language and a common heri-
tage of immigrant origins, and most of the rich diversity that exists
within the nation is relatively similarly dispersed within the fifty
states.430  As such, our continued commitment to structural tension
between local and national authority must stem from a conviction that
it confers important architectural advantages beyond the historical ac-
cident of our aggregative origins.  Even at that time, many of these
values were championed by the early federalism theorists among the
Framers, most famously chronicled in the exchanges between James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in the Federalist Papers.431
429. Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 908–14 (arguing that the original colonial R
benefits of federalism no longer apply in the modern United States).
430. See id. at 922–23 (noting the practically identical political and economic organiza-
tion of the fifty states); see also id. at 944–49 (arguing that the “nation-wide dispersion of
ethnic and cultural identities, paralleling the dispersion of economic or ideological identi-
ties” indicates that the truly meaningful political community within the United States is the
United States).  Professors McGinnis and Somin further explain this phenomenon:
One reason that citizens may have less understanding of federalism today
than they did in the past is that sentiments that may have previously motivated
citizens to take an interest in and protect federalism have faded.  The huge de-
crease in transportation costs and information costs in the twentieth century has
created a mass culture that has largely eliminated cultural differences among
states and has even substantially tempered regional distinctions.  It is more diffi-
cult to feel strongly about states’ rights if you live in New Jersey and work in New
York for a company with its headquarters in Texas.  The social changes responsi-
ble for this decline in local attention seem irreversible and may be accelerating.
As a result, citizens lack the attachments to their states that may have  motivated
them to pay attention to issues of federal structure in the past.
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a
Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 96 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
431. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 195, at 294–300 (dis- R
cussing the tension between state and federal governments).
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Still, we are well advised not to take our assumptions about the
importance Americans place on constitutional federalism too far.
Federalism as a structural feature of government is inherently content-
neutral with regard to substantive political issues.432  As a result, some
suggest that for most Americans, federalism is a secondary political
preference that has always received less consideration than first-order
substantive issues such as civil rights, gun control, abortion, or the
environment.433  For example, Professor Neal Devins champions the
need for judicially enforceable federalism constraints with evidence
indicating that political federalism constraints alone will fail, not be-
cause voters lack the knowledge or impetus to check the behavior of
their representatives, but because “[t]he problem is more pervasive:
[n]o one really cares about federalism.”434  Tracing the history of op-
portunistic invocation of federalism ideals from the Louisiana
Purchase to the modern day, he argues that
the willingness of lawmakers and interest groups to manipu-
late federalism in order to secure preferred substantive poli-
cies is the rule.  Indeed, the historical record is so
overwhelming that it is hard to believe that a majority of in-
formed voters would suspend their personal policy prefer-
ences in order to reap the benefits of structural federalism.
The propensity of the American people to pay more at-
tention to desired results than to which level of government
is acting on their behalf dates back to the Framers.
. . . .
. . . Rather than adhere to a consistent position on feder-
alism, Americans have always let their views on first order
policy priorities dictate their views on federalism.435
Among the more famous examples of such federalism opportunism is
the role reversal between pro-slavery and abolitionist interests before
and after the Civil War.436  Beforehand, abolitionists decried fugitive
slave laws as constitutionally inappropriate federal intrusions into the
432. See Moreno, supra note 144, at 721 (noting that “[f]ederalism was a content-neutral R
principle” in nineteenth-century America); see also Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Feder-
alism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 454 (2002) (concluding, on the basis of federalism’s content-
neutrality, that states’ rights help preserve individual liberties).
433. Devins, supra note 209, at 133. R
434. Id. at 131, 137.  If it were really true that no one cared about federalism, of course,
we would rightly ask why judicially enforceable federalism constraints would be preferable
to allowing ineffective political constraints work the people’s will.
435. Id. at 134.
436. Id. at 134–35; see also Moreno, supra note 144, at 725–27 (“[D]uring the 1850s, R
many southerners became Marshallian judicial nationalists, while many northerners be-
came Jeffersonian-Jacksonian states-rights advocates.”).
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proper realm of state law (while pro-slavery interests approved of this
exercise of national authority).437  But their views on federalism re-
versed after the war, when abolitionists favored the use of national law
and policy to forbid slaveholding, and pro-slavery interests champi-
oned their cause under the banner of states’ rights.438
Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley make a similar ar-
gument in support of their contrary proposition that judicial federal-
ism constraints are not necessary.439  Despite their opposing view
about the value of judicial enforcement (which stems from their skep-
ticism that federalism offers any significant value at all, at least in the
United States),440 their analysis of Americans’ historically opportunis-
tic use of federalism closely reflects Devins’s:
During the Kennedy-Johnson era and the heyday of the War-
ren Court, states’ rights became a rallying cry of those who
opposed desegregation, social welfare, and controls on law
enforcement agents.  During the years of the Reagan and
Bush administrations and the Rehnquist Court, proponents
of abortion, gay rights, and abolition of the death penalty
became enamored of federalism for equivalent reasons.  This
is perfectly good political strategy, but it is hardly a convinc-
ing argument for federalism.  In fact, it demonstrates the
weakness of federalism as a normative principle; because fed-
eralism’s force is symbolic and not truly normative, it quickly
becomes a proxy for more compelling substantive views that
it happens to support.441
Professors Rubin and Feeley level an additional challenge to the
notion that Americans care deeply about federalism, asserting that
even when Americans do tout the benefits of federalism, they are re-
ally praising something other than federalism.  Instead, they are cele-
brating decentralization, a managerial concept that refers to the
instrumental “delegation of centralized authority to subordinate units
of either a geographic or a functional character” without reference to
437. Devins, supra note 209, at 134. R
438. Id. at 134–35.
439. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 910–14 (arguing that the principles of federal- R
ism and the remedy of judicial intervention serve only to prevent the implementation of
sound national policy).  For the iconic argument that federalism values are better pro-
tected by the political process than by judicial intervention, see Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
440. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 907 (“In our view, federalism in America R
achieves none of the beneficial goals that the Court claims for it.”).
441. Id. at 935.
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any kind of dual sovereignty.442  In other words, American federalism
proponents often point to advantages yielded by the protection of lo-
cal autonomy and diversity, but these localism values are more appro-
priately attributed to an architectural choice of decentralized
authority that may or may not have any relationship to federalism.443
A government can arguably preserve the benefits of decentralized lo-
calism without a federal system of dual sovereignty,444 and a system of
dual sovereignty will not necessarily protect genuine local auton-
omy.445  The argument for a federal system over a unitary system must
contend with this critical point, and a model of federalism that will
live up to its billing must take account of the fact that simply protect-
ing an exclusive realm of state authority does nothing for the values
associated with local autonomy so often claimed in support of
federalism.
Accordingly, some have argued that the New Federalism revival
either fails to protect the localist values it claims to champion in any
meaningful way, or reflects an opportunistic political ploy attempting
substantive political objectives under the unrelated guise of preserving
constitutional federalism.446  The criticism has become more poign-
ant in recent years, when the same Court that so often invalidated
federal authority in the name of states’ rights has also enabled pre-
emption of several high profile state laws that appeared to offend
442. Id. at 910.
443. See infra Part V.A.3.
444. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 914–26 (arguing that the four principal justifi- R
cations of federalism are in actuality policy justifications for decentralization).  Professors
Rubin and Feeley explain that
[o]f the standard arguments for federalism, four are really arguments that spe-
cific national policies are best implemented by decentralized decision-making;
these are public participation, effectuating citizen choice through competition
among jurisdictions, achieving economic efficiency through competition among
jurisdictions, and encouraging experimentation. . . .  They are national strate-
gies . . . linked to federalism only by confusing that concept with decentralization,
and by the airy, flag-waving-in-the-breeze rhetoric that characterizes the entire
subject.
Id. at 914–15.
445. See Barron, supra note 147, at 378–79 (arguing that limiting central power may not R
preserve local autonomy because the two spheres are intertwined).
446. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63, 63–65 (2004) (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court’s decisions between 1995 and 2002
“may well reflect the personal preferences of the Justices voting to invalidate these laws,”
but can nonetheless be explained by majoritarian forces); Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpreta-
tion of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003–04 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 626
(2005) (noting that the paucity of federalism discussion in the Court’s environmental deci-
sions in the 2003–04 Term “support the thesis that members of the Court voice federalism
concerns inconsistently and opportunistically”).
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competing first-order policy preferences.447 Gonzalez v. Raich448 re-
mains the most famous example (though it split the New Federalism
coalition),449 holding that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority in-
cludes the power to prosecute purely local cultivation of marijuana for
medical use, despite a statewide referendum legalizing intrastate use
and production of marijuana for approved medical purposes.450  In
his Lorillard Tobacco dissent,451 Justice Stevens suggested that the New
Federalism harbors a purely partisan anti-regulatory agenda, compar-
ing (1) Lorillard Tobacco’s holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act preempted local efforts to protect children by
banning billboard cigarette advertising near schools, with (2) the
same Court’s holding in United States v. Lopez that the federal govern-
ment lacked authority to protect children by banning the sale of guns
near schools.452
Nevertheless, there may well be more principled explanations for
these departures than that of the gored ox, and this piece takes the
arguments of New Federalism proponents seriously and at face value
to engage the conversation they have so powerfully started.  That con-
versation demonstrates that the rationales for American federalism
have remained remarkably consistent since publication of the Federal-
ist Papers (notwithstanding the challenge by theorists like Rubin and
Feeley).453  Then and now, favorable (and content-neutral) answers to
the question “why federalism?” tend to reference three sets of structural
good governance values: (1) the erection of safeguards against tyr-
anny; (2) the promotion of accountability in government; and (3) the
socially valuable benefits associated with localism, especially in foster-
ing diversity and encouraging innovation through interjurisdictional
competition.454
447. See supra Part III.B.
448. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
449. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion and Justice Scalia concurred sepa-
rately, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas dissented. Id. at
3.
450. Id. at 32–33; see also id. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
451. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
452. Id. at 598 & n.8.
453. See supra notes 439–445 and accompanying text (outlining the argument by Profes- R
sors Rubin and Feeley that American federalism serves none of the values claimed by its
proponents).  For a thoughtful refutation of Rubin and Feeley’s claims, see Jackson, supra
note 23, at 2217–20. R
454. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (explaining that the federal-
ist structure assures sensitivity to diverse societal needs, increases democratic involvement,
allows for governmental experimentation, and makes government responsive by fostering
competition); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for
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The following discussion reviews the strengths and weaknesses of
the usual claims, and surfaces an additional, less obvious value to the
mix that is neither stronger nor weaker than the others: the hidden
problem-solving principle of federalism.  As discussed below, these val-
ues stand in some tension with one another.  Ultimately, a viable
model of federalism is one that delivers on the advantages claimed by
its proponents, but alternative models of federalism deliver on these
values in differing ratios.  A choice between models of federalism is
really a choice about the best balance of protection afforded these
underlying values when tensions arise—in other words, which values
will cede to which other values, and under what circumstances.
1. Checks and Balances
A primary value associated with American federalism—and the
one least vulnerable to confusion with the values of nonfederal decen-
tralization—is its architectural promise of checks and balances.455
The division of authority between the national and state governments
is designed to curb ambition on both sides of the divide, such that
neither accumulates power beyond the counter-balancing forces of
the other.  As Alexander Hamilton described in the Federalist Papers,
this serves as a bulwark against tyranny, safeguarding individual liber-
ties against assault by an unchecked, overly powerful sovereign:
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be
said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being
almost always the rival of power, the general government will
at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition to-
wards the general government.  The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it prepon-
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988) (identifying four positive features of
federalism: (1) limitation on power of federal government, (2) citizen participation in the
political process, (3) political and cultural diversity, and (4) state experimentation); see also
Garnett, supra note 147, at 22 (adding that federalism also protects the contribution of R
non-government “associations and mediating institutions” to the preservation of political
liberty against centralized authority); Jackson, supra note 23, at 2214 (adding to the feder- R
alism list: “enhancing personal and group liberty or empowerment, by providing multiple
layers of government to which citizens may appeal”).
455. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, “[m]unicipal bodies and county administrations
are like so many hidden reefs retarding or dividing the flood of the popular will.” DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA 263 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed., Anchor Books 1969) (1835);
see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1504 (1987) (book review) (noting that “[t]he diffusion of power, in and of itself, is
protective of liberty”).
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derate.  If their rights are invaded by either, they can make
use of the other as the instrument of redress.456
Hamilton assured his readers that the balance of power in the new
federal system would successfully check any attempt by either side “to
establish a tyranny.”457  Indeed, anxiety among the Framers about un-
checked governmental authority was also evident in their adoption of
such structural features as the bicameral legislature, the checks and
balances erected between the three federal branches, and provisions
protecting individuals directly against the excesses of state power
(e.g., the protection of habeas corpus, the proscription of ex post
facto laws, and the additional protections for individuals defined in
the Bill of Rights).
Heeding the adage that “absolute power corrupts absolutely,” the
check-and-balance value thus furthers a vision of good government in
which the power of the state is never stored all in one reservoir, and
no governmental actor becomes so powerful that it can act beyond the
law.  It was perhaps the paramount federalism value to the early pio-
neers of American federalism,458 and it is also the value that most ani-
mates the rhetorical New Federalism ideal of better differentiating the
proper realms of state and federal governance.  In Gregory v. Ash-
croft,459 the Rehnquist Court invoked Hamilton’s words in a preamble
456. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 195, at 180–81.  James R
Madison further described the value of this arrangement:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.  In the
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first di-
vided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people.  The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 195, at 323. R
457. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 195, at 180–81.  Indeed, R
history demonstrates that such assaults on individual liberties are as likely to come from
either side of the divide.  Just as the states harbored entrenched racial and gender oppres-
sion (via slavery, Jim Crow laws, and legalized race and sex discrimination in employment
until late in the twentieth century), the federal government gave us McCarthyism, the
World War II era anti-sedition laws, and alleged excesses under the Patriot Act (including
the recent allegations that the executive branch bypassed the laws regarding the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act by arranging for warrantless wiretaps).
458. See Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of
Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 471 (2002) (“For the Founding Fa-
thers and their generation, the main rationale for federalism was not diversity or competi-
tion (the most familiar modern arguments) but the role of the states as a bulwark against
federal tyranny.”).
459. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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to the New Federalism,460 upholding as the “prerogative [of] citizens
of a sovereign State” the mandatory retirement provision in the Mis-
souri Constitution that had been challenged as age-based discrimina-
tion by state judges.461  Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor
observed:
The constitutionally mandated balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the
Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental liber-
ties.  Just as the separation and independence of the coordi-
nate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front . . . .
. . . .
One fairly can dispute whether our federalist system has
been quite as successful in checking government abuse as
Hamilton promised, but there is no doubt about the
design.462
And yet, she warned, the design is of no value if the states’ ability to
check the power of the federal government loses credibility: “If this
‘double security’ is to be effective, there must be a proper balance
between the States and the Federal Government.  These twin powers
will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the tension
between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”463
As suggested in Justice O’Connor’s admonition, the check-and-
balance value is the federalism principle that New Federalism most
seeks to protect in defending the boundary between state and federal
jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that checks and bal-
ances would be well served by realizing the ideal of strict-separationist
dual sovereignty.  A healthy balance of state and federal power is cer-
tainly necessary to realize the “double security” that Justice O’Connor
heralds, and protecting the uncontroversial spheres of state and fed-
eral authority against erosion is important in this regard.  Neverthe-
less, it may also be that the very jurisdictional overlap implied by the
460. Id. at 458–59 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 180–81 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
461. Id. at 473.  Although the Court decided the case by interpreting petitioners’ claims
under the ADEA and Equal Protection Clause, it grounded this analysis in a detailed dispo-
sition of the proper balance of state and federal power within the American system of
federalism. Id. at 457–64.
462. Id. at 458–59 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
463. Id. at 459.
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interjurisdictional gray area adds force to the system of checks and
balances, because it enables citizens to wield governmental power at
one level when they are unsatisfied with governmental performance at
the other level.  For example, history reveals an array of circumstances
in which both the federal government and the states have champi-
oned individual rights against neglect by the other side,464 from the
federal assertion of rights for African Americans and women during
the civil rights movement to the protection by certain states of rights
beyond those afforded at the federal level (ranging from gay rights465
to property rights466).  The increasing attention paid by state and local
government to the threat of climate change in the face of federal inat-
tention may prove the next example.467  Like the innovation of the
bicameral legislature, a little redundancy may strengthen, rather than
weaken, the check-and-balance value.
That a healthy balance of state and federal authority yields a bul-
wark against tyranny seems beyond doubt among most Americans,468
and Justice O’Connor may well be correct in citing it as the “principle
benefit” of federalism.469  Surely the structural tension between state
and federal power has yielded benefits claimed on both sides of the
divide, from the federal vindication of constitutional rights to the
preservation of state authority over taxation and land use policies.
Any model of federalism true to the intention of a federal system (and
not simply a decentralized system) must contend with threats to this
fundamental value.
Still, checks and balances are not the only value that underlies
American federalism.  After all, if the only purpose of federalism were
the preservation of tension between the authority of two independent
sovereigns, then we might best be served by a system of dual sover-
eignty between true “equals”—in other words, one without the
464. See Laycock, supra note 35, at 119 (“Two views of federalism and liberty have com- R
peted through most of American history: that states protect liberty against the dangerous
federal government, which must be kept small; and that the federal government protects
liberty against recalcitrant states, and must be large enough to do so.”).
465. See, e.g., Steve LeBlanc, Massachusetts Retains Gay Marriage, DESERET MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 15, 2005, at A12.
466. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Eminent Domain Reform Signed, KAN. CITY STAR, July 14, 2006, at
B2 (reporting on Missouri’s legislative eminent domain reform that gives citizens new
rights).
467. See infra note 527 and accompanying text (discussing the northeastern states’ Re- R
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative).
468. But see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 928–29 (noting that “[w]hile there is an R
undeniable validity to this argument for federalism, it can readily be overstated,” especially
given the overwhelming military might of the federal government).
469. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is
a check on abuses of government power.”).
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Supremacy Clause, departing from the constitutional model described
in McCulloch v. Maryland.470  But it is hard to imagine the usefulness of
such a model, which seems doomed to the sort of political gridlock
that forced early America’s reconsideration of the Articles of Confed-
eration.  In other words, though a dual sovereignty between equals
might perfect checks and balances, it would overly compromise the
kinds of regulatory problem-solving that the framers hoped the new
Union would enable.  Moreover, the maintenance of structural ten-
sion between two independent sovereigns confounds accountability to
the voters, and need not promote any of the values of localism and
decentralization so often championed as advantages of federalism.471
Certainly, tension between the independent sovereigns of the United
States and the Soviet Union yielded few decentralizing benefits to the
citizens of either nation during the Cold War.
In sum, the check-and-balance value may be a critical federalism
value—certainly the one most protected by the New Federalism’s
quest for strict-separationist dual sovereignty, and perhaps even the
one that most preoccupied the Framers—but it is not the only one
that matters.
2. Accountability
The text of the New Federalism decisions indicates that accounta-
bility is a favorite federalism value among the New Federalism archi-
tects.  As Justice Scalia observed in Printz, “[t]he Constitution . . .
contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain ac-
countable to its own citizens,”472 and federalism is often championed
as a means of ensuring that government remains accountable to the
electorate by enabling citizens to recognize which elected officials are
responsible for which policies (and to reward or punish policy choices
accordingly).473  In other words, if you can always tell the difference
between the realms of state and federal regulatory authority, then you
always know “which bums to throw out” when you don’t like how
things are going in a particular regulatory context.
470. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–36 (1819); see supra notes 153–157 and accompanying R
text (discussing the relationship between the dual sovereigns in light of the Supremacy
Clause).
471. See infra Part V.A.2–3.
472. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997).
473. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 23, at 2205 (stating that “[f]ederal commandeering of R
states . . . can risk confusing the lines of political accountability”); Merritt, supra note 454, R
at 61–62 (describing how federal officials can escape accountability by compelling state
governments into action).
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Accordingly, in overturning portions of the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Act held to commandeer state legislative authority in
New York,474 Justice O’Connor warned that “where the Federal Gov-
ernment compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state
and federal officials is diminished” by frustrating citizens’ ability to
keep track of which sovereign is responsible for what regulation of
hazardous waste disposal.475  Justice O’Connor clarified further:
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that
making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in
their best interest, they may elect state officials who share
their view.  That view can always be pre-empted under the
Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but in
such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the deci-
sion in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials
that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be
detrimental or unpopular.  But where the Federal Govern-
ment directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the fed-
eral officials who devised the regulatory program may re-
main insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision.476
Justice O’Connor thus identifies a primary concern regarding how
state and federal regulatory overlap may blur lines of accountability—
that is, by misleading voters to hold state representatives accountable
for policy choices forced upon them by federal representatives who
escape criticism by the same confused voters.  The New Federalism
decisions highlight the importance of protecting accountability in ad-
dition to checks and balances, but whether the decisions have actually
succeeded in promoting greater accountability remains debatable.
For example, while the Court’s decision in New York purported to pro-
tect regulatory accountability, its ultimate legacy has been the creation
of a “hot potato” political morass for which both sides appear to have
abdicated regulatory responsibility.477
Perhaps a more troubling way in which regulatory overlap could
compromise accountability is the possibility that the federal govern-
ment may escape responsibility for policy choices that unreasonably
impose forced costs on the states via “unfunded mandates.”  The
problem of unfunded mandates has received considerable and war-
474. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992).
475. Id. at 168.
476. Id. at 168–69.
477. See supra Part IV.B.2.b (discussing the aftermath of New York).
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ranted attention.478  Even if voters were not confused about a scenario
in which a federal program indirectly imposed costs on their state,
they might have a harder time allocating disappointment about the
ways that fully unconstrained cost-shifting might undermine the suc-
cess of other state policies.  Yet the same problem has also demon-
strated, via the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,479 how the
political process may, at least in some circumstances, successfully vin-
dicate federalism concerns.  The means by which the unfunded man-
dates problem received repeated federal attention (by executive
order480 and congressional legislation481) shows that voters concerned
about cost imposition on their states successfully identified the prob-
lem and voiced their dissatisfaction through their federal representa-
tives—belying an inherent weakness in the accountability rationale for
federalism.  It assumes that voters either cannot understand what is
happening between the federal and state governments or that they
cannot voice their political preferences through their federal repre-
sentation, when—at least in the case of unfunded mandates—they ap-
parently did both.482  Similarly, Justice O’Connor’s argument in New
York has been criticized for resting on the unsupported empirical
premises “that voters will be unable to determine what level of govern-
478. See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 890 (1979) (noting the quandary for states when Congress directs
them to enact certain policies without providing matching funding levels, forcing the states
to choose the federal agenda over their own).
479. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).  A primary purpose of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act is “to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate Federal funding, in a
manner that may displace other essential State, local, and tribal governmental priorities.”
2 U.S.C. § 1501(2) (2000).
480. Both President Reagan and President Clinton have required agencies to conduct a
pre-promulgation cost analysis. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17,
1981) (“Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.”); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (replacing previous standard with whether “the benefits
of the intended regulation justify its costs”).
481. Congress has similarly enacted legislation that requires agencies to consider the
costs of their proposed regulations. E.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1501(7)(B) (requiring federal agencies
to consider “the budgetary impact of regulations containing Federal mandates upon State,
local, and tribal governments and the private sector before adopting such regulations”);
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2000) (requiring agencies to pre-
pare regulatory flexibility analysis for any regulation that have will have a significant eco-
nomic impact on small entities).
482. Both the executive and legislative versions of unfunded mandates reform appear to
be examples of successful federally enacted political constraints on regulatory overlap, es-
pecially since they constitute votes against interest by federal representatives (if federal
agents are presumed to want more power).
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ment is responsible for a particular program or policy, thus permitting
federal officials to escape deserved blame”483 and “that state and local
officials are incapable of informing their constituents when ‘Washing-
ton’ is really responsible for a particular policy or outcome.”484
Moreover, although accountability concerns doubtlessly motivate
the constitutional design, arguments raised about the role of federal-
ism in preserving accountability stretch the relationship a bit taut.
There are a host of constitutional features more clearly designed to
accomplish the objective of preserving an accountable, noncorrupt
federal government, including the requirement of regular elections at
fixed intervals, limits on forms of corruption and self-dealing by
elected officials, and the requirement that representatives’ voting
records be made publicly available.485  By contrast, federalism is an
architectural choice that muddies accountability by design, causing
Americans to be subjects of two sovereigns in ways that confuse the
legally uninitiated even without reference to the uncertain scope of
Congress’s commerce authority.486  If accountability were all that mat-
tered, then a unitary (or even a confederate) system would clearly be
preferable; nobody would confuse which level was responsible for pol-
icy successes and failures if citizens only had to keep track of one level
of government.487  And yet we chose a federal system nonetheless—
likely for check-and-balance advantages discussed above (and perhaps
the problem-solving advantages discussed below), further demonstrat-
ing the tensions that swirl among the competing values on which fed-
eralism is premised.
In sum, it may well be that preserving a clear boundary between
state and federal regulatory spheres does advance accountability by
some measure, and that a blurrier boundary sacrifices what clarity
there might be in the already muddy world of dual sovereignty.488  Ac-
483. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83
MINN. L. REV. 849, 877 (1999).
484. Id.
485. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 2201 & nn.96–99 (outlining these constitutional fea- R
tures with greater particularity).
486. Anecdotal experience among lawyers concerning their relationship with clients
shows how often those without explicit legal training or experience are surprised to dis-
cover that different states maintain different statutory and common law treatments of such
basic legal institutions as tort and contract principles, and how they are often ignorant of
the distinction between state and federal law even in their most uncontroversially tradi-
tional realms.  It might be argued that this is a result of the erosion of federalism con-
straints, and that similarly situated citizens would have minded the difference with greater
acuity in earlier times.
487. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 201, at 828 (“If one’s goal is to maximize political account- R
ability, then one would simply adopt a unitary state.”).
488. For example, addressing the deficiencies of Printz, Jackson notes:
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cordingly, the strict-separationist model may indeed offer the greatest
protection for accountability values in a federal system, by mitigating
the confusion inherently caused by dual sovereignty as much as is pos-
sible.  But the fact that the accountability value is already sacrificed by
design in the dual sovereign system suggests a weak claim for vindica-
tion when its protection creates tension with more primary values,
such as checks and balances or problem-solving.  Perhaps in light of
this problem, the accountability rationale for judicially enforceable
federalism constraints is made less often by academic champions of
federalism489 than it is in the New Federalism decisions themselves.490
3. The Benefits of Localism
As important as the check-and-balance value was to the authors of
the Federalist Papers and as fiercely as the New Federalism decisions
champion the accountability value, modern federalism theorists most
emphasize the federalism values that attend to the socially desirable
benefits of protecting local authority, including fostering localized di-
versity, encouraging innovation, and developing economic efficiency
through interjurisdictional competition among diverse localities.491
To be sure, there are important differences between the protection of
state authority against federal incursion and the promotion of true
local autonomy, which most treatments of federalism—including this
one—threaten to conflate.492  However, this Article evaluates alterna-
tive models of federalism, rather than the choice between federalism
Federal commandeering of states, therefore, can risk confusing the lines of
political accountability—but the extent to which this is likely (or more likely than
in other forms of federal-state action) depends on the substance and substantial-
ity of the burden.  Political accountability may be relevant but does not of itself
justify the broad rule adopted by the Court.
Jackson, supra note 23, at 2205. R
489. For example, Professor Ilya Somin, an enthusiastic modern champion of American
federalism, does not even address the accountability rationale in his recent treatment of
how federal subsidization of state programs undermines the benefits of federalism.  Somin,
supra note 458, at 464–73.  Instead, Somin identifies three benefits of federalism—“respon- R
siveness to diverse local preferences, horizontal competition between states, and vertical
competition between states and the federal government”—and describes how federal sub-
sidization of state programs undermines each benefit. Id.
490. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (noting the relationship be-
tween the constitutional system of dual sovereignty and dual accountability); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992) (explaining that compelling states to imple-
ment federal policies diminishes the accountability of state and federal officials).
491. See Somin, supra note 458, at 464–71 (discussing the benefits of interstate competi- R
tion on local and state levels).
492. For a full exposition of the difference between empowering states and supporting
localism (and the importance of this difference to federalism), see generally Barron, supra
note 147. R
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and non-federalism, so the relevant variables for present purposes re-
main within the context of a federal system.  As such, the following
discussion focuses on the benefits of a decentralized model of federal-
ism that are associated with the protection of local regulatory author-
ity (by which I broadly mean the power of all regulatory bodies more
localized than the national government).
The preference for localized over centralized decisionmaking
proceeds from the conviction that “[t]here is a value in ensuring that
local jurisdictions have the discretion to make the decisions that their
residents wish them to make.”493  Indeed, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
Court observed how several such advantages attend federalism, each
fostering a “decentralized government that will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”494  Writing for the
Court, Justice O’Connor praised federalism because “it increases op-
portunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for
a mobile citizenry.”495
The claim perhaps closest to most Americans’ hearts but most
easily revealed as one for decentralization instead of federalism is the
claim regarding public participation, which appears to be “that locat-
ing various decisions at the regional or local level will enable more
people to participate in [the making of] these decisions.”496  It may be
that a federal system increases citizen involvement in the democratic
process, perhaps by enticing greater participation with the promise of
more meaningful localized influence than might be true in a unitary
system.  However, to support true federalism rather than mere decen-
tralization, the distinction must be less about the opportunity for par-
ticipation and more about the appeal of making decisions
independent from centralized national authority.  After all, even a
fully centralized polity may still rely heavily on localized participation,
even if the outer bounds of local decisionmaking are constrained
within a centralized plan.  For example, France, a model of Western
democracy, is divided into more than two dozen regions (subdivided
into some 100 departments that are further subdivided into some 350
493. Id. at 382.
494. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
495. Id.
496. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 915. R
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arrondissements for administrative purposes), but operates as a unitary
semi-presidential system with a bicameral legislature.497
Perhaps for this reason, the promotion of localized diversity and
the encouragement of innovation and efficiency through interjuris-
dictional competition are usually the most enthusiastically champi-
oned localism-related federalism benefits among academic
theorists.498
a. Diversity
In protecting a sphere of local authority, federalism is frequently
viewed as a refuge for regional diversity and multiculturalism—or as
the Gregory Court phrased it, federalism ensures that “government . . .
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous soci-
ety.”499  By enabling local majorities to pursue distinctive policymak-
ing preferences, it is hoped that federalism will produce greater
citizen satisfaction than can be accomplished by a unitary, “one-size-
fits-all” government.  Assuming that locally diverse preferences exist,
Professor Ilya Somin describes how a federalist architecture ideally
maximizes citizen satisfaction:
If, for example, some state-level majorities prefer a policy of
high taxes and high levels of government services while
others prefer low taxes and low service levels, they can each
be accommodated by their respective state governments.  A
unitary government with a one-size-fits-all policy will, by con-
trast, likely leave a larger proportion of the population dissat-
isfied with the resulting package of policies.500
Moreover, at least in contexts more regionally heterogeneous than
the United States (for example, in Switzerland, where four national
languages and distinctive regional cultures coexist among twenty-six
states),501 federalism can “ease racial, ethnic, and ideological conflicts
497. Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Per-
spective, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 57, 59–60 (1994).
498. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 775–77 (1995) (arguing that re-
sponsiveness to diverse local preferences and interstate competition are principal argu-
ments in favor of federalism); McConnell, supra note 455, at 1493–94, 1498–1500 (same); R
Somin, supra note 458, at 464–65, 468–69 (same). R
499. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
500. Somin, supra note 458, at 464–65. R
501. SWISS FED. STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA ON SWITZERLAND 2006, at 4–5
(2006), http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/die_schweiz_in_ueber-
blick/ts.Document.76607.pdf.
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by allowing each of the opposing groups to control policy in its own
region.”502
By and large, diversity in the United States is less regionalized
than it is in other federalist societies that are more markedly divided
by language, religion, race, or ethnicity.503  Moreover, many of the
political preferences that most divide contemporary Americans—such
as abortion, affirmative action, or gay marriage—involve contentions
about the kinds of individual rights that could trump federalism con-
cerns, if an individual right protected against federal or state incur-
sion is shown.  In this respect, diversity-based claims for federalism
that are poignantly real in other federalist nations may be overstated
in the United States.
Still, as Professor Donald Regan observes, “[o]ur national culture
is already too homogenized to expect great differences between the
states, but what cultural differences still remain should not be further
eroded by central legislation without good reason.”504  American fed-
eralism has enabled the localized expression of a host of regional pref-
erences that do not appear to implicate clear constitutionally
protected civil liberties, such as the apparent preference of most
Oregonians that citizens should be entitled to the choice of euthana-
sia in certain circumstances,505 or of most Californians that local prop-
erty taxes should be assessed on the basis of acquisition value instead
of market value,506 or of most Missourians that their judges should not
exceed a certain age.507  Perhaps the most important realms of local-
ized diversity are preserved at the truly municipal level, where deci-
sions about some of the most compelling matters of public policy are
made, including crime control, education, and land use planning.508
In any event, the diversity value becomes perhaps more powerful
502. Somin, supra note 458, at 465. R
503. See supra note 430 and accompanying text (discussing the homogeneity of the R
United States).
504. Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 558 (1995).
505. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006) (discussing the ballot-measure-
approved Oregon Death With Dignity Act).
506. This is the policy behind California’s famous “Proposition 13.” See, e.g., CAL. TAX-
PAYERS ASS’N, PROPOSITION 13: LOVE IT OR HATE IT, ITS ROOTS GO DEEP (1993), http://
www.caltax.org/research/prop13/prop13.htm (discussing background of Proposition 13).
507. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991) (noting that the challenged provi-
sion of the Missouri Constitution, which established a mandatory retirement age of seventy
for judges, was “approved by the people of Missouri as a whole”).  For some, this case
approached the scenario in which civil rights should trump federalism concerns, but the
Supreme Court has not applied the same level of scrutiny in reviewing claims of age dis-
crimination that it has for claims of race or gender discrimination. Id. at 470.
508. Barron, supra note 147, at 381. R
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when coupled with the possibility of interjurisdictional competition
and innovation.
b. Competition and Innovation
By enabling local policymaking autonomy, federalism encourages
interjurisdictional competition between local governments (horizon-
tally) and between local and national government (vertically) toward
innovative policies less likely to be discovered through centralized
planning.  In this respect, federalism both promotes the ideal of mar-
ket-style efficiency championed by economic federalism theorists and
the “laboratory of ideas” championed by Justice Brandeis509 that are
now so often touted as among federalism’s chief assets.
According to the interjurisdictional competition ideal, mobile cit-
izens vote their regulatory preferences by establishing roots in locali-
ties that are governed so as to reflect their priorities, always
maintaining the option of leaving (or the potential of “exit”) if their
prospects appear better elsewhere.  If they become disillusioned with
their chosen locality, or another adopts preferable policies, citizens
can “vote with their feet” by relocating to the preferred jurisdiction.510
Ideally, interstate competition, like ordinary market competition, en-
courages states “to provide citizens with the most attractive possible
package of public services at the lowest possible cost in taxes and regu-
latory burdens.”511  Professor Somin distinguishes the force of this
competition value from the more passive mechanism of the diversity
value:
Whereas the theory of interstate diversity assumes merely
that states are responsive to the preferences of citizen-voters
already residing within their boundaries, the theory of inter-
state competition asserts that states actively compete with
each other to attract new citizens, who can improve their lot
through the power of “exit” rights.  Conversely, states also
strive to ensure that current residents will not depart for
greener pastures offered by competitors.  Citizens dissatisfied
with state policy have the option not only of lobbying for
changes but also of moving to another state that deliberately
seeks to attract them with more favorable policies.  To the
509. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (comparing the states to laboratories in which to “try novel social and economic
experiments”).
510. Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150
(1992).
511. Somin, supra note 458, at 469. R
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benefits of political voice provided by interstate diversity, the
possibility of interstate competition adds those of exit.512
The theory of interstate competition draws its insight from Albert
Hirschman’s classic theory of how the recovery mechanisms of “exit”
and “voice” enable organizations to effectively adapt and survive
amidst changing consumer, investor, and employee preferences.513
However, the proposition that citizens will leave their homes in dissat-
isfaction over any particular local policy choices may be less convinc-
ing than Hirschman’s original thesis, which applied to the behavior of
firms in the marketplace.  As some have argued, the cultural and fam-
ily ties that bind individuals to their communities would seem to oper-
ate with more force than product, brand, or even employee loyalty.514
In addition, most localities simultaneously pursue so many different
policies that it would be difficult to tie a given citizen’s decision to
relocate to a particular failed policy choice, at least for all but the
most motivated single-issue advocates.515  For example, there has been
no apparent influx into Massachusetts by gay couples seeking to take
advantage of laws enabling gay marriage by state citizens, nor a
marked exodus of citizens from Massachusetts who oppose that pol-
icy.516  Moreover, citizens are statistically more likely to move within
their home states than between states,517 but the Constitution pre-
serves no local autonomy within states that would prevent the states
themselves from adopting centralized planning policies that would
frustrate the possibility for true local diversity and competition.
512. Id. at 468 (footnote omitted).
513. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
514. See Patrick C. Jobes et al., A Paradigm Shift in Migration Explanation, in COMMUNITY,
SOCIETY AND MIGRATION 1, 23 (Patrick C. Jobes et al. eds., 1992) (“Despite the prevalent
metaphorical acceptance of an economic model as the explanation governing how people
behave, the analyses of migration presented here indicate that noneconomic factors con-
tinue to help determine why, when, where and who moves.”); Shauhin A. Talesh, Note,
Welfare Migration to Capture Higher Benefits: Fact or Fiction?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 675, 712 (2000)
(warning that “[c]oncentrating solely on benefit levels causes analysts to overlook such
factors as relationships with family and friends, as well as safety and security in where to
live”).
515. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 387–88 (1997)
(“Even when moves occur, they tend to be for reasons largely unrelated to government
policy decisions . . . .”).
516. But see Bill Zajac, Gay Marriage War Heats Up, REPUBLICAN, Jan. 13, 2004, at A1 (not-
ing that anti-gay partisan groups moved into Massachusetts in the wake of the ruling).
517. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72,
77 (2005) (“According to statistics compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau, 43.4 million Amer-
icans changed their place of residence between March 1999 and March 2000, 19.4 million
of whom moved to new states.”).
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Nevertheless, if the conventional wisdom is true that most reloca-
tions take place for economic reasons (to follow a job or educational
opportunity), then state policies that encourage or discourage eco-
nomic opportunities may best exemplify the power of interjurisdic-
tional competition.  In addition, state tax policy choices appear to
motivate exit and loyalty choices among at least some particularly sen-
sitive classes of citizens, such as retirees and young people.  For exam-
ple, Florida’s decision to collect neither personal income taxes nor
estate taxes may have contributed to the in-migration of many retirees
in recent decades,518 simultaneously raising concerns by families with
school-age children about dropping local investment in school budg-
ets.519  Similarly, it has been speculated that California’s famous 1978
decision in Proposition 13 to tax real estate on acquisition value
rather than conventional market value may have contributed to the
retention of long-time homeowners reluctant to give up their ex-
tremely favorable tax status,520 though at the expense of younger
Californians and new families more likely to leave the state in search
of affordable homes elsewhere.  Some have argued that the most sig-
nificant results of interjurisdictional competition are experienced not
by citizens but by businesses, who flock to incorporate under Dela-
ware’s comparatively business-friendly state laws, and perhaps to states
with forgiving business tax policies, such as Florida or Nevada.521
518. See StateofFlorida.com, Florida Tax Guide, http://www.stateofflorida.com/
flortaxguid.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (“There is no personal income tax in Flor-
ida.”).  Another possible explanation, however, is the combination of mild winter weather
and the new availability of air conditioning during the summer.  Indeed, federalism schol-
ars have debated whether the large in-migration to the southern states in recent decades is
better attributed to innovative tax-incentives and other local policy choices or innovations
in inexpensive air conditioning.
519. Cf. Matthew J. Meyer, The Hidden Benefits of Property Tax Relief for the Elderly, 12 ELDER
L.J. 417, 419–20 (2004) (“Cuts in state aid to schools have also forced local governments to
choose between decreasing school budgets and increasing taxes to cover the shortfalls.”).
520. See Les Picker, The Lock-in Effect of California’s Proposition 13, NBER DIG., Apr. 2005,
at 4.  This study confirms that residents are less likely to move from their California homes
in order to reap the advantages of lower tax rates on longer-owned properties in a market
where property values are increasing, but does not address the question of whether home-
owners are more or less likely to leave California when they do move.  It may be possible to
extrapolate from the fact that Californians move less often than other state residents that
they leave California less often than residents in other states leave their states, but more
data is needed.
521. See, e.g., CURTIS S. DUBAY & CHRIS ATKINS, TAX FOUND., 2007 STATE BUSINESS TAX
CLIMATE INDEX 2 fig.1 (2006), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/bp52.pdf (finding Flor-
ida and Nevada as the fourth and fifth most-friendly states in terms of business taxes).
However, although the Tax Foundation rated Wyoming above all other states for the busi-
ness-desirability of its tax laws and New York forty-seventh, there is much more business
conducted in New York than in Wyoming—demonstrating the limits of such conjecture.
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In addition to the hope that market-like competition between lo-
calities will improve governance and keep it closely tethered to citi-
zens’ preferences, the interjurisdictional competition value enables
states to function as the “laboratories of ideas” envisioned by Justice
Brandeis,522 exploring innovative means of solving regulatory
problems in ways that might ultimately benefit the nation as a whole.
In this regard, the innovation/competition value can be claimed by
competing models of federalism that promote alternatively more lo-
calist or nationalist ends.  From the localist perspective, federalism-
enabled competition should allow states to pursue and follow differ-
ent policies in order to allow citizens choices in a “marketplace” of
state alternatives.  From the nationalist perspective, the laboratory of
ideas is valuable because it produces better regulatory solutions than a
centralized planner could, enabling those proven solutions to be
adopted nationally with fewer risks.  Indeed, as Professors Issacharoff
and Sharkey have pointed out, this is the possibility that Justice Bran-
deis intended to preserve in the oft-ignored second half of his famous
quote, in which he praised the possibility that “a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”523
The laboratory/competition value of federalism has indeed pro-
duced important regulatory innovations, many of which have later
been adopted by other states or the nation as a whole, including many
in the classically interjurisdictional environmental arena.  For exam-
ple, California pioneered the regulation of automobile emissions,
leading to the adoption of a federal vehicle emissions standard,524
while New York recently became the first state to offer tax incentives
to the builders and developers of energy-efficient and environmen-
tally friendly buildings,525 a policy now followed in thirty-five other
states.526  Similarly, a coalition of Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states
522. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that states may serve as laboratories for incubating novel regulatory approaches).
523. Id. (emphasis added); see also Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 31, at 1355 (noting R
that the latter part of Justice Brandeis’s aphorism has important lessons for federalism as
well).
524. Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Fed-
eral Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93, 103 (2004).
525. See National Resources Defense Council, New York’s Green Building Tax Credit,
http://www.nrdc.org/cities/building/nnytax.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
526. See Andrew Meyerson, The Dollars and Cents of Green Construction, J. ACCT., May 2005,
available at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/may2005/meyerson.htm (appending a chart
of the thirty-five states that offer a combination of income, corporate, property, or sales tax
incentives to green building projects).
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has recently formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a regula-
tory cap-and-trade partnership.527
The socially valuable benefits of localism are thus powerful ratio-
nales for federalism—or, at least, for a particular kind of federalism.
The choice of a federal system more generally does not necessarily
ensure that these values will actually be advanced.  For example, a
model of federalism that prioritizes the check-and-balance value over
competing considerations could theoretically undermine localism val-
ues, since balancing power between the national and state govern-
ments offers no protection for localism at the municipal level, from
which many of the benefits of local diversity and competition most
organically stem.  After all, dual sovereignty divides authority between
a centralized national government and regional state governments,
but most states are far too big to function as local communities; many
are on par in size with the nation-states of Europe, and some even
rank among the world’s largest economies.528  The Constitution says
nothing that would prevent state governments from becoming the
very central planners, scorned by economic theory federalists, that
would suppress local autonomy, diversity, and competition.
Ultimately, a federalism model can be carefully elaborated to bal-
ance consideration of localism with anti-tyranny and other federalism
values, but unmodified “federalism” may or may not.  For example,
though New Federalism proponents claim the socially valuable bene-
fits associated with localism in support of their movement, both the
partnering preemption cases and the New Federalism’s strict-separa-
tionist rhetoric suggests that the Rehnquist Court’s model of federal-
ism actually prioritizes the check-and-balance value above localism.
Professor Barron similarly argues that the New Federalism model has
527. Participating states include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, and Delaware.  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: An Initiative of
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States of the U.S., http://www.rggi.org (last visited Mar. 15,
2007).  In addition, California recently set standards for carbon dioxide automobile emis-
sions in hopes of achieving significant state-based reductions by 2016, although the Alli-
ance of Automobile Manufacturers has asserted that the regulations are preempted by the
CAA.  First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, 23–24, Central
Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. 1:04-cv-06663-REC-LJO (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2005); see also Pendergrass, supra note 258, at 8 (describing other recent state initiatives to R
combat environmental problems in Washington, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania).
528. For example, in 2001 the State of California beat out the nation of France to be-
come the world’s fifth largest economy. California Now World’s Fifth-Largest Economy,
SILICON VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUS. J., June 15, 2001, available at http://sanjose.bizjournals.
com/sanjose/stories/2001/06/11/daily58.html.  In 2004, the Texas state economy ranked
as the eighth largest in the world.  Bus. & Indus. Data Ctr., Overview of the Texas Econ-
omy, http://www.bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 117  9-MAY-07 9:47
2007] FEDERALISM & THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 619
not demonstrated great regard for localism values, and indeed, that
the American federalism discourse has failed to establish a meaning-
ful baseline of localism for evaluating New Federalism’s claims on this
front.529  His work demonstrates that strong state authority (and/or
weak national authority) may actually compromise localism values by
suppressing municipal autonomy or otherwise frustrating a local com-
munity’s ability to pursue its desired ends without outside
interference.530
This last insight goes to the heart of interjurisdictional problem-
solving, in which disparate communities discover interlinked and in-
terdependent interests in what may at first seem an overtly local or
national problem—such as local land use decisions that impact the
quality of interjurisdictional waters, or national security programs that
impact local law enforcement.  After all, if local autonomy were all
that mattered, we could always disintegrate the Union—but the fact
that we turned to a federation in the first place suggests the ways in
which the ability of local communities to pursue their desired ends
relies on coordinated activity with other communities.  For example, it
was the early States’ recognition that centralized coordination was
necessary to realize efficient interstate commerce, provide for the
common defense, and resolve interstate disputes that led to the rejec-
tion of the Articles of Confederation in favor of constitutional federal-
ism.  Indeed, the limitations of the local autonomy value in
vindicating the interests of individual communities leads nicely to the
problem-solving value of federalism to which we turn in the next
Section.
For most academic treatments of federalism values, this might
well prove the end of the discussion.  Federalism can promote good
government, in various degrees, by encouraging accountability and
public participation, forestalling tyranny, and fostering localism.
However, there is an additional, often overlooked value further em-
bedded into the way in which Americans generally conceive of the
relationship between federalism and localism values—another means
by which federalism promotes good government, and a separate bene-
fit yielded by the choice of a federal system.  This is the hidden prob-
lem-solving value of federalism, inconspicuously partnered with the
preference for localism in the federalism-based approach that extols
529. See Barron, supra note 147, at 377–81 (arguing that the Court’s New Federalism R
principles ignore the fact that local autonomy issues are too complex to be promoted sim-
ply by reducing central power).
530. See id. at 382–90 (noting that leaving policy judgments in the hands of state govern-
ments may result in negative effects on local autonomy).
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localized decisionmaking over centralized decisionmaking as much
possible.  The magic words are, “as much as possible,” and the unfa-
miliar name of the familiar concept is “subsidiarity.”
4. Subsidiarity and the Hidden Problem-Solving Value of Federalism
Colloquial accounts of American federalism generally proceed
from a localist assumption that government action should be taken at
the most local level possible531—or conversely, that higher levels of
government should never take action that could be accomplished as
well or better at a more local level.532  (An extreme localist position
might argue that all public action should take place locally, but this
would not be the approach taken by any model of American federal-
ism.)  The principle that governance should take place at the most
local level possible, though easily recognized by students of American
federalism, goes by the less-recognized name of “subsidiarity.”533  Lit-
erally, “subsidiarity” means “to ‘seat’ (‘sid’) a service down (‘sub’) as
close to the need for that service as is feasible.”534
The subsidiarity principle has a rich history in the United States
and Europe, drawing its origins from early Greek and Catholic philos-
ophy.  Some scholarly accounts trace it to Aristotle, though it surfaced
as a modern socio-political doctrine through the writings of Thomas
Aquinas.535  As a first principle from which to structure government,
531. This principle of subsidiarity is a primary means of reading content into the other-
wise tautological text of the Tenth Amendment. See David T. Koyzis, Subsidiarity and Federal-
ism, COMMENT, Aug. 2004, at 3, http://wrf.ca/comment/article2.cfm?ID=74 (noting that
the Tenth Amendment is the constitutional embodiment of the subsidiarity principle).
532. E.g., Alexander Tabarrok, Presentation at University of California Hastings College
of the Law: Arguments for Federalism (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.independent.org/is-
sues/article.asp?id=485.
533. For various accounts of the subsidiary principle, see David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1
GREEN BAG 2D 359 (1998); James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adap-
tive Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004); John F.
Stinneford, Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Federal Prosecution of Street Crime, 2 J. CATH. SOC.
THOUGHT 495 (2005); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law—
American Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61 (1995); Jared Bayer, Comment,
Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in the United
States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1421 (2004).
534. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND.
L. REV. 103, 103 (2001) (quoting J. Bryan Hehir, Catholic School Teaching and the Challenge of
the Future, WOODSTOCK REP., June 1998, http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/publications/
report/r-fea54a.htm) (internal quotation marks omitted).
535. Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on
City, Province and Empire, 26 LAW & PHIL. 161, 165–66 (2007).  In an attempt to find a
balance between laissez-faire capitalism and state-controlled socialism, Pope Pius XI articu-
lated subsidiarity as the most effective methodology for carrying out the Catholic Church’s
task of Christian charity.  Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, VATICAN.VA, May 15, 1931, at
paras. 79–80, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/docu-
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subsidiarity receives its most explicit treatment in the European
Union’s governing structure, as set forth in the Maastricht Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the [European] Community shall take action, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.536
Just as the nationalists and the federalists negotiated the relationship
between the federal and state governments during the American Con-
stitutional Convention, the Maastricht subsidiarity rule establishes a
relationship between the European Community and its member states
that prevents “an overcentralization of power at the EU level and . . .
thereby ensure[s] the acceptance of the EU among the citizens.”537
Although the term “subsidiarity” may be best known for its promi-
nence in the Maastricht Treaty, considerations of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple in the United States long predated its appearance in the
European Union, though often by other names.  The principle itself
was in clear circulation at the time of the Constitutional Convention,
prompting the movement to retire the failed Articles of Confedera-
tion.  In the Federalist Papers, James Madison gave it indirect expression
in his impassioned plea to the adversaries of the Constitution who
fretted that the national government would intrude on the powers of
the states.  Urging that the federalism-based distribution of power
contemplated by the Constitution was necessary to accomplish the
very goals for which Americans looked to governance, he argued:
[I]f . . . the Union be essential to the happiness of the people
of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an objection to a
government, without which the objects of the Union cannot
be attained, that such a government may derogate from the
importance of the governments of the individual States?
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, . . . not that
the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and
safety, but that the governments of the individual States, that
ments/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html. But see Reimer von Borries &
Malte Hauschild, Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369, 369 (1999)
(contrasting the “subsidiary function” tenet of the Catholic Church with the constitutional
law principle of “subsidiarity”).
536. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Es-
tablishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 5, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1, 182–83 (modifying 1992 Treaty on European Union, art. 3b).
537. von Borries & Hauschild, supra note 535, at 369. R
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particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain
extent of power and be arrayed with certain dignities and
attributes of sovereignty? . . .  It is too early for politicians to
presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real wel-
fare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to
be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has
any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of
this object.538
Even to Madison, for whom anti-tyranny concerns were critical, the
check-and-balance principle of federalism must yield before it would
threaten the federal system’s ability to accomplish the overall ends for
which it was created.  Checks and balances are critical, but must be
weighed against the need that government be enabled to solve the
very problems that motivated the Union.539  Madison’s admonition
demonstrates that pragmatism is more than something exogenous to
federalism, a separate goal with which federalism values must compete
in the operation of government.  Rather, it is built into federalism
itself, a value in tension with others, as part of the allocation of powers
between the national and the local level.
The subsidiarity principle was also embedded into the founda-
tions of contemporary federalism theory by Russell Kirk, who pro-
pounded a model of federalism in the early 1960s that would inspire
the proponents of the New Federalism revival decades later.540  Kirk’s
model adopted the principle of subsidiarity as a primary consideration
in his theory of “territorial democracy,” which takes as definitional
that “federalism is an order in which the smaller circles and communi-
ties are granted the maximum possible power to direct their own af-
fairs.”541  Although his model of territorial democracy never refers to
subsidiarity by that name, it is an unmistakable element.  In contrast
to European Union federalism, American statements of federalism
538. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 195, at 288–89. R
539. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
4–11 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing the ability of the federal administrative state to regulate
aspects of American society); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO-
CESS 1–22 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining the various political rationales for the existence of an
administrative state); see also PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 152–86 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that “regulation to remedy the deficiencies of the
economic marketplace . . . has been the prevailing form of federal government regulation
over the past three decades”).
540. Russell Kirk, The Prospects for Territorial Democracy in America, in A NATION OF STATES:
ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 42 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1963).
541. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
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theory such as Kirk’s generally situate subsidiarity as one part of a
broader rubric; still it is usually stated as a primary component.542
Subsidiarity has received increasing scholarly and political atten-
tion in the United States in recent years.543  It is incorporated as a
federalist premise of the Department of Homeland Security’s Na-
tional Response Plan, which emphasizes that “[a] basic premise of the
NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional
level possible.”544  Of note, subsidiarity has been most enthusiastically
embraced—even by the name made popular by its explicit incorpora-
tion into the laws of the European Union—by conservative commen-
tators in support of the New Federalism.545  The principle is also
embraced by libertarians, who take as a natural corollary that when
any government is necessary, it should be imbued with as little power
as possible.546  The core libertarian position is thus consonant with
subsidiarity’s directive that higher government actors never be given
tasks that could be accomplished as effectively by a more local actor.
Professor Donald Regan has also invoked a core insight of the sub-
sidiarity principle when he proposed a simple alternative for con-
straining federal authority under the Commerce Clause:
The kernel of my positive suggestion is so obvious that I
would be embarrassed to offer it, if it did not seem necessary
that someone should: when we are trying to decide whether
some federal law or program can be justified under the com-
merce power, we should ask ourselves the question, “Is there
some reason the federal government must be able to do this,
some reason why we cannot leave the matter to the states?”
542. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 451–52 (1994) (noting that sub-
sidiarity cannot be the sole focus of a “seasoned” American federalism because of the vary-
ing considerations attendant in each policy decision, but nonetheless stressing its
importance in decisionmaking).
543. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity and Suffering: The View from New Orleans, 45 J.
CATH. LEG. STUD. 183 (2007); John F. Stinneford, Subsidiarity, Federalism and Federal Prosecu-
tion of Street Crime, 2 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 495 (2005).
544. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR THE NATIONAL RE-
SPONSE PLAN 3 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Quick_Refer-
ence_Guide_5-22-06.pdf (emphasis added).
545. See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok, supra note 532 (listing subsidiarity as one of four R
principal arguments for federalism).
546. Walter Block, Decentralization, Subsidiarity, Rodney King and State Deification: A Liberta-
rian Analysis, 16 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 139, 140 (2003) (noting that for libertarians “sub-
sidiarity is the goal,” and thus a libertarian “tends to favor city government over state, and
the latter vis a vis the federales”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 122  9-MAY-07 9:47
624 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:503
Federal power exists where and only where there is special
justification for it . . . .547
Even President Bush has appealed to subsidiarity in his philosophy of
compassionate conservativism regarding social works programs, not-
ing that his “philosophy trusts individuals to make the right decisions
for their families and communities, and that is far more compassion-
ate than a philosophy that seeks solutions from distant
bureaucracies.”548
Subsidiarity is thus a clear and present element in American fed-
eralism consciousness.  But what does this add to our discussion?  Is it
really any different from the preference for localism already ad-
dressed?  Indeed so.  Examined closely, the subsidiarity principle re-
ally embodies two sets of underlying values—one familiar, one new.
In directing that governance take place at the most local level possi-
ble, subsidiarity fosters the very localism values discussed above—the
promotion of localized diversity and the encouragement of horizontal
and vertical competition toward innovative and efficient regulatory
policies.
But subsidiarity implies another principle of good government as
well, the implied corollary of the first, but one so easily missed that it
usually is.  In directing that public decisions be taken as locally as pos-
sible—in other words, by the most local level of government with ca-
pacity—subsidiarity couples the preference for localized
decisionmaking with a problem-solving element, the requirement of
capacity or competence.  In other words, the principle directs that
decisionmaking take place at the most local level that can get the job
done.  Thus, at least to the extent that citizens may rightly look to
regulatory assistance in solving a given problem,549 subsidiarity directs
that if the most local level of government lacks the capacity to address
it, citizens should be entitled to expect that the next level up with
capacity should at least be authorized to try.  This is the problem-solving
principle of federalism—the flip-side of subsidiarity’s preference for
localism.
547. Regan, supra note 504, at 555. R
548. RONALD KESSLER, A MATTER OF CHARACTER: INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE OF GEORGE W.
BUSH 58 (2004); see also Vischer, supra note 534, at 103 (observing that subsidiarity is inexo- R
rably tied to President Bush’s view of compassionate conservatism); Franklin Foer, Spin
Doctrine: The Catholic Teachings of George W., THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 5, 2000, at 18, 18
(noting that President Bush “acknowledged compassionate conservatism’s debt to sub-
sidiarity” in a discussion with Catholic leaders).
549. Identifying which problems are indeed susceptible to solution by governmental
regulation is a separate problem that I do not engage here. See supra note 304 and accom- R
panying text.
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It was the problem-solving value that James Madison invoked in
Federalist No. 45, when he chided the opponents of the Constitution to
recall that “the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the
people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of gov-
ernment whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the
attainment of this object.”550  He clarified the problem-solving of what
Justice Black would later call “Our Federalism”551 in explaining that
our federal system was created so that “the people of America should
enjoy peace, liberty, and safety,” and pointedly not so that “the govern-
ments of the individual States, that particular municipal establish-
ments, might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with
certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty[.]”552
Similarly, it was the problem-solving value of federalism that the
Department of Homeland Security incorporated into the NRP when it
included the statement of subsidiarity in its preamble, and even the
White House invoked it in explaining the ultimate federal response to
Katrina.  According to the White House’s own report, The Federal Re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned:
An important limiting factor of the Federal response . . . is
that the Federal response is predicated on an incident being
handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. . . .  In the case
of Katrina, the local government had been destroyed and the
State government was incapacitated, and thus the Federal
government had to take on the additional roles of perform-
ing incident command and other functions it would nor-
mally rely upon the State and local governments to
provide.553
Although it appears the White House did not learn this lesson in time
to prevent the failures discussed in Part II, hindsight made the impor-
tance of the problem-solving principle crystalline clear.  While re-
specting the check-and-balance principle may mean that the federal
government should take a “hard look” before crossing into the in-
terjurisdictional gray area, the White House report is at least a post-
hoc acknowledgement that checks and balances should not come be-
tween the federal government and its responsibility to protect the lives
and safety of citizens that the NRP considers its highest priority.554
550. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 195, at 289. R
551. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
552. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 195, at 289. R
553. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 59, at 42 (emphasis added). R
554. See NRP, supra note 54, at 4 (listing prevention, preparedness, response and recov- R
ery actions as top priorities for incident management).
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The problem-solving principle regularly appears during the
sleeves-rolled-up world of actual regulatory decisionmaking, but it has
been mostly absent from consideration by the New Federalism deci-
sions.  The Supreme Court has never decided a case on the basis of
subsidiarity, although Justice Breyer invoked the principle in dissent-
ing from United States v. Morrison’s invalidation of the VAWA,555 point-
ing to the European Union’s subsidiarity principle as an alternative
approach to protecting the federalism values that were the subject of
the case.556  Suggesting that the majority’s strict-separationist ap-
proach to protecting federalism values would prove unworkable, Jus-
tice Breyer proposed that federalism values might be better protected
by the sort of procedural approach that Congress had actually taken
before passing the VAWA, which he analogized to subsidiarity.557
Under this approach, Congress would take a “hard look” at whether
the federal regulatory intervention is truly warranted in an area in
which the states have traditionally regulated, and legislation would
proceed only if Congress could demonstrate that additional response
is needed at the federal level.558  To state Justice Breyer’s position in
the vocabulary of this piece, both Congress and the Court should be
able to evaluate whether federal regulation in an interjurisdictional
gray area is a legitimate instance of regulatory crossover by applying a
fact-responsive standard of analysis.559
As Justice Breyer’s cautious endorsement indicates, appeal to the
problem-solving value cannot alone be dispositive of whether a partic-
ular act of regulatory crossover is legitimate within the overall federal-
ism framework.  The problem-solving value can operate in opposition
to the check-and-balance principle, and so must be considered in bal-
ance with the anti-tyranny values with which it stands in tension.  In
other words, the problem-solving value may not care whether resolu-
555. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
556. See id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bermann, supra note 542, at 378–403). R
557. Id. at 663–64.
558. Id.  Justice Breyer continued:
Of course, any judicial insistence that Congress follow particular procedures
might itself intrude upon congressional prerogatives and embody difficult defini-
tional problems.  But the intrusion, problems, and consequences all would seem
less serious than those embodied in the majority’s approach . . . .
. . . But I recognize that the law in this area is unstable and that time and
experience may demonstrate both the unworkability of the majority’s rules and
the superiority of Congress’ own procedural approach—in which case the law
may evolve toward a rule that, in certain difficult Commerce Clause cases, takes
account of the thoroughness with which Congress has considered the federalism
issue.
Id.
559. Just such an approach is recommended by this piece in Part VI, infra.
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tion occur by local or national authority, but the check-and-balance
value cares very deeply, lest every problem become the subject of na-
tional attention, and state authority wane accordingly.  It is this con-
cern that Professor William Van Alstyne invoked in his admonition
that we would soon find federalism adrift in a “cellophane sea” if Con-
gress were permitted to legislate on any topic it could encase in the
“cellophane wrapper” of a putative connection to interstate
commerce.560
However, a framework of federalism that accounts for all of the
component values need not be so at risk.  For starters, the subsidiarity
principle has always paired the problem-solving value together with
the preference for localism, providing a framework that moderates
problem-solving in the direction of localized decisionmaking, support-
ing the anti-tyranny purposes of the check-and-balance value.  Simi-
larly, the preference for localism is moderated by the requirement for
problem-solving capacity, and the federal government will lack com-
petence in many regulatory arenas demanding local expertise.  This
bilateral moderating influence prevents the problem-solving principle
from overwhelming the anti-tyranny principle, just as the problem-
solving principle keeps the anti-tyranny principle in service of the ulti-
mately pragmatic purposes of government acclaimed by Madison.561
The careful maintenance of structural tension between these underly-
ing principles promotes healthy federalism in the same way that the
careful maintenance of structural tension between the state and fed-
eral governments promotes the health of the overall system.
The problem-solving value is not the most important federalism
value, nor is subsidiarity the defining federalism principle.  For exam-
ple, subsidiarity-based models of federalism have been aptly criticized
for encouraging too much bifurcation in localized and centralized
regulatory response, even when more integrative solutions to in-
terjurisdictional problems are needed.562  This strict reading of the
560. See Van Alstyne, supra note 210, at 782–83 (noting that “[a]ll laws affect commerce R
in one way or another”).
561. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 195, at 289; see also R
Moreno, supra note 144, at 715 (“Federalism provided the most important device of consti- R
tutional government for the framers of the Constitution.  By ‘constitutional’ government,
the framers meant effective but limited government.” (emphasis added)).
562. See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law
Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (2006) (advancing a model of integrated federal-
ism that relies on greater cooperation based on each governmental actor’s capacity for
problem-solving in a given context); Telephone Interview with John Nolon, Professor, Pace
Law School, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 24, 2006) (“Subsidiarity’s problem is that it tends to
lead toward dual sovereignty and bifurcation, disallowing the different levels of govern-
ment to cooperate in the more integrated fashion often necessary to solve problems.”).
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subsidiarity principle understands it as assigning responsibility for
problem-solving to one governmental actor at a time, even though
certain interjurisdictional problems may demand a more collaborative
approach, such as the CWA’s Phase II Stormwater Rule discussed
above.563  To that end, some proponents of subsidiarity in the United
States have taken it to stand for the proposition of strict-separationist
dual sovereignty that this Article critiques in the New Federalism.564
But just as federalism may be a content-neutral vessel into which
any first order policy preference may be poured,565 so in this sense, is
subsidiarity.  Strictly speaking, the problem-solving value of sub-
sidiarity—and of federalism generally—does not endorse one particu-
lar vision of dual sovereignty or another, so long as structural tension
is maintained without overly compromising the ability of government
at all levels to respond to interjurisdictional problems.  Subsidiarity
may start from a preference for a model of dual sovereignty that pro-
tects localism values, but its capacity requirement demands room for
further negotiation if neither the local nor the national level, acting
alone, possesses the needed jurisdiction or expertise.
5. Values and the New Federalism
In sum, the strict-separationist project of differentiating local
from national authority may promote governmental accountability
and acts in laudable service to the check-and-balance goal of federal-
ism.  It less faithfully serves the competition and diversity values of
localism, as federal preemption of local regulation at the margin of
state and federal jurisdiction has accelerated in tandem with enforce-
ment of the increasingly rigid boundary between them.566  And to the
extent that the rigid assignment of mutually exclusive regulatory juris-
diction frustrates meaningful resolution of interjurisdictional
problems, it seriously compromises the problem-solving value, an
equally important element in the overall federalism project.
563. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
564. Cf. Foer, supra note 548 (noting that the Bush Administration adopted subsidiarity R
to further “compassionate conservatism,” which in turn emphasizes the use of local com-
munity groups in favor of state and local government, and state and local government in
favor of federal government).
565. Cf. Baker, supra note 432, at 454 (asserting that liberals need to understand that R
“‘states’ rights’ are not synonymous with any particular right nor any particular state”).
566. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 201, at 823–24 (contrasting the rebirth of state administra- R
tive authority with the functional reality that federal law preempts “virtually all significant
regulatory fields”); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REV. 685, 750–52 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court’s extension of the preemp-
tion doctrine to state laws that achieve an “improper state purpose”).
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In this respect, the New Federalism does not promote federalism
values indiscriminately; rather, it promotes a specific constellation of
support for some federalism values at the expense of others—a dis-
tinct model of federal-state relations that is one of many possible varia-
tions.  It is, of course, a legitimate choice, though its failure to
contend with the interjurisdictional gray area renders it a problematic
choice.  But despite New Federalism’s claim to the true essence of
American federalism, it is merely one interpretive possibility among
others.
In fact, the history of federalism in the United States reveals the
development of a variety of conceptual models of federalism, each ul-
timately faithful to the fundamental federalism values but in different
configurations.  These values, the true essence of American federal-
ism, exist in surprising tension, and the different models of American
federalism that evolved over the twentieth century reflect repeated at-
tempts to find the right balance between them.
B. From New Deal to New Federalism
Like all good tales of legal history, the story of American federal-
ism is largely one of competition between compelling principles in
tension with one another, stretching the legal framework in one direc-
tion and then overcorrecting in another.  If New Federalism pushed
the pendulum far toward the check-and-balance value, it was surely in
response to a previous swing far toward the problem-solving side,
which expanded federal jurisdiction after the Great Depression viti-
ated the capacity of states and localities to respond to overwhelming
economic collapse.567  We might therefore understand the New Fed-
eralism as one of many iterations in the episodic tug of war between
the competing federalism values, especially the anti-tyranny and prob-
lem-solving values.  Even the broad outlines of federalism’s progres-
sion across the twentieth century reveals this tug of war in the
movement between the models embraced during the Progressive/
Lochner era and into the New Deal, later moderated by cooperative
federalism, and finally to the New Federalism of the Rehnquist
Court.568  Ultimately, New Federalism’s exaltation of the check-and-
567. Martin S. Flaherty, Byron White, Federalism, and the “Greatest Generation(s),” 74 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1573, 1596–97 (2003) (noting that the New Deal resulted in the “expansion
of Federal power applied in pragmatic fashion through the national political process; a
corresponding rejection of federalism constraints; and judicial acceptance of this shift
combined with robust enforcement of Federal law”).
568. What follows is by no means a work of legal history; I mean only to trace how the
broad outlines of these historical periods correspond to different federalism values and
models.
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balance value above all others was a response to the New Deal’s like
exaltation of the problem-solving value above all else, which was itself
a reaction to the preceding circumstances.
1. The Progressive Movement and the Lochner Era
The model of federalism adopted during the New Deal era was a
reaction to the period immediately prior, characterized by the Pro-
gressive movement and the Supreme Court’s infamous Lochner era.
Although the Civil War posed the greatest challenge to federalism in
American history, it was the industrial revolution that most set the
stage for the parade of federalism models with which we experi-
mented over the following century.  Rapid industrialization at the turn
of the twentieth century multiplied links across interstate markets
while spawning working and living conditions that triggered outrage
among the burgeoning Progressive movement.569  Interstate com-
merce flourished as industrialization began to transform the United
States from a rural agrarian nation to one of rapidly developing port
and manufacturing centers, and Congress began to experiment with
the scope of its commerce authority.570
Still, Congress remained reserved over the first few decades of the
new century (and at times, preoccupied with the international affairs
leading to and from World War II).  During this time, the Progres-
sives’ relentless pursuit of reform—addressing a panoply of issues
ranging from voting rights to labor practices to Prohibition—was most
commonly channeled toward the passage of uniform state legisla-
tion.571  Although a variegated movement of diverse priorities, the
Progressives were mostly champions of localism, embracing national
legislation “only as a last resort, in cases where the states had
failed.”572  However, vast numbers of Progressive state laws were dubi-
ously invalidated by the Supreme Court on due process and equal pro-
tection grounds during its Lochner era, in which it invalidated many
569. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 174–214 (1955) (describing the
rapid growth of American cities at the turn of the century and the Progressives’ documen-
tation and reform efforts to resolve the deplorable conditions).  For background on many
of the Progressive leaders of the era, see generally ROBERT M. CRUNDEN, MINISTERS OF
REFORM: THE PROGRESSIVES’ ACHIEVEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 1889–1920 (1982).
570. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (asserting federal authority over the national
railroads as channels of interstate commerce); see also Moreno, supra note 144, at 736–38 R
(noting that the Supreme Court accepted some of Congress’s early attempts at Progressive
legislation).
571. See, e.g., Moreno, supra note 144, at 732 (noting that uniform state legislation was R
“the most common progressive remedy for social ills”).
572. Id.
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regulatory efforts as abridging the freedom of contract and other pri-
vate rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.573  This confus-
ing era of American federalism was characterized by the Progressives’
emphatic appeal to state and local authorities to take on the perceived
regulatory problems of the day,574 coupled with a Supreme Court ju-
risprudence that deferred neither to state legislative factfinding nor to
the states’ police power obligations to protect the public welfare.
As a side note, the overall Progressivist agenda drew heavily on
each of the federalism values discussed above: (1) the check-and-bal-
ance value (in ambivalence about using the federal government to
drive reform efforts);575 (2) the promotion of local autonomy (in ef-
forts to grant cities and municipalities home rule authority);576 (3)
governmental accountability (in campaigns for citizen entitlement to
nominate candidates in open primary elections, to vote on laws di-
rectly, to elect and recall judges, and to elect U.S. senators directly,
rather than by state legislatures);577 and (4) problem-solving (in ulti-
mate willingness to support national legislation when state legislation
failed to accomplish needed reforms).578  When the Progressives fi-
nally assumed the national stage through the election of Progressive
Presidents Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the movement pri-
oritized the problem-solving value over the check-and-balance value—
but reluctantly, and after due diligence in pursuing the state path
first.  In this respect, although their legacy mixes landmark legislative
accomplishments (e.g., women’s suffrage and the direct election of
senators) with discredited regulatory goals (e.g., Prohibition), the
Progressives proceeded from a recognizable federalist ethic.
By contrast, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of state laws during
the Lochner era did not appear to factor federalism values very care-
573. The 1900–1937 period is the so-called Lochner era, named for the Court’s decision
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down a state law limiting the
working hours of bakers to ten per day and sixty per week.  During this time, the Court
struck down nearly 200 laws under the Due Process Clause (sometimes coupled with an-
other constitutional provision). GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755–56
(5th ed. 2005).
574. The Progressives saw almost all social problems as proper targets of government
regulation, reflecting a widespread nineteenth-century view that the state had a duty to
help individuals control their negative impulses.  Moreno, supra note 144, at 733.  The R
definition of regulatory problems that I propose in this Article is more moderate, focusing
on market failures, negative externalities, and other collective action problems.
575. Id.
576. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 569, at 262–63 (discussing the Progressive push to R
move government reform efforts to the most local levels).
577. See id. at 258–64, 311 (noting Progressivists’ belief that a “direct popular democ-
racy” was the best method to political participation without self-interest).
578. Moreno, supra note 144, at 732–33. R
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fully.579  Invalidating state laws would not have advanced the accounta-
bility of state officials to their electorate, nor would it have advanced
local autonomy.  Nor would it have materially advanced check-and-
balance values, since these laws were not invalidated for transgressing
between a realm of state and federal authority, but for exercising reg-
ulatory authority that the Court would deny any level of government.
To the extent these state laws addressed legitimate regulatory
problems, the Court’s decisions would appear to have discounted the
problem-solving value as well.580
Nevertheless, the Court also invalidated federal progressive stat-
utes, including child labor reforms, by invoking the pre-industrial
model of federalism that had long viewed the states as the competent
regulators of labor and employment matters.  In Hammer v.
Dagenhart,581 the Court struck down a prohibition on the interstate
shipment of goods produced by children under the age of four-
teen,582 and though the law suffered for a number of reasons,583 Jus-
tice Day reminded Congress that “[i]n interpreting the Constitution it
must never be forgotten that the Nation is made up of States to which
are entrusted the powers of local government.  And to them and to
the people the powers not expressly delegated to the National Gov-
ernment are reserved.”584  In this respect, the Supreme Court showed
some sensitivity to check-and-balance values (in limiting federal au-
thority to regulate in the employment sphere), though little concern
for true local autonomy or problem-solving (in invalidating state regu-
lations with similar objectives).
579. Cf. Barry Cushman, Lochner, Liquor and Longshoremen: A Puzzle in Progressive Era Feder-
alism, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 5 (2001) (characterizing Lochner era decisions as the result of
various antebellum ideological beliefs, including northern free labor principles, distaste
for special legislation, and enthusiasm for faction-free politics).
580. On the other hand, one might argue that the Court understood threats to the
freedom of contract as the most important problem at hand, and that these decisions thus
exalted problem-solving above all other concerns.  The troubling feature of this argument
is that it forfeits the policymaking role of the legislature to the Court, casting judges as
affirmative problem-solvers rather than interpreters and adjudicators.
581. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
582. Id. at 276–77; see also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidat-
ing a prohibitive tax on goods manufactured by child labor).
583. See Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 271–72 (distinguishing between Congress’s authority to
regulate commerce and its lack of authority to regulate manufacturing, and between prod-
ucts that are inherently harmful and those that harm by means of their production).
584. Id. at 275.
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2. The Great Depression and the New Deal
However, federalism concerns would soon occupy the Court’s
foremost attention, as the booming economy of the 1920s gave way to
the Great Depression of the 1930s.  In 1928, President Herbert Hoo-
ver was elected on a platform of regulatory non-interference and rug-
ged individualism.585  After the stock market collapse of 1929, Hoover
urged private and local solutions to economic despair, opposing con-
gressional efforts to provide food and humanitarian relief to the na-
tion’s growing ranks of unemployed.586  The depression worsened
despite his regular exhortations to the public, local officials, and busi-
nesses to do their parts in reversing the economic downturn.587  After
leaving office, Hoover was quoted as summarizing his philosophy of
government in strikingly subsidiarity-like terms:
The humanism of our system demands the protection of the
suffering and the unfortunate.  It places prime responsibility
upon the individual for the welfare of his neighbor, but it
insists also that in necessity the local community, the State
government, and in the last resort, the National government
shall give protection to them.588
Toward the end of his presidency, he reluctantly conceded that the
time had come for national intervention, and took modest steps to-
ward involving the federal government in the ordinary economic lives
of its citizens, establishing a federal bank to forestall foreclosures of
home mortgages and a finance corporation to bolster financially fail-
ing banks, corporations, and railroads.589
By 1932, states and localities had proved powerless to resolve the
crippling social and economic problems associated with the depres-
sion, and social unrest appeared headed toward catastrophe.590  In
the summer of 1932, 20,000 World War I veterans marched on Wash-
ington and clashed with police in their demands for prepayment of
wartime bonuses not due until 1945; communists and unemployed
masses staged hunger marches in Philadelphia, Chicago, New York,
and other cities across the nation; and Iowan populists organized a
“farm holiday” movement threatening to cease shipments of food
585. Cf. 10 ERNEST R. MAY ET AL., THE LIFE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: BOOM AND
BUST (1917–1932), at 129, 134–35 (1974) (noting that President Hoover relied more on
exhortation than regulation during his presidency).
586. Id. at 135.
587. Id. at 134–35.
588. Id. at 135.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 136–37.
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products to the cities unless commodity prices were raised.591  Toward
the end of the year, American industry was operating at less than half
its 1929 volume and twenty-five percent of the labor force was unem-
ployed.592  At this point, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was
elected on a platform of federal intervention that would become
known as the New Deal.593
Concluding that only the national government had the capacity
to address the scope of the depression and its sequelae of joblessness,
homelessness, hunger, and social dislocation, Congress joined FDR in
marshaling the nation’s resources and directing regulatory programs
into realms that were previously the sole regulatory purview of the
states.  Between 1932 and 1938, New Deal regulatory reforms included
such federally sponsored jobs programs as the Works Progress Admin-
istration594 and the Civilian Conservation Corps;595 the Agricultural
Adjustment Act596 and other farm programs; the Emergency Banking
and Bank Conservation Act;597 the establishment of the Securities and
Exchange Commission598 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion;599 the Federal Emergency Relief Administration that became the
precursor to modern social security,600 and many others.
Combining the reformist zeal of the Progressives with the power
of central administration at a pivotal time of national crisis, the New
Deal redefined the traditional spheres of state and federal regulatory
concern.601  But this federalism paradigm shift did not proceed with-
591. Id. at 137.
592. 11 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG ET AL., THE LIFE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: NEW
DEAL AND GLOBAL WAR (1933–1945), at 7–8 (1964).
593. The name stems from the promise he made in accepting the Democratic nomina-
tion for President that he would seek “a new deal for the American People.” MAY ET AL.,
supra note 585, at 136. R
594. Exec. Order No. 7034 (May 6, 1935).
595. Civilian Conservation Corps Act of 1937, ch. 383, 50 Stat. 319 (repealed 1966).
596. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
597. Emergency Banking and Bank Conservation Act of 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
598. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2000)).
599. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1832
(2000)).
600. Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, ch. 30, 48 Stat. 55, replaced by Social Security
Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2000)).
601. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 351–52 (2004).  According to Professor Lobel:
[T]he New Deal brought a paradigm shift to American society. . . .  Responding
to the burdens and risks of the Depression and two world wars, the New Deal
instigated the creation of the modern regulatory and administrative state.  The
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out significant hesitation on the part of traditionalists, and faced legal
challenges at nearly every turn.602  The Supreme Court did reject
some early New Deal regulatory programs for exceeding enumerated
federal powers, including the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, by which the federal
government had sought pricing and production controls.603  Justice
Brandeis was particularly concerned about the centralization of regu-
latory authority, reportedly telling one of FDR’s political advisors to
“tell the President that we’re not going to let this government central-
ize everything.”604  However, the Court ultimately approved most of
the second wave of “more carefully crafted” New Deal legislation,
which accomplished most of the regulatory goals of the first wave in a
more piecemeal but narrowly tailored fashion.605  As one historian
notes, the Court at this time “abandon[ed] the two chief doctrinal
limitations on government power”: (1) the Lochnerian understanding
of liberty-of-contract substantive due process, by which it had con-
strained state regulatory authority; and (2) the pre-industrial under-
standing of dual sovereignty, by which it had constrained federal
regulatory authority in the early New Deal years.606
American federalism underwent a spectacular (some would ar-
gue, spectacularly misguided) transformation during the New Deal
era—but it hardly disappeared.  The body politic remained one of
dual sovereignty.  Then—as now—“the bulk of American law [wa]s
still state law, and overwhelmingly so.”607  States continued to manage
the vast array of regulatory contexts in which the police power is
deployed, from family law, to local law enforcement, to education.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s staged acceptance of the New Deal
legislation indicates that federalism controls were operating.  The first
wave of federal laws demanded too much unconstrained federal
New Deal paradigm invoked three Rs—relief, recovery, and reform, but it was the
legal developments that united all three under the umbrella of the big “R” of
regulation.
Id. at 351. Professor Laura Kalman, however, has recognized a split in the academic litera-
ture between “externalists,” who assert that political reasons, such as the massive economic
collapse of the Great Depression, caused the shift in federalism theory at this time and
“internalists,” who “point to doctrinal, intellectual causes in explaining constitutional
change during the New Deal.”  Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE
L.J. 2165, 2165–66 (1999).
602. See Moreno, supra note 144, at 737–38. R
603. Id.
604. Id. at 738 (quoting PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 352
(1984)).
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 661 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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power for use in the interjurisdictional gray area of economic regula-
tion.  Now that historians have largely set to rest the “switch-in-time-
that-saved-nine” mythos,608 we understand the Court’s acceptance of
the second wave of New Deal programs as a principled decision by
ambivalently progressive Justices to approve urgently needed
problem-solving legislation that had been sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to pass constitutional muster.609
Many disagreed with the Court’s assessment that this expansion
of federal power passed constitutional muster,610 but such disagree-
ment (then and now) is really between competing models of federal-
ism.  Mature New Deal federalism, although faithful to the overall
premise of dual sovereignty, exalted the problem-solving value above
all other considerations.  To the extent that citizens might be con-
fused about the source of new economic regulations, accountability
concerns were not given much consideration (although the over-
whelming and repeated re-elections of FDR suggest that citizens had a
fairly certain idea of who was responsible for New Deal programs).611
New Deal regulation proceeded without particular regard for localism
values,612 and the vast expansion of federal power proceeded at direct
cost to the check-and-balance value.  As each regulatory target became
the legitimate subject of federal reach under the Commerce
Clause,613 so state regulation in these areas became vulnerable to pre-
emption under the Supremacy Clause.
The regulatory ambit of the national government waxed and that
of the states correspondingly waned, threatening the balance between
the problem-solving and anti-tyranny principles of federalism.614  And
yet a federalism that enabled pragmatism to eclipse checks and bal-
ances during the Great Depression years seems well-suited to the cir-
608. Moreno, supra note 144, at 738–39. R
609. The reluctant Progressives emerged as Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts.
Id.
610. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4 (1938) (describing “fulmi-
nation” among opponents of the New Deal, who considered it unconstitutional).
611. LEUCHTENBURG ET AL., supra note 592, at 57. R
612. However, some argue that the relevant local community targeted by the New Deal
programs was the nation as a whole; indeed, never before had the nation constituted so
coherent a community as it did during the New Deal era, collectively riveted to the Presi-
dent’s radio broadcast fireside chats, sinking or swimming economically as one. Cf. Rubin
& Feeley, supra note 23, at 945–46 (arguing that the political community of the United R
States “belongs only to the nation as a single entity”).
613. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 381, at 1210–19 (tracing the growing power of R
the federal government’s Commerce Clause power through New Deal legislation at the
expense of traditional realms of state regulatory authority).
614. See Lobel, supra note 601, at 351–52 (describing the paradigmatic shift of regula- R
tory authority from the states to the federal government).
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cumstances of the time: massive unemployment, farmer uprisings and
hunger marches, public rioting, and widespread fear of revolt.615  If
even Herbert Hoover—great champion of localism and laissez-faire
economics—finally recognized that federal intervention was needed,
surely most would have come to the same conclusion.616  New Deal
federalism did not aggrandize the federal government’s power for fed-
eral expansion’s sake; it was in direct response to the states’ demon-
strated lack of capacity to overcome a nationwide economic collapse,
and was thus ultimately faithful to the premise of subsidiarity.  The
Supreme Court subjected the New Deal programs to forgiving but
meaningful review, requiring that programs be narrowly tailored out
of weakened but sincere respect for the maintenance of balance be-
tween state and federal power.  A model of federalism that would have
prevented a federal response under such circumstances would have,
like Katrina multiplied exponentially, profoundly disserved the
nation.617
Perhaps New Deal federalism most proved its authenticity as a
model of federalism by virtue of being falsifiable.  At some point, the
pendulum had swung too far to the problem-solving side, and check-
and-balance concerns began to draw it back.  When FDR announced
plans to add new Justices to the Supreme Court in 1937, he began to
lose public support,618 and failed to win any further reform legislation
in Congress after 1938.  World War II claimed the attention of the
nation, and the New Deal was over.
3. The Growth of Cooperative Federalism
Since World War II, cooperative federalism—in which state and
federal governments take responsibility for separate but interlocking
components of a unified regulatory program—has been the dominant
model of interjurisdictional problem-solving.  The continuing involve-
ment of the federal government in areas once managed solely by the
states reflects both the expanded reach of the federal commerce
615. See MAY ET AL., supra note 585, at 137 (“From one end of the country to the other, R
people fearfully whispered the word ‘revolution.’”).
616. See id. at 134–35 (recounting Hoover’s continued reluctance and eventual acquies-
cence to limited governmental intervention).
617. Indeed, the Katrina emergency indicates how the New Deal era changed public
expectations about the regulatory role of the federal government.  Before the New Deal,
Americans would not have expected the federal government to have done very much. Cf.
JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR’S HUNDRED DAYS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE
91–92 (2006) (characterizing direct involvement by the federal government in fighting
poverty as “radical” before FDR took office).
618. LEUCHTENBURG ET AL., supra note 592, at 70. R
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power achieved during the New Deal era and continued popular ex-
pectations for federal regulatory solutions following the rights revolu-
tions of the Civil Rights era.619  The incorporation of the Bill of Rights
as enforceable against the states imposed greater federal limits on
state and local governments, and World War II and the Korean War
further galvanized national power.  However, cooperative federalism
matches this expansive federal role with due regard for the role of
state authority.  Where New Deal programs virtually preempted state
involvement in the newly federally regulated realms, programs of co-
operative federalism afford roles for both state and federal regulators
in the interjurisdictional gray area.
For example, in its Congressional declaration of goals and poli-
cies, the CWA exemplifies the cooperative federalism approach in stat-
ing that:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the de-
velopment and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under
this chapter.  It is the policy of Congress that the States man-
age the construction grant program under this chapter and
implement the permit programs under . . . this title.  It is
further the policy of the Congress to support and aid re-
search relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination
of pollution and to provide Federal technical services and
financial aid to State and interstate agencies and municipali-
ties in connection with the prevention, reduction, and elimi-
nation of pollution.620
Although cooperative federalism thus remains rooted in the post-New
Deal expansion of federal regulatory authority, it affords greater pro-
tection to the check-and-balance value of federalism.
Programs of cooperative federalism dominate in many areas of
modern law,621 especially in environmental contexts such as the CAA’s
619. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (detailing popular expectations for an R
increased federal role during Katrina); see also William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Stat-
utory Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
298, 362 & n.210 (1996) (discussing the popular support for various environmental protec-
tion programs, such as the Endangered Species Act); Christopher Yeh, Workplace Stereotypes:
The Simultaneous Eradication and Reinforcement, HAW. B.J., May 2002, at 6, 6 (discussing pub-
lic support for Title VII).
620. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
621. See supra notes 29–32 (referencing cooperative federalism programs in environ- R
mental law, telecommunications law, products liability, and consumer finance).
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division between standard-setting authority (to the federal govern-
ment) and program design and implementation (to the state govern-
ment), or the CWA’s invitation to the states to assume the EPA’s role
as the in-state permitting authority for the NPDES (an invitation that
all but five states have accepted).622  Between consciously designed
partnership programs like these and the many legal realms boasting
both state and federal law,623 cooperative federalism remains the pre-
dominant model of American governance in interjurisdictional
arenas.
Cooperative federalism has been championed by its proponents
as “partnership federalism,” enabling a collaboration in which each
level of government takes responsibility for what it can do best.624  It is
a problem-solving model, taking a pragmatic approach in the gray
area, though with more careful attention to the check-and-balance
value than New Deal federalism in assigning both state and federal
roles.  Although cooperative federalism may encourage less competi-
tion than a federalism that minimized central planning authority,
some have favorably characterized it as affording greater competitive
benefits than the New Deal model, by enabling laboratory-style com-
petition among the states as they develop separate implementation
strategies for their allocated tasks.625  True to the federalism values
associated with localized diversity and competition, the laboratory ele-
ment of cooperative federalism promotes regulatory efficiency and in-
novation, while checking political power from becoming too
concentrated around a fully centralized planning regime.  Coopera-
tive federalism thus shifted the pendulum from the extreme problem-
622. EPA, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): State Program
Status, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  For a
graphical depiction of authorized states, see EPA, NDPES Authority State Program, http://
www.epa.gov/npdes/images/State_NPDES_Prog_Auth.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
623. See supra notes 201–204 and accompanying text (discussing the various areas of law R
with concurrent state and federal jurisdictions).
624. Cf. Babbitt, supra note 222, at 857–58 (advocating a “good neighbor policy” that R
permits joint decisionmaking on public lands); Esty, supra note 222, at 652–53 (concluding R
that environmental policy decisions are best handled through interaction of several levels
of government); Karkkainen, supra note 222, at 225–26 (arguing that it is likely that “high R
levels of intergovernmental, interagency, and public/private collaboration” are needed for
ecosystem governance).  Even so, cooperative federalism at its best merely enables the state
and federal governments to “take turns” at regulating; true collaboration exists only in
isolated examples of federal-state regulatory partnerships, such as the new Phase II
Stormwater Rule of the CWA or the Coastal Zone Management Act. See supra Part IV.A.
625. See, e.g., Elazar, supra note 222, at 67–68 (noting that cooperative federalism has R
elements of “antagonistic cooperation” that lead to sharing of ideas between levels of gov-
ernment); Kincaid, supra note 222, at 88 (arguing that cooperation and competition are R
equally necessary for effective federalism).
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solving side that it occupied during New Deal federalism back toward
the center (perhaps at some expense to the weaker accountability
value), reflecting attention to each of the federalism values in varying
degrees.
However, cooperative federalism has also been the subject of vo-
ciferous criticism from opponents who object to its continued sanc-
tioning of New Deal-expanded federal authority,626 and it inspires
some anxiety among federalism scholars who note theoretical ques-
tions left unresolved by this pragmatic (and perhaps undertheorized)
approach to interjurisdictional problem-solving.  For example, Profes-
sor Philip Weiser has called attention to the need to better justify the
authority of state agencies to implement federal law, and to ensure
constitutionally adequate oversight by the federal executive of state
agencies’ implementation of federal law.627  Professor Roderick Hills
has raised questions regarding the unjustified preferential treatment
by the Court of “generally applicable” federal laws that regulate states,
and the unresolved permissibility of conditional preemption and fed-
eral “funded mandates” to states to implement federal law.628
From the point of view of the states, the cooperative federalism
model seems preferable to that of New Deal preemptive federalism, in
which the federal government displaced the state altogether in
targeted arenas by crafting and staffing programs that extended all
the way to the local level.  Even so, cooperative federalism partner-
ships are often based on the federal spending power, in which Con-
gress persuades state participation in realms that the federal
government could not as straightforwardly preempt state law.  Some
critics of cooperative federalism thus argue that it would be more ac-
curately characterized as “coercive federalism,” in which the federal
government forces state cooperation on penalty of withholding
needed benefits or preempting state regulatory programs.629  Most im-
portant, cooperative federalism provides no clearly theorized means
of mediating between the competing federalism values in a way that
626. Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 210, at 782 (stating that the Commerce Clause was R
never intended to regulate “‘whatever affects’ the movement of people or their goods
across state lines”).
627. Weiser, supra note 222, at 677–81, 713–19. R
628. Hills, supra note 201, at 916–26, 934–38. R
629. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 205, at 169–73 (asserting that cooperative federalism in R
the environmental context either preempts state action or discourages state innovation);
cf. Baker, supra note 211, at 217–19 (noting that the Supreme Court has suggested that R
Congress cannot use its Spending Clause power to coerce states in ways not directly permis-
sible under Article I).
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affords meaningful protections for the check-and-balance value or
predictability for pragmatic-oriented regulators.
Frustration with cooperative federalism’s solicitousness of federal
authority and anxiety over its theoretical robustness ultimately in-
spired the New Federalism revival.  However, Congress has continued
to rely heavily on the cooperative federalism model in crafting regula-
tory solutions to interjurisdictional problems like wetlands regulation,
products liability, bankruptcy, and national security.630  The resulting
disconnect between the predominant empirical model of state-federal
regulatory relationships and the strict-separationist model that ani-
mates the Court’s New Federalism jurisprudence has evoked calls for
everything from a complete rejection of state-federal cooperative reg-
ulatory programs631 to a revision of the Rehnquist Court’s jurispru-
dence to better accommodate the cooperative model.632  Concerns
that the pendulum has swung either too far in favor of the national or
the local extreme have also motivated proposals for a cooperative
model that affords greater protection for local authority,633 to adop-
tion of a model of Polyphonic Federalism in which neither the state
nor the national government wholly occupies proprietary realms of
regulatory authority,634 to adoption of an Integrated Federalism,
which would enable regulatory partnerships that draw on a more indi-
vidualized evaluation of the capacity of the relevant local, state, and
630. See supra Part IV.A.
631. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559
(2000) (“Cooperative federalism undermines political transparency and accountability,
thereby heightening civic disaffection and cynicism; diminishes policy competition among
the states; and erodes self-government and liberty.”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federal-
ism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 270–80 (1997)
(arguing cooperative federalism is inconsistent with the Framers’ intentions, fails to con-
serve legislative resources, and reduces federal accountability).
632. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 222, at 571, 652–53 (arguing for “multiple tiers of govern- R
mental activity in the environmental domain”); John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Prin-
ciple? The Tenth Amendment Since United States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445, 531–32
(1997) (concluding that more clarification is needed—perhaps by constitutional amend-
ment—but failing to delineate an appropriate level of judicial review); Weiser, supra note
222, at 719–20 (concluding that a “reverse-Erie” doctrine is needed to balance federal R
supremacy and state autonomy in the administrative context); Kimberly C. Galligan, Note,
ACORN v. Edwards: Did the Fifth Circuit Squirrel Away States’ Tenth Amendment Rights at the
Cost of National Environmental Welfare?, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 508–09 (1998) (arguing for a
middle-of-the-road approach to federal-state cooperation).
633. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 211, at 220–21 (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s R
Commerce Clause opinions as prioritizing state sovereignty over federal regulatory power
in areas of traditional state concern); Hills, supra note 201, at 816–17, 938–44 (arguing for R
local autonomy on a functional basis, as opposed to the New Federalism’s focus on princi-
ples of dual sovereignty and political accountability).
634. See Schapiro, supra note 222, at 1466–68 (proposing a framework whereby federal R
and state courts participate together in developing constitutional law).
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federal agencies to address a given interjurisdictional problem.635  But
it is the New Federalism model that has most powerfully altered the
federalism discourse, permeating legal thinking in the making, inter-
preting, and teaching of law.
4. The New Federalism
If cooperative federalism swung the pendulum away from the
problem-solving extreme of New Deal federalism, the New Federalism
ideal swings it from the more central position staked out by coopera-
tive federalism toward the check-and-balance extreme.  New Federal-
ism arose out of concern that cooperative federalism fails to
adequately circumscribe federal authority.636  Anxious to preserve the
check-and-balance value against further degradation, New Federalism
proceeds from the strict-separationist model of dual sovereignty,
sometimes called “Dual Federalism,” that has been a primary focus of
this Article.637
Borrowing from historical predecessors, this straightforward
model of dual sovereignty provides an intuitively attractive framework
from which to test assertions of regulatory jurisdiction against con-
cerns about the balance of local and national power.  However, the
previous discussion shows how the model proves ill-equipped to han-
dle the dynamics that arise in interjurisdictional contexts, where the
need for adaptive approaches may overwhelm the wall of separation
that dual federalism seeks to preserve at all costs.638  Indeed, the strict-
separationist ideal does a poor job of vindicating most of the funda-
mental federalism values other than checks and balances, especially
short-changing the problem-solving value.  Its obsessive focus on seg-
regating the local from the national threatens inefficient governance
in high-stakes regulatory contests, such as the management of natural
635. Nolon, supra note 562, at 18–22. R
636. New Federalism’s proponents were perhaps also legitimately antagonized by in-
creasingly sloppy congressional attention to federalism boundaries, exemplified by Con-
gress’s failure to attempt a federal jurisdictional nexus in the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–63 (1995).
637. “Dual federalism” posits that the state and federal governments operate with
cleanly distinguishable spheres of regulatory authority that never overlap, thus refuting the
justification (and obviating the need) for state-federal regulatory partnerships. See Hills,
supra note 201, at 850–51 (citing Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870)). R
638. See supra Part IV.
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disasters,639 terrorism threats,640 water pollution,641 or radioactive
waste.642
The New Federalism cases are relatively few in number (and the
Tenth Amendment cases scarcer still), and reasonable minds may dif-
fer on the extent to which this pessimistic forecast reflects the status
quo after the first decade of their ascendancy.  Even so, the trajectory
of New Federalism principles should concern us because it extends
inexorably toward a separationist climax that warrants pessimism,
both for the doctrinal barriers it promises and the intellectual barriers
it encourages in the minds of policymakers.  Indeed, the failures of
leadership in the wake of Katrina, the anxiety hovering over regula-
tion of serious environmental problems like air and water pollution,
and the total abdication of state and federal responsibility for the dis-
posal of radioactive waste after New York was decided all indicate the
treacherous future of interjurisdictional problem-solving in the ideo-
logical shadow of New Federalism ideals.
New Federalism has thus arisen at the apex of one end of a pen-
dulum that has been swinging for nearly a century between the com-
peting values that underlie the essential federalism enterprise.  Of
course, the fact that the functional framework of American federalism
continues to evolve hardly means that its underlying principles are
stale.  The deep political divide made visible across the nation against
the backdrop of expansive post-9/11 federal authority suggests that
the importance of federalism values—fostering governmental ac-
countability, protecting ideological diversity, vindicating individual
rights, and promoting efficient and innovative governance—remain
as compelling as ever.  Nevertheless, the increasingly interjurisdic-
tional nature of the problems we face—from new threats to national
security to new environmental harms—signals this as a moment that
the framework for implementing these federalism values must adapt.
The pendulum must continue to swing at least until we reach a model
that can effectively cope with the interjurisdictional gray area.
639. See supra Part II.B (assessing New Federalism’s effects in terms of the Katrina
emergency).
640. See supra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing the interjurisdictional nature of domestic
counterterrorism efforts).
641. See supra notes 344–351 and accompanying text (explaining the challenges in pass- R
ing the Clean Water Act’s Phase II Storm Water Rule).
642. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the New Federalism’s strict-separationist vision as it
applied in the commandeering cases).
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VI. TOWARD A BALANCED FEDERALISM
A. Balanced Federalism
Developing a coherent model of federalism that will support a
healthy balance between local and national authority while allowing
effective regulatory response thus remains a central task of modern
public law.  A model that accounts for interjurisdictional problems
and provides a means of evaluating crossover into the gray area pays
homage to the importance of both efficient regulatory problem-
solving and vigilance against unchecked power.  Accordingly, this Arti-
cle calls for the development of a model that fosters a more thought-
ful balance between the federalism values that, through their network
of tension, fortifies our system against the challenges of change.  In
honor of such balance, we might call this model “Balanced Federal-
ism.”  This Section offers a preliminary exploration of what a Bal-
anced Federalism might look like, setting forth the theoretical ideal,
factors for judicial consideration, and mechanics of how the model
might work in practice.
Unlike New Federalism or cooperative federalism, Balanced Fed-
eralism explicitly recognizes the competition between the check-and-
balance, accountability, localism, and problem-solving values, and pro-
vides a theoretically grounded means of mediating between them
when conflicts arise.  Moreover, Balanced Federalism recognizes that
while most regulatory concerns may lie within uncomplicated realms
of local or national jurisdiction, some straddle the imaginary bright
line between them that is postulated by the strict-separationist ap-
proach.  Balanced Federalism rejects New Federalism’s mutually ex-
clusive spheres for a vision of dual sovereignty in which the clear areas
of purely state and federal jurisdiction are bridged by the gray area of
overlapping, interjurisdictional concern.  Conflicting state law would
continue to be preempted in the uncontroversial sphere of federal
authority, but the preemption inquiry would shift in the interjurisdic-
tional gray area, returning force to the longstanding presumption
against preemption of traditional state police power unless Congress
has explicitly required it.643  Correspondingly, federal policymakers
would continue to respect the primacy of state authority in its uncon-
troversial sphere and avoid regulatory encroachment into the gray
643. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption against pre- R
emption).  Among other benefits, requiring Congress to clearly express its intent to pre-
empt state law would enhance the accountability to the electorate of federal legislators who
so choose this route, rather than allowing such decisions to be politically diluted among
agency and judicial interpreters.
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area until interjurisdictional factors demand capacity available only at
the national level.
Balanced Federalism dual sovereignty would also require a shift
in the work of the Tenth Amendment.  According to the strict-
separationist ideal, a state or federal authority threatens constitutional
values whenever it regulates beyond the uncontroversial sphere of its
own jurisdiction and into the interjurisdictional gray area at its mar-
gin.  As construed in New Federalism, the Tenth Amendment implic-
itly polices this boundary, punishing transgressions from either side
and framing other affirmative limits on federal power.  In Balanced
Federalism, such regulatory reach is conceived not as crossover from
the permissible into the impermissible realm, but from the unqualified
into the qualified realm of jurisdiction.  Of course, crossover from one
uncontroversial sphere past the gray area and all the way into the
other would be immediately preempted (if by the state) or invalidated
(if by the federal government), but crossover into the gray area would
require additional consideration.  As construed in Balanced Federal-
ism, the Tenth Amendment polices regulatory activity within the gray
area by either side, testing the potential threats and benefits of such
crossover against the fundamental federalism values.  The adjudicator
must balance the degree to which the advancement of one federalism
value is or is not outweighed by harm to competing values.
In essence, governmental activity in the gray area would be re-
viewed with heightened scrutiny for overall faithfulness to the panoply
of federalism values for which the Tenth Amendment stands.  Because
they are engaged in perpetual tug of war, this analysis would require
more explicit judicial balancing than New Federalism allows (the
threat of which then becomes an incentive for balancing as a matter
of ex ante policymaking by legislative and executive actors).  A mature
model of Balanced Federalism thus hinges on the development of a
jurisprudential standard for adjudicating regulatory crossover within
the boundaries of meaningful dual sovereignty.
B. Judicially Enforceable Balanced Federalism Constraints
Under Balanced Federalism, the Tenth Amendment would as-
sume renewed importance as the textual ambassador of the constitu-
tional dual sovereignty that informs all other federalism inquiries.  As
the Tenth Amendment most encapsulates the constitutional dual sov-
ereignty directive,644 it is the proper point of departure for the devel-
opment of a jurisprudential standard for balancing threats to
644. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. R
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American federalism.  As proposed here, the standard would facilitate
consideration of whether the challenged regulatory activity ultimately
serves or disserves Balanced Federalism as a whole, with reference to
each of the foundational federalism values.
The articulation of such a standard would do for the Tenth
Amendment what has already been done for nearly every other opera-
tive provision in the Bill of Rights, each of which has required the
crafting of interpretative rules by which to administer the constitu-
tional rule of law it sets forth.  The Eighth Amendment tells us that
cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited, but lacks specific direc-
tion as to whether the execution of minors is prohibited.645  The
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, but
remains silent on the use of drug-sniffing dogs during traffic stops.646
The Tenth Amendment tells us that powers not delegated to the fed-
eral government are reserved to the states, which offers even fewer
specifics than most of its nine predecessors.647  As discussed in Part II,
a penumbral reading of the Constitution confirms its premise that the
state and federal governments would operate simultaneously but sepa-
rately, but the Tenth Amendment itself gives no specific direction on
where the line between state and federal power lies, nor even about
what kind of boundary it is.648  Its directive is meaningful only in con-
cert with other constitutional provisions enumerating federal powers
and limitations, none of which has settled the debate.649
Indeed, it is not surprising that they don’t, as the Constitution’s
resilience has so often flowed from the interpretive possibilities pre-
served by its brevity—just specific enough to convey the foundational
rule of law, just flexible enough to allow for evolving rules of interpre-
tation that mediate between the enduring principles and the chang-
ing circumstances of society.  Formal amendment is required only
when substantive textual commands must give way, for example, to
645. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
646. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
647. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The exception may be found in the Ninth Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).  The Ninth
Amendment’s textual vagueness has left it relatively off the table of constitutional interpre-
tation, save for the efforts of Justice Goldberg to ground in the Ninth Amendment the
penumbral right to privacy.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490–92 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It
Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 80 (2006) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment should be read
literally to “prohibit[ ] constitutional constructions . . . that infringe upon the unenumer-
ated, natural, and individual rights retained by the people”).
648. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. R
649. Id.
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outlaw slavery, enfranchise women, or permit the general federal in-
come tax.650  But none of the Bill of Rights has ever required amend-
ment; indeed, it is doubtful that their directives could be improved
upon without compromising their ultimate potency.  In this way, the
First Amendment made sense in 1789 and it makes sense today, de-
spite ambiguous moments at the margins of interpretive turnover
(such as the Tenth Amendment now invites).
But the First Amendment has received attention from the judici-
ary for well over 100 years,651 and the body of jurisprudential rules
that have developed around it reflects this volume of consideration.
By contrast, Tenth Amendment dual sovereignty has been the focus of
sustained judicial attention only twice in the last century, most re-
cently in only three significant cases.652  It is not surprising that the
Tenth Amendment lacks rules of interpretation that would better
translate its underlying principle into an ascertainable directive
amidst the thicket of competing values in real cases and controversies.
It is not surprising, but it is about time.653
Models for a Tenth Amendment jurisprudential standard are
available among the rules of interpretation that have developed
around the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments and the
Commerce Clause, bargaining rules that the Court has promulgated
to constrain the federal spending power654 and municipal regulatory
650. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (outlawing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (en-
franchising women); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (permitting taxation without
apportionment).
651. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–67 (1878) (interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause to allow an act of Congress forbidding polygamy in Utah).
652. See supra Part III.A.
653. It is fitting that the Supreme Court take the affirmative step of adopting such a
standard, as it periodically does in providing needed guidance to governmental actors re-
garding complicated areas of law.  For example, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978), the Court adopted a three-factor balancing test for
interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s taking prohibition in regulatory contexts (evaluating
the character of the state action, the extent of its interference with the property owner’s
investment-backed expectations, and the overall economic impact of the state action).
Similarly, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
the Court supplemented the Administrative Procedures Act’s vague proscription of “arbi-
trary and capricious” agency action with a four-factor test to facilitate judicial review.  463
U.S. 29 (1983); see id. at 42–43 (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capri-
cious if the agency has relied on tactics which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).
654. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (finding that the Spending
Clause limits Congress by three general restrictions and a separate constitutional bar).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 146  9-MAY-07 9:47
648 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:503
exactions,655 and such common law efficiency-based tests as the Hand
Formula of tort law.656  Moreover, prior scholarship has shown how to
tailor such a standard to take account of the fact-rich scenarios that
tend to accompany specific constitutional dilemmas.  Just as Professor
Michelman demonstrated in proposing the elements that helped in-
form the regulatory takings balancing test adopted by the Court in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,657 a close analysis of
the tension between the federalism values promoted by dual sover-
eignty reveals a series of factors that warrant consideration when regu-
lation crosses into the interjurisdictional gray area.  Although a
consummate proposal is beyond the scope of this treatment, the
broad outlines that such a test might take follow below.
C. Factors for Consideration
Like the Court’s balancing tests in Penn Central, Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.,658 and other areas of law that sport competing values, the
Balanced Federalism Tenth Amendment standard would be a pur-
pose-and-effects oriented balancing test, structured around considera-
tion of the anti-tyranny, accountability, localism, and problem-solving
values explored in Part V.  A Tenth Amendment challenge would not
be tethered to the New Federalism commandeering construct, but
would enable redress whenever a plaintiff with standing shows that
regulatory activity in the gray area unduly threatens Our Federalism.
A threshold consideration for the reviewing court would be
whether the challenged regulatory activity is taking place within the
interjurisdictional gray area or one of the uncontroversial spheres of
state and federal authority described by the Balanced Federalism
model of dual sovereignty.  Facilitated by a gatekeeping inquiry, this
determination would control which standard the court would apply to
655. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386–91 (1994) (requiring that there be a
“rough proportionality” between a municipal regulation and the intended use of prop-
erty); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring a demonstrable
nexus between the regulatory taking and the legitimate government purpose).
656. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also
Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge and Theory: A Cautionary
Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 695 (2002) (discussing the Hand
Formula as a type of balancing approach).
657. 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978); see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, And
Fairness: Comments On The Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1226–45 (1967) (proposing the elements that would form the basis of the Court’s
three-factor balancing test).
658. 397 U.S. 137 (1970); see id. at 142, 145 (employing a balancing test to determine
whether a legitimate state interest outweighed the nature of the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce).
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evaluate the challenged regulation.659  If the challenged activity takes
place within the regulator’s own uncontroversial sphere, the chal-
lenge fails to state a Tenth Amendment claim.  If the challenged activ-
ity represents regulatory crossover fully into the uncontroversial
sphere of the other side, strict scrutiny is applied and the Balanced
Federalism Tenth Amendment standard is not needed.  But if there is
a nonfrivolous basis for characterizing the challenged activity as within
the interjurisdictional gray area, then the court applies the Tenth
Amendment multifactor test.
In applying the test to evaluate challenged regulatory activity in
the gray area, the Court would consider to what extent the activity
would either support or derogate: (1) checks and balances, (2) gov-
ernmental accountability, (3) localism values, and (4) problem-
solving.  After weighing these findings in consideration of the factual
context of the crossover, the court would conclude whether, on bal-
ance, the challenged activity serves or disserves the principles of con-
stitutional federalism.  Based on a review of the literature and
principal Tenth Amendment and interjurisdictional cases decided in
all federal courts of appeal since the Court’s 1992 decision in New York
v. United States, this piece recommends that deliberation of each factor
take particular account of the following considerations:
1. Checks and Balances
In considering whether an activity unduly burdens the check-and-
balance value, decisionmakers should consider such factors as consent
or waiver by the adversely affected party, the scope and duration of
the crossover, the nature of the crossover, and the degree to which the
crossover is designed to prevent undue exploitation by the state or
federal government of its sovereign authority.
a. Waiver by Adversely Affected Party
Waiver by the adversely affected party should be a factor in evalu-
ating the degree to which an act of crossover threatens the check-and-
balance value, since the act of consent should generally negate con-
cerns about a tyrannical abuse of power.  For example, the New York
holding was most convincing to the extent it addressed an act of legis-
lative commandeering, but least convincing to the extent that the reg-
ulatory crossover had been invited by the state plaintiff.  The State of
New York had arguably waived its Tenth Amendment objection when,
together with the other states, it asked Congress to engage in the regu-
659. See infra Part VI.D (discussing the mechanics of applying the standard).
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latory crossover by ratifying the states’ consensus as federal law
(thereby granting the needed dormant Commerce Clause exception).
Respecting the subsidiarity principle, New York and its sister states
chose this course of action based on the conviction that they lacked
capacity to resolve the radioactive waste disposal collective action
problem by other means.  Respecting the expressed preference of the
states, Congress declined to exercise available plenary federal author-
ity in lieu of this more localist (and arguably less tyrannical) state-
based approach.
Especially troubling in the New York decision was Justice
O’Connor’s explanation that a state’s consent is no defense to a
Tenth Amendment violation, because the Tenth Amendment protects
the rights of individuals, not state agents who might bargain away the
individual rights of their citizens.660  Her analysis leaves unclear what
theory of representation is employed if citizens do not elect their
agents to represent their interests, and effectively abrogates the Coase
Theorem in the interjurisdictional gray area.  The reasoning would
prevent state and federal bargaining in the gray area, rendering the
Tenth Amendment an inalienability rule rather than the property or
liability rules adopted by most statutory and common law regimes to
facilitate efficient bargaining.661  If the Tenth Amendment could pro-
vide a useful threshold around which the state and federal govern-
ments could trade, then the “no waiver” rule is a bad absolute because
it overprotects checks and balances at the expense of legitimate
problem-solving partnerships (such as that formed by state and fed-
eral negotiations over the terms of the Phase II Stormwater Rule).662
We should be able to assume that a state would not bargain for cross-
over against its interests, and that its consent preserves the check-and-
balance value against undue assault.  Waiver should thus be consid-
ered as one of the factors; a challenge leveled by one who has not
consented should weigh more heavily than a challenge by one who
has.
660. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–83 (1992) (stating that constitu-
tional constraints are unaffected by the consent of government actors, who may be moti-
vated by a desire to avoid responsibility for unpopular decisions).
661. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (proposing a model for
differentiating between different ways of protecting legal entitlements).
662. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
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b. Scope of the Regulatory Crossover
The standard should also consider the scope of the crossover,
measured over time or in degree of compromise.  For example, in
Printz, Congress was held to have commandeered the executive au-
thority of the states in temporarily requiring state police officers to
perform background checks on would-be gun purchasers while the
federal government established the facilities to run such checks it-
self.663  The Court concluded that any amount of commandeering vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment,664 no matter how small or how
temporary.  Whether or not the challenged federal law was correctly
construed as commandeering, however, both the temporariness and
degree of crossover should be relevant considerations under the Bal-
anced Federalism standard.  Obviously, longer and larger crossover
threatens the check-and-balance value more seriously than shorter
and lesser crossover.  The Court recognizes a similar series of dimen-
sions against which it measures the degree of harm in its balancing
analysis used to evaluate the scope of a regulatory taking.665
For example, Justice O’Connor distinguished the background
checks required in Printz from the Department of Justice’s missing
children reporting requirement on the grounds that the latter was a
more “ministerial” requirement, indicating one less severe in scope
and thus less threatening to federalism.666  Alternatively, the fact that
the background checks was a temporary requirement while the miss-
ing child reporting requirements are permanent indicates that the
background checks were less severe over time.  Indeed, when coupled
with a compelling short-term problem-solving need (for example, the
immediate Katrina relief effort), a large, temporary crossover may be
less threatening to the check-and-balance value than a small, perma-
nent crossover, which could threaten a more pernicious slippery
slope.
c. Nature of the Crossover
The nature of the crossover is also an important consideration;
outright commandeering warrants stricter scrutiny than more self-
663. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
664. Id. at 935.
665. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331–32 (2002) (“An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal as-
pect of the owner’s interest.  Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be
viewed in its entirety.” (citation omitted)).
666. Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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contained regulatory activity within the gray area.  However, even the
nature of an alleged act of commandeering warrants consideration.
Legislative commandeering (such as that invalidated in New York) is
the most severe form of crossover, and rightly subject to the most
searching scrutiny under the standard.  By contrast, the evaluation of
alleged executive commandeering may prove more nuanced, because
it is harder to distinguish between federal rules that regulate state ex-
ecutive actors in legitimately ministerial or market-participant capaci-
ties and those that regulate them in capacities deserving greater
protection.
As the preceding discussion of the Condon quandary suggests,667
persuasively differentiating the two may ultimately hinge on consider-
ation of all the various factors in play.  For example, following Justice
O’Connor’s intuition in her Printz concurrence, the complete calculus
would probably weigh in favor of requiring states to report missing
children to a federal database, especially if there are no other effective
means for resolving kidnappings that may cross state lines.  The inter-
ference with state sovereign activity is very limited in scope, and the
protection of child kidnapping victims that may be left vulnerable by
purely intrastate enforcement efforts spells a particularly compelling
interjurisdictional problem-solving need.  On the other hand, a court
might conclude that requiring state law enforcement officers to report
criminal background information to gun dealers as part of a federal
gun safety program exceeds the acceptable level of strain on check-
and-balance or accountability values, especially if evidence suggested
that the federal government could fulfill the role directly within a rea-
sonable period of time.  (Of course, both analyses might shift if the
stated assumptions about available alternatives were not supported by
the evidence.)  Meanwhile, check-and-balance concerns over the po-
tential exploitation of state sovereign authority might justify a federal
prohibition against profiteering by states from personal data extracted
from their citizens, the very specter raised in Condon.
d. Extent to Which Crossover Thwarts Undue Exploitation by
Government of Its Sovereign Power Against Individuals
As the check-and-balance value protects citizens from the undue
exercise of sovereign power by both the states and the federal govern-
ment, the extent to which crossover thwarts exploitation of sovereign
power may also be a valid consideration.  Indeed, one legal realist in-
terpretation of Reno v. Condon suggests that such considerations could
667. See supra Part III.A.2.
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have already played a (perhaps subconscious) role in the Court’s
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
In Condon, the Court avoided finding commandeering on the
stated grounds that the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act did not truly
invade the states’ sovereign authority.668  Perhaps, although a more
cynical interpretation of the decision is that the Court simply lacked
sympathy for what South Carolina wanted to do with its citizens’ per-
sonal data.  Although Balanced Federalism review would reject the
reasoning in Condon, it might reach a similar outcome on grounds
that the crossover here allowed (federal law preventing the noncon-
sensual dissemination of citizens’ information by states) was intended
to protect individuals against exploitation by the government when
they seek official identification and permission to drive—two impor-
tant gateways to participation in modern society that only the state
may grant.  Because a primary purpose of checks and balances is the
protection of individual rights against government excess, regulatory
crossover designed to protect individual rights against the state should
fare better in the analysis than nakedly self-aggrandizing regulatory
crossover.
2. Accountability
The decisionmaker should consider the extent to which account-
ability problems associated with the regulatory crossover would over-
whelm other federalism values served by the regulation, and the
extent to which these problems can be effectively mitigated.
a. Potential for Mitigation
In some cases, otherwise desirable crossover that threatens ac-
countability values might be salvaged by effective public explanation.
If voters can be reasonably made to understand which regulators are
responsible for which regulatory choices, then accountability con-
cerns might be overcome.  For example, the Phase II Stormwater Rule
upheld in Environmental Defense Center partnered federal and munici-
pal regulators in an effort to abate stormwater pollution, blurring
lines of accountability in an already tricky interjurisdictional zone.
However, it also included a public education campaign to ensure that
citizens be given the tools to understood what the program was for,
how it would work within each municipality, and who was responsible
for which aspects of regulatory decisionmaking in each locale.  Never-
theless, the less likely it is that such problems can be effectively miti-
668. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
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gated by transparency and communication with voters, the more
seriously accountability concerns should weigh in the analysis.
b. Purpose and Effects
Crossover designed to shoulder the adversely affected party with
significant regulatory burden, financial or political, warrants addition-
ally heightened scrutiny.  For example, objections to a federal un-
funded mandate to state governments might find traction under this
prong if it can be shown that the cost-shifting mandate creates una-
voidable confusion among voters without a compelling rationale.  An
adjudicator should consider carefully whether a federal command for
state assistance that saddles the states with disproportionate responsi-
bility can truly be justified by unusual satisfaction of other federalism
considerations.
3. Localism Values
The decisionmaker should consider the extent to which the regu-
latory crossover would assist or undermine federalism values associ-
ated with the protection of local autonomy, including the protection
of localized diversity and the promotion of efficiency and innovation
through interjurisdictional competition.
a. Extent to Which Crossover Protects Local Autonomy Against
State or Other Local Power
Some states apply a “home-rule” system that encourages local au-
tonomy (e.g., New York), while others regulate in a more centralized
manner (e.g., “Dillon Rule” states such as Virginia).  When important
localism values are under-protected at the state level, regulatory cross-
over by a local jurisdiction that responds to a pressing localized prob-
lem may deserve greater deference than might otherwise be
warranted.  One such example may be the South Coast Air Quality
Management District’s invalidated efforts in Engine Manufacturers to
protect the respiratory health of its especially vulnerable children de-
spite broad federal authority over the regulation of air pollution.669
By contrast, a centralized regulatory scheme may prove the only
means of accomplishing localist objectives if it is required to police
negative externalities associated with the autonomous choices of other
localities (for example, to avoid the border-crossing impacts of extra-
territorial land use management policies by other localities).670  Such
669. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
670. See Barron, supra note 147, at 386–87; see supra note 530 and accompanying text. R
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a centralized scheme might also deserve greater deference than would
otherwise be warranted (e.g., the Phase II Stormwater Rule’s require-
ment that all localities participate in a national effort to combat
stormwater pollution).
b. Extent to Which Crossover Marginalizes or Discriminates
Against Vulnerable Localities
Consideration of localism values might also address the extent to
which crossover discriminates against or otherwise marginalizes vul-
nerable states or localities.  One example of this concern (although
not within a currently justiciable controversy) is Nevada’s continuing
opposition to siting the nation’s most dangerous high-level nuclear
waste disposal facility near Las Vegas at Yucca Mountain.671  Because
the other states prefer not to host it, Nevada’s concerns are simply
outvoted each time they are raised in legislative session.  But should
Nevada citizens be forced to bear the brunt of all other Americans’
most dangerous waste, simply because the other states can effectively
gang up on Nevada’s representatives in Congress?  Although an ap-
propriate remedy for Nevadans remains unclear, the scenario suggests
a legitimate localism-related factor for consideration in Tenth Amend-
ment controversies.
4. Problem-Solving
The decisionmaker should consider the extent to which regula-
tory crossover is necessary for an effective regulatory response to an
interjurisdictional problem that satisfies the criteria described in Part
IV.  Careful attention to the conflict between pragmatism and anti-
tyranny values is warranted, such that the problem-solving value does
not automatically overcome checks and balances whenever a legiti-
mate interjurisdictional problem arises.  Moreover, it is important to
remember that the problem-solving value is partnered with the prefer-
ence for localism in the subsidiarity principle.  If capacity exists at
both levels, subsidiarity empowers the more local actor to respond.
a. Capacity Analysis
A key aspect of the problem-solving analysis will be its ability to
distinguish cases where one side or the other lacks capacity to cope
exclusively with the problem.  In assessing the extent to which regula-
tory crossover is or is not warranted by problem-solving values, the
671. See EPA, Yucca Mountain Standards, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/
about.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
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decisionmaker should take a “hard look” at relative capacity.  One
starting point for evaluating the limits of state capacity to effectively
regulate a given problem is the extent to which the matter implicates
border-crossing harms or interstate commerce.  A starting point for
evaluating the limits of federal capacity is the extent to which the mat-
ter disproportionately affects some localities over others, or requires
local expertise unavailable at the federal level.  Evidence of a given
party’s past performance (or undue lack thereof) may also be relevant
to an evaluation of its problem-solving capacity in a given scenario.
Creating a satisfactory metric for capacity will prove the most im-
portant and difficult task of the Balanced Federalism model, since it
weighs significantly in consideration of the problem-solving value.  A
poorly calibrated threshold for evaluating regulatory competency
could allow a stated need for problem-solving to unnecessarily domi-
nate other considerations.  Future work is needed in this regard, al-
though the literature reveals good starts on the project, including
Justice Breyer’s proposal in his Morrison dissent,672 and a theory of
capacity separately proposed by Professors Donald Regan and Douglas
Kmiec in work interpreting the Commerce Clause.673  In their work,
Regan and Kmiec turn for inspiration to the sixth Virginia Resolution,
a proposal for distinguishing between state and federal competencies
that was approved by the Constitutional Convention on July 17,
1787.674  The signatories were resolved:
That the National Legislature ought to possess the Legisla-
tive Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and
moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests of
the union, and also in those to which the States are sepa-
rately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
Legislation.675
The Resolution did not become part of the final text of the Constitu-
tion, but Regan notes that a proposal based on this text would “not
672. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 663 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that courts evaluate the rigor of congressional factfinding when deciding whether
Congress has impermissibly invaded a traditionally state-controlled area of regulation).
673. Regan, supra note 504, at 557–58 (suggesting that differing state views should be R
protected and should not be infringed by Congress without sufficient justification); Doug-
las W. Kmiec, Rediscovering a Principled Commerce Power, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 547, 561–62 (2001)
(proposing that courts evaluate states’ inability to rectify regulatory problems as one factor
in determining the boundaries of the federal commerce power).
674. Regan, supra note 504, at 555. R
675. Id. at 555–56 (quoting JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966)).
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rely on it for any proposition that we could not infer from the text of
the Constitution itself.”676  Still, other than affirming that the states
and federal government will possess different competencies, the text
does not provide explicit tools for ex ante evaluation of which sover-
eign is best suited for a specific regulatory target.677  Such a determi-
nation would likely hinge on the facts in each controversy,
acknowledging that competencies may shift over time and—impor-
tantly—in response to previous determinations.
The possibility of shifting competencies places important limits
on the precedential effects of capacity-based determinations under
the standard.  Although procedural approaches developed in per-
forming the capacity analysis would surely have precedential effect,
substantive determinations would always be vulnerable to reexamina-
tion in later cases.  For example, it may be that in comparison to Loui-
siana (though perhaps not Mississippi), the federal government had
superior capacity to cope with the Katrina emergency, and that the
Tenth Amendment standard might have permitted federal crossover
had it arisen.  However, the Katrina experience could subsequently
motivate Louisiana to improve local capacity such that, should similar
circumstances arise again in the future, the more local actor would be
equally capable.  Even had the federal government permissibly taken
charge the first time, if another Katrina were to strike Louisiana and
both the state and federal government were capable of response, a
second act of identical crossover by the federal government might not
pass muster under the Tenth Amendment standard.  The preceden-
tial effects of all decisions under the standard must take account of
both subsidiarity’s ongoing preference for localism and the potential
for responsively adjusted capacity.
The sixth Virginia Resolution also suggests an important sandtrap
in the capacity analysis, which is the danger that how one character-
izes the regulatory target might determine which side has the relevant
capacity.  In other words, if the regulatory objective is identified as
“the need for a uniform approach” (because, in the words of the Reso-
lution, the exercise of individual legislation would interrupt the har-
676. Id. at 556.
677. In other contexts, one could imagine that the enterprise might work better the
other way around: if we assign roles ex ante, then the respective parties could develop the
capacity required of them to manage their responsibilities.  However, this seems less worka-
ble within the existing constitutional framework, where local and national expertise organ-
ically accumulate at the state and federal levels, and respective obligations are pre-assigned
by law.  An interjurisdictional regulatory problem, as defined here, draws on both sets, so
unless we were willing to more substantially revise the legal responsibilities of state and
federal actors, the suggestion appears to be unavailing.
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mony of the nation), then only the federal government will have the
capacity to act as needed.  It is critical therefore to begin the analysis
by asking the right question, or identifying the core regulatory prob-
lem that demands redress.  A problem characterized as “the need for
a uniform approach” must always be probed several analytical levels
deeper.  Why the need?  Are we concerned about a prisoner’s di-
lemma in which the states, acting rationally as individuals, may never-
theless pursue an irrational end (for example, a race to the bottom on
the siting of hazardous waste or the setting of stationary source air
pollution standards)?  Or is the problem really one of market failure
in a uniquely local market, in which the need for fine-tuned regula-
tory solutions and local expertise are paramount (for example, the
human and financial toll of a public health crisis in light of uniquely
local factors)?  The former concern suggests a legitimate need for na-
tional capacity; the latter less so.
b. Extent to Which Federalism-Based Objections Are Pretextual
Finally, the standard might legitimately consider whether federal-
ism-based objections are merely pretextual, offering rhetorically ap-
pealing cover for baser motives.  The behavior of the State of New
York in New York v. United States comes again to mind, as does the
suggestion that federalism concerns invoked by the federal govern-
ment after the Katrina debacle were mere post-hoc rationalizations to
cover for incompetence or abdication.678 The Court should treat ap-
parently pretextual invocations of federalism concerns with at least
the level of skepticism it has applied to Congress’s invocations of ties
to interstate commerce in Commerce Clause cases like Lopez and Mor-
rison.  Neither the check-and-balance value nor any other principle of
federalism should be opportunistically deployed as an excuse to avoid
unpalatable or difficult problem-solving in the interjurisdictional gray
area.
D. Mechanics
Embrace of a Balanced Federalism model would resound
throughout the general federalism inquiry, but the mechanics of as-
serting federalism claims would remain similar to the New Federalism
model in most respects.
A gatekeeping inquiry at the outset would establish a two-track
system of Tenth Amendment review, screening out challenges invok-
ing the uncontroversial spheres of state and federal authority and re-
678. See supra Part II.B.4.
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serving application of heightened scrutiny under the balancing test to
challenged activity within the interjurisdictional gray area.  For exam-
ple, the gatekeeping baseline might designate the uncontroversial
sphere of federal authority as extending as far as there is clear consti-
tutionally delegated authority and Congress has expressly preempted
further state regulation—but if the state can raise a colorable claim as
to why its action has not been preempted, then it will be treated as a
gray area claim and adjudicated under the balancing test.  The
gatekeeping baseline might reciprocally define the uncontroversial
sphere of state authority as extending as far as the Constitution has
not expressly denied it regulatory authority and it has not been ex-
pressly preempted by valid federal law.  If no colorable claim can be
made that the challenged action falls within the gray area, then the
matter is resolved according to the existing jurisprudence without re-
course to the balancing test.  A challenge to regulation that takes
place within the regulator’s own sphere fails to state a Tenth Amend-
ment claim, and crossover fully to the sphere of the other side would
be invalidated without recourse to judicial balancing.  But if either
party can set forth a nonfrivolous argument challenging either the
clarity of the constitutionally delegated authority or the extent of con-
gressionally intended preemption, the court proceeds to the four-
factor test.
Still, the proposed Tenth Amendment standard would provide a
means for evaluating only those controversies that could not be re-
solved under a more specific federalism inquiry, and the rest would be
brought as before.  For example, although Balanced Federalism dual
sovereignty has theoretical implications for cases involving the scope
of federal authority under the Commerce Clause or Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, such challenges would not be adjudi-
cated under the Tenth Amendment standard; they would be resolved
on the basis of the most specifically relevant constitutional doctrines.
The principles of Balanced Federalism dual sovereignty may yet bear
on the unfolding jurisprudence in these related federalism inquiries,
but not by application of the Tenth Amendment standard.
Nevertheless, Tenth Amendment challenges might be more read-
ily available under Balanced Federalism than previous models.  In
contrast to cooperative federalism, Balanced Federalism claims would
be justiciable.  In contrast to New Federalism, they would include but
not be limited to commandeering challenges.  Establishing the ulti-
mate parameters of the doctrine exceeds this treatment, but states
might find a broader forum to challenge other alleged federal excess
that threatens federalism values.  For example, if it could survive the
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gatekeeping inquiry and show unjustifiable harm to accountability val-
ues, a state might attempt to challenge an unreasonable unfunded
mandate.  In extreme cases, a state might even attempt to bring a
Tenth Amendment challenge to an unjustifiably preemptive applica-
tion of federal law in the gray area.  Federal actors are more likely to
defend against Tenth Amendment challenges than bring them, but
the standard would provide additional guidance for ex ante poli-
cymaking in anticipation of how a court might rule, as well as new
defenses in litigation.  For example, in extreme cases (as perhaps rep-
resented by Hurricane Katrina), the federal government might raise
problem-solving values in defense of an alleged check-and-balance vio-
lation.  As with all doctrinal transitions (including introduction of the
New Federalism anti-commandeering rule), the new possibilities
would probably lead to a bevy of federalism challenges in the short
term, after which the doctrinal parameters would become settled and
the volume of exploratory challenges would fall.679
Otherwise, a Balanced Federalism Tenth Amendment challenge
would be brought like any other.  A party with standing would claim
that a regulatory initiative should be invalidated on Tenth Amend-
ment grounds.  The reviewing court would apply the gatekeeping in-
quiry to establish, in essence, what level of scrutiny to apply:
something akin to rational basis review if within the regulator’s own
uncontroversial sphere, intermediate scrutiny under the balancing
test if within the interjurisdictional gray area, and perhaps strict scru-
tiny if crossover is to the uncontroversial sphere of the other sover-
eign.  If a challenge merits heightened scrutiny under the
jurisprudential standard, then the court tests the challenged regula-
tion against the fundamental federalism values, heeding the factors
articulated above, and weighs the results of its inquiry.
679. In the fourteen years following the introduction of the anti-commandeering rule in
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992), 73 cases were decided in all of the
federal courts of appeals (including the Supreme Court) in which New York was signifi-
cantly cited in reference to a Tenth Amendment claim.  During the first seven years after
the New York decision (1993–1999), 44 such cases were decided.  During the second seven-
year period (2000–2006), an additional 29 such cases were decided, a reduction of about
34% over the first seven-year period.  These figures are suggestive of the trend predicted in
the main text, but even more so when the full set of 73 is winnowed to select for the most
meritorious claims.  After eliminating the 26 cases in which the novel anti-commandeering
claim represented more of a “shot in the dark” or “kitchen-sink” argument than a persua-
sive application of the newly articulated doctrine, the remaining 47 cases span the
fourteen-year period relatively evenly: 26 were decided between 1993 and 1999, and 21
between 2000 and 2006.  (Research on file with author.)  This suggests that a passing surge
of cases attempted to capitalize on potential new claims available under the new doctrine,
leaving a smaller and steadier stream of more appropriate claims after the Court used this
first wave to clarify the parameters of the doctrine.
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For example, the municipalities that challenged the Phase II
Stormwater Rule in Environmental Defense Center could claim that the
Rule should be invalidated because it compels them in their sovereign
capacity to participate in the federal management of stormwater pol-
lution by regulating the conduct of their own citizens.680  (To make
this evaluation interesting, assume there is no alternative permitting
scheme to enable a locality to opt out of this requirement, in contrast
to the actual facts of the case.)  As discussed in Part IV, the manage-
ment of stormwater pollution is well within the interjurisdictional gray
area, so the reviewing court would apply the Tenth Amendment stan-
dard with intermediate scrutiny.
The court would then test the regulation against the factors iden-
tified in the standard.  It would consider the plaintiffs’ claim that the
Phase II Rule derogates from the check-and-balance value by enabling
the federal government to compel state regulatory activity in a realm
of traditional state authority.  The Rule might similarly erode account-
ability, in mixing and matching state and federal responsibility within
a single program of regulation.  However, its incorporation of a public
information campaign might alleviate accountability concerns by
helping voters understand the nature of the federal-municipal part-
nership.  Similarly, enabling a centrally imposed plan to bind munici-
palities threatens local autonomy, but the court would also consider
the ways in which the Rule advances localism values, by couching its
commands in terms that minimize federal preemption and maximize
local initiative in a realm in which both central coordination and local
expertise are crucial.  The court might accordingly note that the Rule
encourages diversity and competition between localities, and fosters
the proverbial laboratory of ideas from which individual localities and
the nation as a whole might ultimately benefit, as different municipali-
ties experiment with unique approaches to satisfying the broadly
stated federal requirements.  Finally, the court would consider
whether the Rule serves the problem-solving value.  In this case, the
problem-solving value makes a strong case for allowing the challenged
crossover, in that stormwater pollution is a collective action problem
that cannot be managed by either the federal or the local government
acting alone.  The problem is closely tied to the management of local
land uses that are the specialty of local government, and only local
actors would have the relevant expertise to create a stormwater man-
agement plan adapted for unique local characteristics.  Yet stormwater
pollution is a border-crossing prisoner’s dilemma of the sort that pro-
680. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
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vides strong incentives for individual localities to do nothing, even
though all would eventually suffer if nothing is done.  In this instance,
the force with which the Rule advances problem-solving and certain
localism values might outweigh its admitted costs to checks-and-
balances and certain accountability values.
On another familiar front, had the federal government taken
charge of the Katrina response effort without gubernatorial consent,
placing state and local first responders already on the ground within
the federal chain of command, this easily could have been challenged
afterward as outright commandeering.  It is hard to imagine a more
serious breach of the check-and-balance value—a President wresting
away command of a state’s own National Guard—but if it were suffi-
ciently constrained in time, then even this breach might have been
overcome in the balancing analysis.  Such federal crossover would
have been large in scope but short in time, and possibly warranted in
the Balanced Federalism calculus by the overwhelming need for an
efficient response that ultimately would have saved lives, honored the
express desires of the local government in New Orleans, and fore-
stalled at least some of the grave externalities that were spun off
throughout the rest of the nation.  By contrast, it is possible that a
reviewing court would have concluded that the kind of legislative com-
mandeering in New York could never be excused by offsetting prob-
lem-solving advantages, waiver and pretext notwithstanding.
E. The Time for Balance
In sum, the Balanced Federalism standard would correct the
strict-separationist fallacy of New Federalism while grappling with the
tensions that cooperative federalism glosses over.  It would provide an
inventory of federalism considerations to assist both ex ante poli-
cymaking and ex post adjudication, forging a middle path between
the critical but competing values that have thus far driven the federal-
ism debate to extremes on either side.681  Indeed, the Court often
turns to a balancing approach when evaluating tensions between or-
thogonal values, such as between protection of efficient interstate
commerce and conflicting but legitimate local exercise of the police
power, or between legitimate exercise of the police power and private
property rights.682  In such cases, the Court is left with no real alterna-
681. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 122 (1992) (“Ideological poles tend to attract rules.  Standards tend to dive for the
middle and split the difference between ideological poles.”).
682. For example, in adjudicating dormant commerce clause challenges, the Court con-
siders values relating to the state’s obligation to protect its citizens and values relating to
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tive other than the time-honored balancing test.  Rules that pretend
otherwise either drive judicial balancing into the unaccountable un-
derground or perpetuate (even irrationally) a particular balance es-
tablished by the judge who articulated the rule in the first place.683
In addition, jurisprudential standards that could lead to ineffi-
ciencies in isolated transactions have been recognized as well-suited to
adjudication between repeat players (here the state and federal gov-
ernments), because they “mimic a pattern of post hoc readjustments
that [the parties] would make if they were in an ongoing relationship
with each other.”684  The classic advantage of the bright-line rule in
enabling efficient bargaining between governed parties evaporates in
this context, given the Court’s admonition in New York that the state
may not bargain away a Tenth Amendment entitlement that essen-
tially belongs to its citizens.685  Even were the Court to correct this
nullification of Coasian bargaining in the gray area, irregular parties
like the state and federal governments cannot be expected to bargain
in the same fashion as individuals, rendering this usual bright-line
rule advantage dubious in this unusual context.  In the end, the flexi-
ble standard may foster the more helpful progression toward a healthy
balance of state and federal power.
Of course, this preliminary exploration of Balanced Federalism is
marked by important unanswered questions.  It does not settle the ab-
solute boundaries of the interjurisdictional gray area, it provides only
the outlines of a proposed jurisprudential standard, and its theory of
capacity remains in an early stage.  Further such work is needed, and
underway.  In addition, the proposal heralds all the usual disadvan-
tages associated with flexible standards in comparison to bright-line
rules—enhancing the discretion of judicial decisionmakers, limiting
certainty for regulated parties, promising mud instead of crystal.686
For example, precisely how to balance the competing inquiries would
be committed to judicial discretion, distressing those who distrust the
independent decisionmaking of individual judges.  On the other
hand, judges have long proved expert in exactly this sort of contextual
the nation’s interest in efficient interstate commerce.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 145 (1970).  Similarly, in adjudicating regulatory takings claims, the Court balances
values relating to the protection of public interests and to the owner’s private property
rights.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978).
683. See Joseph Singer, Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 278
(1983).
684. Rose, supra note 266, at 602–03. R
685. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
686. See Rose, supra note 266, at 578–79 (likening clear-cut rules of decision to crystals R
and ambiguous rules to mud).
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balancing in performing the causation analysis at the heart of the neg-
ligence standard, a foundational common law tradition that even crit-
ics of judicial discretion are happy to entrust to the judiciary.
Opponents of the uncertain Balanced Federalism approach might
long for the comparative simplicity of New Federalism’s bright line
rules—but a bright-line approach that fails to track the real world
targets of adjudication is of no jurisprudential value.  A rough-edged
balancing test that provides meaningful protections for federalism val-
ues and genuine guidance for decisionmakers is better than a crisp
rule that obstructs good government and forces difficult considera-
tions below the radar of accountability.687
Moreover, it is unlikely that Balanced Federalism would induce
balancing where there is none presently.  More likely, it would give
overt expression to the value-laden balancing process already covertly
in use by courts and policymakers when they reason their way through
the conflict between strict-separationist dual sovereignty and in-
terjurisdictional problem-solving.  Evidence of this values-based assess-
ment appears in the progression of the Environmental Defense Center
(Phase II Stormwater) decisions,688 the New Jersey court’s reasoning
in American Civil Liberties Union,689 and the court of public opinion
regarding the Katrina response.690  Perhaps even the apparent discon-
nect between Gonzales v. Raich691 and Gonzales v. Oregon692 can be ex-
plained this way.  Similarly, despite Justice Scalia’s strong appeal to
federalism in his Rapanos plurality opinion,693 Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence highlights the limitations of bright-line rules in his embrace
of the ad hoc, “case-by-case-basis” approach that is now the governing
687. For example, Professor Vicki Jackson argues that “the particular rule drawn by
Printz . . . is not well supported in constitutional history and is both underinclusive and
overinclusive toward legitimate goals of protecting state governments and promoting polit-
ical accountability.”  Jackson, supra note 23, at 2182.  Professor Jackson further argues that R
“[d]espite the conventional association of the rule of law with more categorical ap-
proaches, . . . a multifactored flexible standard is likely to provide more stability than the
categorical (but insufficiently supported) rule of Printz, and better accords with both rule
of law and federalism values.” Id. at 2183.
688. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
689. ACLU of N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 654–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (allowing preemption of state law requiring release of suspected terrorist de-
tainee names); see supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. R
690. See supra note 101. R
691. 545 U.S. 1 (2005); see id. at 9 (approving federal jurisdiction to prosecute in-state
cultivation of medical marijuana as legalized under California law).
692. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006); see id. at 925 (disapproving federal jurisdiction to prosecute
euthanasia as legalized under Oregon law).
693. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224–25 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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rule.694  If covert values-balancing is really informing these decisions,
far better to move that reasoning process to the surface, where it can
be scrutinized and developed according to the mechanisms of the
common law tradition.695  A well-defined judicial balancing test will
provide a rational means of inventorying the factors that judges
should consider, while providing guidance for state and federal policy-
makers to formulate and defend regulatory choices about crossover in
anticipation of the courts’ calculus in the interjurisdictional gray area.
VII. CONCLUSION: SEEKING CHECKS AND BALANCE IN FEDERALISM
The accelerating interdependence of modernity has revived the
great dilemma of constitutional federalism—that is, how to define the
boundaries of state and federal jurisdiction so as to preserve checks
and balances without eviscerating effective regulatory responses to in-
terjurisdictional problems.  The Tenth Amendment, representing the
most direct (if nondirective) constitutional statement about the bal-
ance of local and national power, has become a site of heated political
contest between those who respectively favor stronger and weaker
boundaries between local and national reach.  According to the for-
mer, the interlinking cooperative federalism model that drives many
of our most ambitious regulatory endeavors impermissibly threatens
the constitutionally intended balance;696 to the latter, the strict-
separationist New Federalism approach impossibly threatens meaning-
ful resolution of our most pressing societal problems.697  Still, the in-
694. Id. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
695. Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 30–31), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/so13.papers.cfm?abstract_id=912545 (highlighting the benefits of common
law decisionmaking in arguing for an enhanced role for state common law in environmen-
tal regulation).
696. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 399  (2005) (stating that the administration of federal
programs through the states obscures federal regulatory responsibility); Greve, supra note
631, at 576 (arguing that a system of cooperative federalism threatens central constitu- R
tional values); Hills, supra note 201, at 891–908 (decrying commandeering as inefficient, R
unjust in cost distribution, and violative of the First Amendment as forced speech).
697. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 222, at 623–24 (finding that environmental programs are R
best enforced with both state and federal cooperation); Schapiro, supra note 306, at 258 R
(finding that the dualist federalist approach advanced by the Supreme Court may limit
Congress’s ability to deal with various national problems, such as environmental protec-
tion); Weiser, supra note 30, at 1733–34 (noting that the dual federalism approach has not R
worked in the telecommunications context and in fact, “defied reality”); Weiser, supra note
222, at 665–66 (observing that the New Federalism rhetoric does not account for the prac- R
tical need for federal-state regulatory sharing); John D. Tortorella, Note, Reining in the
Tenth Amendment: Finding a Principled Limit to the Non-Commandeering Doctrine of United
States v. Printz, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1365, 1381 (1998) (stating that Printz’s non-
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tractability of interjurisdictional regulatory problems like Katrina,
national security maintenance, air and water pollution, and others all
highlight the need to develop a model of Balanced Federalism that
can more meaningfully contend with the interjurisdictional gray area.
The Court’s New Federalism jurisprudence points us toward a
strict-separationist model of federal-state relations that assumes a clear
line between areas of properly national and inviolate local concern,
policed by the Tenth Amendment.  A host of controversial preemp-
tion cases, doctrinally silent on federalism but for their vociferous dis-
sents, acts in tacit support of the project.  Yet this idealistic bright line
between mutually exclusive spheres of authority is illusory.  At the
margins, a gray area exists in which regulatory problems implicate
matters of both national and local obligation.  Decisionmaking that
imposes the bright-line rule in the interjurisdictional gray area is
doomed to arbitrariness, unable to navigate the tension there arising
between the competing federalism values of checks and balances, ac-
countability, localism, and problem-solving.  The latter value is espe-
cially weakened in the strict-separationist approach, promoting
inefficient regulatory response in the gray area.
Yet even if legitimate constitutional interpretation does not re-
quire the bright-line rule approach, neither does it warrant a whole-
sale abandonment of the check-and-balance value that the New
Federalism privileges.  The fact that federalism constraints enjoy no
natural constituency suggests that judicially enforceable constraints
may be necessary if we value federalism’s underlying principles,698 as
this piece argues we should.  A powerful case can be made for the
importance of the under-appreciated problem-solving value, but each
of the others continue to exert considerable normative force.699  Fed-
eralism itself remains content-neutral, designed to realize a set of com-
peting good government values that are suspended in a permanent
tug of war.
What is needed, simply, is balance.  The embrace of a Balanced
Federalism model of dual sovereignty that anticipates interjurisdic-
tional problems would facilitate interpretation of the Tenth Amend-
ment so that it can police the real boundary at issue: that between
commandeering rule will impede Congress’s ability to implement important policy
objectives).
698. See Devins, supra note 209, at 133 (discussing voter disregard for federalism issues), R
and accompanying text.
699. Indeed, those so satisfied with the New Deal expansion of federal legislative juris-
diction that anti-tyranny constraints now seem quaint might reflect on whether the expan-
sion of federal executive authority in the post-9/11 era alters this complacency.
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legitimate and unjustifiable regulation within the interjurisdictional
gray area.  It would facilitate interpretation of the other controversial
federalism inquiries that hinge on our conception of dual sovereignty,
such as the scope of the commerce power and the relationship be-
tween federal authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
In Balanced Federalism, the Tenth Amendment functions not as the
blunt bright-line rule into which it has been caricatured by the New
Federalism, but instead as the guardian of dual sovereignty by the
careful application of a jurisprudential standard made sensitive to the
clash of federalism values in the gray area.  Dual sovereignty under
Balanced Federalism may be less attractively simple than New Federal-
ism’s strict-separationist ideal, but it would be more honest, more
grounded in reality, and ultimately more useful.  A judicial balancing
test such as that proposed in Part VI would assist application of Bal-
anced Federalism Tenth Amendment constraints to the variety of
challenges that arise in the gray area, providing guidance for courts
and policymakers nationwide.
Much work is needed to bring this proposal to maturity. Still,
moving toward a more Balanced Federalism would progress the dis-
course at a critical time for both federalism and regulatory law.  At
stake is the ability of state and federal government to take on con-
founding interjurisdictional problems without compromising the im-
portant federalism values associated with structural checks and
balances, all while continuing to promote accountability and localized
diversity and innovation.  Moving from the bright-line approach to the
jurisprudential standard would maintain a healthy balance between
local and national power without catapulting any one federalism value
over all competing considerations.  And it would help make the differ-
ence between a faltering, ponderous response to interjurisdictional
crises like Katrina and the more confident, smoothly coordinated reg-
ulatory response of which we should be capable.
